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The application and role of the rules of evidence in practice
under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act' are related
issues which, upon a cursory analysis, are not defined with any
particular clarity in the Act and the cases decided thereunder. The
Act, in the first paragraph of section 422, makes specific provision
for the rules of evidence, but fails to provide clear-cut parameters
for application of those rules. In fact, section 422 suggests that the
rules may have no application whatsoever:
Neither the Board nor any of its members nor any referee shall be bound by
the common law or statutory rules of evidence in conducting any hearing or
investigation, but all findings of fact shall be based upon sufficient, compe-
tent evidence to justify same.
2
The appellate courts, similarly, produce declarations which,
though accurate, reflect the apparent uncertainty which surrounds
the parameters for application of the evidence rules. In the frus-
trated-and non-definitional-words of the commonwealth court,
"It is true that the compensation authorities are not bound to fol-
low the common law or statutory rules of evidence, but [section
422] has not been interpreted to mean that the rules of evidence
can be completely disregarded."'
Confusion concerning the purpose of limiting the application of
the evidence rules is also evident in the cases. For example, the
suggestion has been made by the courts, on more than one occa-
sion, that "relax[ation] of the rules of evidence," a principle re-
flected in section 422, was merely intended so that claimants could
proceed "without learned counsel."'4 Such a declaration is most as-
suredly wrong, because from the very enactment of the Pennsylva-
nia law in 1915 the role of attorneys in representing injured work-
ers was clearly contemplated.5 Furthermore, the implication that
one party to litigation does not have to abide by the rules of evi-
dence, while the other side must comply, was certainly never in-
1. Act of June 2, 1915, as amended, P L 746, 77 Pa Stat §§ 1-1065.1 (Purdon 1952 &
Supp 1990) [hereinafter referred to as the "Act"].
2. Id at § 834 (Purdon Supp 1990).
3. Sledge v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Temple Univ.), 78 Pa Commw
380, 382, 467 A2d 913, 915 (1983) (emphasis added).
4. City of Pittsburgh v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 12 Pa Commw 246,
249, 315 A2d 901, 903 (1974). See also, Frey v Lehigh Engineering Co., 202 Pa Super 596,
199 A2d 287 (1964).




tended,6 is unacceptable, and is in fact unconstitutional.7
A considered and patient analysis of the Act and the cases which
have construed it, does, however, reveal that there are discernible
parameters which govern application of the rules of evidence in
compensation practice. Those parameters are defined, in part, (1)
by the specific statutory provisions which are found in the Act and
in the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act, and (2) by the
precedents specifically addressing the applicability or non-applica-
bility of various evidence rules or principles in compensation cases.
Perhaps the most vital definitional principle, however, involves
the simple fact that compensation cases are heard before adminis-
trative fact-finders, rather than juries. Accordingly, to the extent
that the common law rules of evidence developed because of con-
cerns over how juries would perceive various types of evidence, the
common law rules of evidence will naturally have lesser impor-
tance.' Of course, that compensation cases are heard before spe-
cialized fact-finders, rather than juries, is the principal reason that
the rules of evidence are relaxed in the first place.0
The latter principle is one which is common to all aspects of
Pennsylvania administrative law.10 It is probably safe to say, how-
ever, that many rules applicable to administrative law do not nec-
essarily overlap with practice in workmen's compensation. There
are perhaps two reasons for this which are revealed in the cases.
The first is pragmatic and based upon historical considerations.
Workmen's compensation law was one of the first experiments
with administrative decision-making, and attorneys and judges
naturally looked to common law practice and precedents for guid-
ance in ruling upon workmen's compensation evidence questions."
6. See for example, text accompanying note 20.
7. See Rich Hill Coal Co. v Bashore, 334 Pa 449, 7 A2d 302 (1939). See also, notes
531 to 538 and accompanying text.
8. See Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review v Ceja, 493 Pa 588, 594, 427 A2d
631, 634 (1981).
9. Ceja, 427 A2d at 634. See also, notes 507 to 519 and accompanying text.
10. See for example, 2 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 554 (Purdon Supp Pamphlet 1990):
Local agencies shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence at agency hearings,
and all relevant evidence of reasonably probative value may be received. Reasonable
examination and cross-examination shall be permitted.
11. See for example, Poluski v Glen Alden Coal Co., 286 Pa 473, 476, 133 A 819, 820
(1926) (at common law unobjected to hearsay constitutes competent evidence, even in crimi-
nal cases; same rule applied in compensation case); Riley v Carnegie Steel Co., 276 Pa 82,
85, 119 A 832, 833 (1923) (workmen's compensation definition of res gestae statement based
upon common law cases). See also, Thompson v Conemaugh Iron Works, 114 Pa Super 247,




For example, while in Pennsylvania unemployment compensation
practice hearsay testimony alone (even that which is not objected
to) cannot support a decision, an early Pennsylvania Supreme
Court case resolving a workmen's compensation dispute applied
the common law rule that such evidence has the same effect as
competent direct evidence, and can indeed support findings of fact
and a decision. 2 This was so held before the unemployment law
was even enacted.
The second reason is likewise historical but based upon theoreti-
cal considerations. It is certainly safe, in this regard, to differenti-
ate workmen's compensation from other administrative proceed-
ings such as unemployment compensation and public utility law.
While unemployment compensation deals with legislatively created
rights"8 and utility law deals with regulation of an industry, 4 work-
men's compensation represents a system which was created to dis-
place the common law right to sue for personal injury.'"
Accordingly, while workmen's compensation hearings are indeed
"administrative proceedings," they nonetheless involve disputes
over well-established personal rights which were in the past liti-
gated in court and which hence received the various procedural
and evidentiary protections of a jury trial. Rather than dealing
with issues of government regulation or legislatively-created rights,
workmen's compensation proceedings address and decide matters
which were once decided at common law and which were only
eliminated by the constitutional amendment which permitted crea-
12. Poluski v Glen Alden Coal Co., 286 Pa 473, 477, 133 A 819, 820 (1926).
13. See 43 Pa Stat § 752 (Purdon 1964). See also, Bliley Elec. Co. v Unemployment
Compensation Bd. of Review, 158 Pa Super 548, 553, 45 A2d 898, 901 (1946) ("The statute
• . . created a body of rights and duties unknown to the common law.").
14. See 66 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 501(b) (Purdon 1979).
15. William A. Skinner, 1 Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Law 10-11 (Bisel,
1st ed 1924):
The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act was to afford .a workman a mea-
sure of protection against injuries and relief in case of accident, which were denied
under existing law; to substitute a method of accident insurance in place of common
law rights and liabilities for substantially all employes . ...
Its purpose was to afford an employe and his dependents prompt, expeditious and
intermediate relief in case of injury or death caused by an accident in the course of
employment, through proceedings, "not litigation," and to which the principles and
rules of common law practice are said not to apply.
Id (citations omitted).-
For an historical background of the genesis of workmen's compensation laws in general,
see D. DeCarlo & M. Minkowitz, Workers Compensation Insurance and Law Practice: The
Next Generation 1-6 (LRP Publication 1989).
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tion of the compensation act."6
The distinction has been noted by Professor Larson in his dis-
cussion of the law of evidence in his workmen's compensation trea-
tise.17 While Larson believes that the rules of evidence should be
relaxed, even suggesting that hearsay should be admissible,18 he
recognizes the qualitative distinction between compensation and
other forms of administrative law:
Compensation decisions ... have become leading administrative law prece-
dents, and, conversely, compensation law cannot expect to be unaffected by
decisions or legislative reforms bearing on administrative tribunals gener-
ally.
One caveat must, however, be issued: in the spectrum of administrative
agencies, ranging as they do from executive regulatory and rule-making
bodies to quasi-judicial tribunals deciding individual cases between particu-
lar private parties, the compensation commission[,] while deciding contro-
verted claims[,] is as far toward the judicial end of the spectrum as it is
possible to go without being an outright court. Accordingly, investigatory
procedures or rules of official notice that might be appropriate for a regula-
tory agency primarily concerned with implementing some public policy
while incidentally settling some dispute between particular parties may not
be entirely appropriate for a compensation board.1'
The implication of this aspect of proceedings was not lost upon
the early interpreters of the Pennsylvania Act. To the contrary, the
early administrators of the law immediately perceived and ac-
knowledged that important rights were at stake in compensation
proceedings and that, while the ancien regime of jury trials for
work-related injuries had been overthrown, the rules of evidence
were nevertheless to have application to protect those rights. The
seriousness with which these early interpreters approached the is-
sue is clear from the tone of the following early opinion of the first
chairman of the Workmen's Compensation Board (hereinafter
"Board"):
The administration of compensation laws must be marked by evenhanded
justice. The same rules of evidence and principles of law apply equally to
the injured, the dependents, and to the employer. The moment we depart
16. See Pa Const, Art III, § 18. See generally, William A. Skinner, Pennsylvania
Workmen's Compensation Law 4-10 (Bisel, 3d ed 1938).
17. A. Larson, 2B Workmen's Compensation §§ 79.10-79.90 (Matthew Bender 1988).
18. A. Larson, 2B Workmen's Compensation Law § 79.00 at 14-426.33 (cited in note
17) (hearsay rules, under the well-established principle that the compensation board is best
qualified by its expertness to judge the probative value of the testimony, could well be
deemed inapplicable in "judging the ability of evidence to ground an award").
19. Larson, 2 Workmen's Compensation § 79.90 at 15-69-15-70 (Matthew Bender,
Desk ed 1989) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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from this thought a compensation law ceases to be a great humanitarian
measure of untold value to the employe and a great economic advantage to
the employer, but becomes a socialistic propaganda that cannot survive in
an enlightened community."0
The appellate courts, further, have long acknowledged that dis-
puted compensation cases constitute "adversary proceedings,"2 as
opposed to mere fact-finding missions pursued in satisfaction of
some government mandate. In light of this acknowledged aspect of
workmen's compensation, the superior court held many years ago
that cross-examination was a crucial right of the parties in com-
pensation cases. Such examination is
a fundamental right, without which the prime essentials of a fair trial, ac-
cording to Anglo-American standards of justice are not preserved. The
Board [and referees], no less than the courts, must obey the indispensable
basic mandates of our jurisprudence.
2 2
It is thus correct to posit that evidence issues arising in work-
men's compensation are not necessarily to be decided by reference
to the law of evidence decided under general principles of adminis-
trative agency law. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect, in light of the
rights and liabilities at stake in compensation proceedings, that the
rules of evidence, which protected the rights of litigants at com-
mon law, should indeed apply-with liberality3 and flexibil-
ity 24 -so as to protect the rights of the parties at compensation
hearings. And, in fact, such an expectation is usually fulfilled in
most well-run compensation hearings convened in Pennsylvania.
Apart from setting forth this initial thesis, the present article
has two objectives. The first portion of this article 2 is devoted to
exploring the parameters of the application of the evidence rules
under the Pennsylvania Act. In the process, the author has at-
tempted to set forth, as near as is possible, the "black letter" rules
of evidence as applied in compensation proceedings. Along the
way, issues which are perceived as unsettled are addressed. Two
areas have intentionally been addressed in brief, namely the sub-
jects of expert testimony 6 and the burden of proof,21 both of which
20. Dodson v Hailer, 1 WCB 149, 151 (1916).
21. See for example, City of Pittsburgh v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 12
Pa Commw 246, 248, 315 A2d 901, 903 (1974).
22. Cowan v Bunting Glider Co., 159 Pa Super 573, 576, 49 A2d 270, 271 (1946).
23. Giordano v Ralph J. Bianco, Inc., 204 Pa Super 219, 223-24, 203 A2d 396, 398
(1967).
24. Cody v S.K.F. Indus., 447 Pa 558, 568, 291 A2d 772, 777 (1972).
25. See notes 34 to 467 and accompanying text.
26. See notes 436 to 467 and accompanying text.
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could easily support short treatises of their own, so prolific have
the Pennsylvania appellate courts been.
The second portion of this article28 examines various theoretical
considerations which better define the parameters of the applica-
tion of the evidence rules. Among these considerations is the prin-
ciple of "liberal application" which is applied to the evidence rules
in compensation practice.2 9 In addition, this article examines the
requirement that the evidence rules be evenly applied to both em-
ployer and employee, an equal protection proposition which should
be taken for granted but which is sometimes absent from compen-
sation practice and procedure." The second part of this article also
examines the practical approach taken by the commonwealth court
in analyzing evidence questions arising in workmen's compensation
hearings.3 1 A recent approach, which apparently consists only of
determining whether the "fundamental rights" of the parties have
been violated, is criticized.3 2 Finally, this article makes suggestions
with respect to guidelines for applying the evidence rules in com-
pensation cases.
33
In the course of this article several theses are set forth and advo-
cated. Perhaps the pervasive thesis of this article is, however, that
there is indeed a coherent law of evidence under the Pennsylvania
Workmen's Compensation Act.
II. SOURCES FOR THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
While section 422 of the Act does provide that neither the Ap-
peal Board nor any referee is to be bound "by the common law or
statutory rules of evidence, '34 in practice such rules are routinely
applied.3 5 The evidentiary rules themselves come from a variety of
sources, including the compensation statute itself, the referee's
rules, general Pennsylvania statutory evidence law, and the deci-
sional law.
27. See notes 499 to 506 and accompanying text.
28. See notes 468 to 568 and accompanying text.
29. See notes 522 and 523 and accompanying text.
30. See notes 530 to 551 and accompanying text..
31. See notes 552 to 568 and accompanying text.
32. See notes 564 to 568 and accompanying text.
33. See notes 569 to 573 and accompanying text.
34. 77 Pa Stat § 834 (Purdon Supp 1990).
35. See for example, Sledge v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Temple Univ.),
78 Pa Commw 380, 467 A2d 913 (1983) (referee did not commit error by sustaining em-




In theory, the Department of Labor and Industry and the Bu-
reau of Worker's Compensation have the power to create eviden-
tiary standards pursuant to the powers invested in them by the
Act. The last paragraph of section 422 provides as follows:
The department may adopt rules and regulations governing the conduct of
all hearings held pursuant to any provisions of this act, and hearings shall
be conducted in accordance therewith, and in such manner as best to ascer-
tain the substantial rights of the parties."
The Bureau. has never undertaken such a task, which is under-
standable and appropriate in light of the sage maxim that the rules
of evidence are to be applied in a relaxed3 7 and "flexible ' 38
manner.
Pursuant to this authority, the Bureau has enacted Referee's
Rules which have the force of regulations.3 9 These rules, some of
which are discussed in passing below,' include some provisions
which approach rules of evidence. However, most are really proce-
dural provisions. It is certainly true, in any event, that the newly
revised Referee's Rules represent a serious attempt at regulating
the manner in which evidence is submitted.
The following-sections of this article examine the various sources
which can be said to be precise sources of evidence law in work-
men's compensation practice. Of course, in light of the pervasive
admonition that the rules are to be applied in a relaxed and liberal
manner, consideration of whether the specific source will have ap-
plication should usually be considered in the context of the partic-
ular situation at hand. An exception to this rule of thumb-which
should be announced at the outset-exists when a specific section
of the Act announces a clear-cut rule of evidence. In such situa-
tions, the commonwealth court has indicated that it will strictly
construe any such provision and will not entertain an argument
that, because the Act should be liberally construed, the evidence
36. 77 Pa Stat § 836 (Purdon Supp 1990).
37. See A.F. Barbieri, Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation § 6.21 at 75 (Bisel
1974).
38. Cody v S.K.F. Indus., 447 Pa 558, 568, 291 A2d 772, 777 (1972)..
39. See 34 Pa Code §§ 131.1-131.122. The cited rules were amended recently and took
effect on March 30, 1991. See 21 Pa Bulletin, No. 13, Part II (March 30, 1991). Knowledge
of these provisions is crucial to practice before referees in Pennsylvania workmen's compen-
sation practice. Some of the new rules are discussed in this article where appropriate. Be-
cause of the essentially procedural nature of the Referee's Rules, however, they are not
covered to a great extent in this article.
40. See notes 43 and 44 and accompanying text.
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rule should be ignored.'
A. Evidentiary Rulings and Appellate Review of Evidentiary
Matters
As a preliminary matter, it is to be recognized that, in almost
every situation, it is the workmen's compensation referee who will
be making rulings on all evidentiary matters. When testimony is
being presented at hearings, objections based upon the rules of evi-
dence are considered and then ruled upon by the referee.42 Fur-
ther, under the new Referee's Rules, objections made at deposi-
tions upon which the objecting party desires a ruling must be
presented to the referee in writing prior to the closing of the rec-
ord.' Failure to specify the objection will result in a waiver."4
It is the referee who has the power to rule on evidentiary mat-
ters in light of his or her status as the presiding officer in work-
men's compensation proceedings.45 In terms of ruling on evidence,
the workmen's compensation referee has consistently been referred
to as "act[ing] in a capacity similar to that of a trial judge in a civil
case in passing on the admissibility of evidence . ".. 46
Further, it is conceivable that the Appeal Board may on occasion
make evidence rulings of its own. This would, however, be an ex-
tremely rare case, in light of the fact that the referee is also the
fact-finder 47 and "arbiter of credibility,' who is responsible for
receiving the evidence and rendering a judgment with regard to
what weight to ascribe to it."9 Indeed, the Board is permitted to
take evidence only when it determines that the referee's findings of
fact are not based upon competent evidence.5 0 On appeal, both the
41. See Young v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 39 Pa Commw 265, 395 A2d
317 (1978). See also, notes 483-84 and accompanying text.
42. See generally, 34 Pa Code § 131.54(a).
43. 34 Pa Code § 131.66(b). See also, notes 54 to 57 and accompanying text (regarding
waiver in general).
44. 34 Pa Code § 131.66(b).
45. Section 401.1 of the Act, 77 Pa Stat § 710 (Purdon Supp 1990).
46. Commonwealth v Strickland, 30 Pa Commw 463, 466, 373 A2d 1188, 1190 (1977).
See also, Kope v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 98 Pa Commw 341, 344, 510 A2d
1294, 1296 (1986).
47. American Refrigerator Equip. Co. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 31 Pa
Commw 590, 595, 377 A2d 1007, 1010 (1977).
48. American Refrigerator, 377 A2d at 1010.
49. See Stewart v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 62 Pa Commw 351, 354, 436
A2d 1043, 1045 (1981).
50. See Allegheny Ludlum Indus. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
(Macurdy), 71 Pa Commw 74, 76, 455 A2d 213, 214 (1983) ("'Where the referee's findings
Vol. 29:447
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Appeal Board and appellate courts can, of course, review the legal
propriety of a referee's ruling on an evidence issue. Plainly, if the
Board or court determines that a prejudicial error of law has been
committed by the referee, these entities are empowered to reverse
and/or remand the case.51 Not surprisingly, of course, a referee's
are supported by competent evidence, the Board cannot take additional evidence and sub-
stitute its own findings of fact for those of the referee.' ") (quoting McGartland v Ampco-
Pittsburgh Corp., 489 Pa 205, 207, 413 A2d 1086, 1087 (1980)).
The rule that the referee is the ultimate fact-finder stems from the 1972 amendments to
the Pennsylvania Act. As part of those amendments, section 423, which provides for the
scope of review of the Appeal Board, was modified. See 77 Pa Stat § 854 (Purdon 1952 &
Supp 1990). Prior to the amendment, the cited section provided that the Board could disre-
gard the referee's factual findings, "and if it deem proper may hear other evidence." Id
(Purdon 1952). The 1972 amendment, however, eliminated this language and indicated that
the Board was only to "disregard the findings of fact of the referee if not supported by
competent evidence and if it deems proper may hear other evidence ... 77 Pa Stat § 854
(Purdon Supp 1990).
This change was promptly held to indicate that credibility judgments were beyond the
scope of review of the Board. The landmark decision in this regard is Universal Cyclops
Steel Corp. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 9 Pa Commw 176, 305 A2d 757 (1973).
Subsequent decisions, such as those cited above, then held that the Board could only choose
to take more evidence after a threshold decision is made that the referee had relied upon
incompetent testimony. See also generally, Page's Dept. Store v Velardi, 464 Pa 276, 282-83,
346 A2d 556, 559 (1975).
51. See Weingrad v Bybery State Hosp., 26 Pa Commw 410, 363 A2d 833, 838-39
(1976); City of Pittsburgh v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 12 Pa Commw 246, 249,
315 A2d 901, 903 (1974). The commonwealth court and the Appeal Board both review the
referee's decision to ascertain whether all findings are supported by substantial competent
evidence, whether an error of law has been committed or whether constitutional rights have
been violated. Hammer v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Gannondale), 105 Pa
Commw 356, 360, 524 A2d 550, 552 (1987). See also, Estate of McGowan v State Employees'
Retirement Bd., 512 Pa 377, 517 A2d 523 (1986). But see, Fiore v Commonwealth, __ Pa
-, 585 A2d 994 (1991). In the new case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court seems to have
expanded the applicable scope of review beyond that traditionally described in the cases, at
least in terms of how "substantial evidence" is conceived:
Our scope of review of an administrative agency determination is limited to decid-
ing whether it is supported by substantial evidence on the whole record .... Sub-
stantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade-
quate to support a conclusion. . . .Reviewing the whole record includes reviewing
evidence which both supports and detracts from the agency decision. Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951). Once the court has determined
that there is a "reasonable probability" of the fact found by the administrative
agency it becomes "functus officio."
Fiore, 585 A2d at 996, n.2 (citing, among other things, Louis Jaffe, Judicial Review: Ques-
tion of Fact, 69 Harv L Rev 1020 (1956)) (emphasis added).
How the Appeal Board and commonwealth court review referee decisions to ascertain
whether the pivotal findings are supported by substantial evidence is an issue beyond the
scope of the present article. It has been and is, however, a matter debated in both litigation
and in the literature. See for example, Stephen I. Richman, Struggle for Reason and Ac-
countability: Current Concepts of Causation, Aggravation and Substantial Evidence in Oc-
cupational Disease Claims, 90 Dickinson L Rev 363 (1986). The most recent commonwealth
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harmless error regarding the application of the rules of evidence
will not support a reversal.52 Similarly, if the referee admits evi-
dence erroneously, relying upon an inapplicable rule, no reversal
will result if the evidence was in fact admissible pursuant to an-
other theory not relied upon by the referee.
53
Further, the courts, applying familiar tenets of appellate proce-
dure have held that alleged error with regard to application of an
evidentiary rule which the party does not raise before the referee
will be considered by the appellate courts to be waived on appeal.84
One of the early treatise-writers on the Pennsylvania Act noted
this harsh rule of strict issue preservation, 5 realizing that it was
seemingly at odds with the otherwise liberal approach taken to-
wards the rules of evidence in compensation practice, and he was
and is probably correct. The traditional approach reflects, however,
that much less liberty in terms of presentation of the claimant's
case is given to the claimant once the record is closed and the refe-
ree issues his ruling.56 There is certainly no indication that the
commonwealth court will retreat from its position of strict issue
preservation regarding the raising of a rule of evidence, although it
is conceivable that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court might rule
court cases, decided in mid-1990, may have been displaced, sub silentio, by the supreme
court's latest declaration, quoted above. See Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v Workmen's Compen-
sation Appeal Bd. (Skirpan), 132 Pa Commw 277, 572 A2d 838 (1990); Strube v Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd. (Consolidation Coal Co.), 132 Pa Commw 277, 572 A2d 838
(1990).
52. See Hill v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 59 Pa Commw 219, 225-26, 429
A2d 771, 774 (1981) (even if referee committed error in relying upon report, referee's deci-
sion would be sustained where findings, were supported by other substantial, competent evi-
dence); Stankowski v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 29 Pa Commw 433, 436, 371
A2d 542, 543 (1977) (where referee curtailed claimant's presentation of case, and did not
allow claimant's physician to testify, no prejudicial 'error was committed; referee had de-
cided to dismiss claimant's petition as a matter of law based on his own testimony). See
also, Miller v Pittsburgh.Coal Co., 129 Pa Super 1, 195 A 151 (1938) (opinion evidence in
hospital record should have been excluded as impermissible hearsay, but this "did the
claimant no harm," since physician testified later in case).
53. Widdis v Collingdale Millwork Co., 169 Pa Super 612, 615, 84 A2d 259, 260 (1951).
54. See for example, Yellow Freight System v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.,
32 Pa Commw 147, 150-51, 377 A2d 1304, 1306 (1977).
55. William A. Skinner, Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Law 709-10 (Bisel,
3d ed 1938).
56. By statute, for example, claimant must appeal the referee's decision within twenty
days or the right expires. The period runs strictly and is "jurisdictional" in nature, and the
fact that claimant is unrepresented and/or ignorant of the law is no excuse. See section 427
of the Act, 77 Pa Stat § 853 (Purdon Supp 1990). See also, David B. Torrey, Time Limita-
tions in the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation and Occupational Disease Acts: The-




B. Specific Evidentiary Provisions Within the Act
The most clear-cut evidence rules considered by referees- in com-
pensation practice are those found in specific provisions of the Act.
These provisions deal with a variety of evidentiary issues.
Some, for example, specifically assign one of the parties the bur-
den of proof on a particular issue, and may assign the standard of
proof which is applicable. This is not an unusual aspect of Penn-
sylvania administrative law."8 Some establish presumptions, rebut-
table and otherwise, while others specifically authorize affidavits,
reports and other documents as competent evidence. A series of
provisions address how referees are to administer evidence. As set
forth below, these and numerous other evidentiary questions are
specifically addressed in the statute.
1. Administration of the Law of Evidence
Precisely how referees are to administer evidence is dealt with
specifically in various sections of the Act. Section 416 of the Act,"9
for example, provides first that an answer to a claim or other peti-
tion is to be filed within fifteen days, and that "[e]very fact alleged
in a claim petition not specifically denied by an answer . . . shall
be deemed to be admitted . The statute further indicates,
however, that the referee, in fact, has significant power to demand
that allegations made in petitions other than claim petitions61 be
proved, notwithstanding the failure of the parties to file timely an-
swers: "But the failure of any party or of all of them to deny a fact
alleged in any other petition shall not preclude the referee before
whom the petition is heard from requiring, of his own motion,
57. For example, for many years the superior court and commonwealth court applied
the common-law generated rule regarding after-discovered evidence as the standard for a
claimant to seek a rehearing before the Board. The supreme court, however, overthrew that
long-standing rule and held that a rehearing was to be granted whenever the interests of
justice so demand. See Cudo v Hallstead Foundry, Inc., 517 Pa 553, 557, 539 A2d 792, 794
(1988).
58. L. Packel & A.B. Poulin, Pennsylvania Evidence § 301.1 at 47 (West 1988).
59. 77 Pa Stat § 821 (Purdon Supp 1990).
60. Id. This is an example of the Act specifically establishing an evidentiary admis-
sion. See also, notes 363 to 368 and accompanying text.
61. 77 Pa Stat § 821. As discussed in a subsequent portion of this article, there exists a
grave question as to whether this aspect of section 416 is constitutional, since it applies one
evidentiary rule for employers and another for claimants. To be constitutional, an evidence
rule must be evenly applied. See also, notes 530 to 544 and accompanying text.
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proof of such fact."62 The referee in this regard exercises greater
authority than would normally be the case in civil actions, where
failures to file answers or enter denials would usually result in de-
fault judgments or the granting of a motion for summary judg-
ment.e" A trial judge would not demand that allegations be proven
with evidence prior to entry of judgment.
Just as the referee has this authority, however, he can most
likely dispense with the need for evidence to be presented in dis-
posing of certain cases. The last sentence of section 416 provides
that, "[i]f a party fails to file an answer and/or fails to appear in
person or by counsel at the hearing without adequate excuse, the
referee hearing the petition shall decide the matter on the basis of
the petition and evidence presented."64
Note that the statute states that failure to contest a case can
result in disposing of it on the "basis of the petition and evidence
presented . ".8.."I' Thus one may argue that the employer, for ex-
ample, cannot merely "rest on its pleadings" when it seeks suspen-
sion or termination, but must always submit some evidence, even if
unobjected-to hearsay, to secure the relief sought. The better anal-
ysis is, however, that the referee has the power to consider as ad-
mitted the allegations of a totally-ignored petition, and, therefore,
that no evidence need necessarily be submitted. Such power would
ideally be exercised in the not uncommon situation where a claim-
ant who is on suspension or who is receiving partial disability dis-
appears from the scene or otherwise resigns and becomes incom-
municado.6 In practice, most referees probably undertake this or a
62. 77 Pa Stat § 821.
63. See for example, Pa R Civ Pro 1037(b).
64. 77 Pa Stat § 821.
65. Id (emphasis added).
66. See for example, Dobson v Eat 'n Park Restaurants, Inc., Suspension Petition No
178-50-6210 (filed Oct 29, 1990). In that case, claimant had returned to work at partial
disability, but then abruptly resigned from any employment in Pennsylvania, advising the
employer that he was moving to Nevada to take up employment at wages that vastly ex-
ceeded his time-of-injury average weekly wage. He refused to sign an agreement to suspend
his compensation and, as a result, a suspension petition was filed. An affidavit or live testi-
mony based upon personal knowledge was not available as claimant had disappeared and
refused to communicate.
Claimant neither filed an answer, had counsel appear for him, nor responded to solicita-
tions from the referee to defend the case. As a result, the referee suspended compensation,
finding as fact the allegations of the employer's petition and holding as follows:
As claimant failed to file an answer and failed to appear in person at hearings and
failed to respond to additional inquiries with regard to his employment status, your
Referee concludes as a matter of law that he is enabled, under the provisions of the
Act, to decide the matter on the basis of the petition presented. Section 416 of the
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similar approach when it seems apparent that the involved party
received notice of the hearing and of the allegations of the petition,
yet still totally ignored the proceedings. 7 Of course, when hearsay
evidence is presented and the adverse party or counsel does not
appear, without adequate excuse, such evidence is competent and
admissible and can form the basis for a referee's decision.
8
Section 420 of the Act6 also affects the manner in which evi-
dence may be adduced in broadly empowering the referee to
"make or cause to be made an investigation of the facts set forth in
the petition or answer or facts pertinent in any injury under this
act." The same section imparts power to the referee to "appoint
one or more impartial physicians or surgeons to examine the inju-
ries of the plaintiff and report thereon .... " The report gener-
ated "shall be filed with the. . . referee. .. , and shall be a part of
the record ... .7o
With these provisions, the referee is actually invested with the
authority to offer into the record evidence he or she has secured,
on his own motion.7 1 That authority is not often exercised, since
the parties in contemporary compensation proceedings are usually
represented by counsel, and investigations by a referee would usu-
ally be duplicative of their efforts. Further, the workload of con-
temporary referees is such that undertaking personal investigations
is not usually practical or efficient.
The power is often exercised when, for example, the referee per-
ceives that relevant, available information required for resolution
Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 77, § 821 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
Dobson, Suspension Petition No 178-50-6210 at 3.
67. Most referees undertake the prudent and considerate practice of ensuring that the
parties had notice of the petition and hearing or did not have "adequate excuse" before
"decid[ing] the matter on the basis of the petition and evidence presented." Often, referees
will give the parties, especially claimants, every benefit of the doubt and schedule a second
hearing, seeking also personal contact with the parties to investigate whether the petition is
in fact being contested. This practice, which is certainly reasonable, is undertaken even
though the statute admonishes that the referee "shall decide the matter on the basis of the
petition and evidence presented," making no mention of "second-chance" hearings. The fact
that the language of this phrase is mandatory has been pointed out by the commonwealth
court. See Yellow Freight System v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 56 Pa Commw
1, 7, n.8, 423 A2d 1125, 1120, n.8 (1981).
68. Nobles v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 49 Pa Commw 255, 258, 410 A2d
971, 972 (1980).
69. 77 Pa Stat § 831 (Purdon Supp 1990).
70. Id. See also, section 437 of the Act, 77 Pa Stat § 994 (Purdon Supp 1990) (parallel
provision).
71. Compare S. Seigel & I. Stander, Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Practice
and Procedure 131 (PBI 1990).
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of an issue is most likely in the control of one particular party, but
the adversary fails to request the production of such evidence.72 In
such instances, it is not uncommon for some referees to order the
party holding the evidence to produce it and offer it into evidence.
And, of course, it is this provision which empowers the referee to
cross-examine witnesses,73 including medical witnesses,74 called on
his own, or by the parties. This provision is also authority for the
referee to undertake a personal view of a worksite or injury scene,75
although fact-finders in general possess such power anyway under
American law.7
Importantly, the cases have held that evidence secured directly
by, or on order of, a referee is still subject to evidentiary objections
and cross-examination by the parties.77
Section 418 of the Act 78 invests the referee with the power to
issue subpoenas, as does section 436. 71 The latter proviso specifi-
cally indicates that an individual's refusal to obey a subpoena may
result in punishment "as for contempt of court," and provides that
enforcement in this regard is handled by "an application . . . to
any court of common pleas within whose territorial jurisdiction the
offense was committed, for which purpose such court is hereby
72. For example, a referee may order the employer to produce post-injury wage data
so that the claimant's potential partial disability entitlement can be calculated. This power
is also invested in referees under section 418 of the Act, 77 Pa Stat § 833 (Purdon Supp
1990), which provides, in pertinent part, that the "referee ... may . . . order the produc-
tion of books and other writings . Id.
73. See American Can Co. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 37 Pa Commw
169, 171-72, 389 A2d 263, 264 (1978) (" 'referee is entitled, and indeed bound, to attempt to
bring out the truth ... '") (quoting Fonte v Koppers Co., 25 Pa Commw 349, 360 A2d 836
(1976)).
74. See Zimmerman v Jack & Jim Maser, Inc., 57 Lanc Rev 105 (Common Pleas
1960).
75. See for example, Yantos v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Vulcan Mold &
Iron Co.), 128 Pa Commw 231, 563 A2d 232 (1989); Cooper v Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Bd., 49 Pa Commw 488, 411 A2d 859 (1980); Cowan v Bunting Gilder Co., 159 Pa
Super 573, 49 A2d 270 (1946). A referee may also view a videotape of the work site to
determine such things as the type of work the claimant performed. Smith v Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd. (Donegal Indus.), 131 Pa Commw 240, 569 A2d 1049 (1990).
Such evidence need not formally be offered into the record, because "review of [such] video-
tape was no different than the referee seeing the job site himself..." Smith, 569 A2d at
1050. The court, in this regard, held that "[sluch a review is . . . not includable in the
record because it is not evidence fixed in a tangible medium." Id.
76. Packel & Poulin, Evidence § 416.5 at 243-46 (cited in note 58).
77. Skinner, Pennsylvania Workmen's at 206-07 (cited in note 15). See for example,
Capuzzimati v Phila. & Reading C.&I. Co., 20 Schuylkill Leg Rec 97, 99 (Common Pleas
1923).
78. 77 Pa Stat § 831.
79. Id § 992.
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given jurisdiction."8
Subpoenas in compensation practice are secured directly from
the referee hearing the involved case. The manner of service and
objecting to subpoenas is provided for in the Referee's Rules.81 Al-
though not provided for in the Act or rules, it seems certain that
the party that requested the subpoena can, as under civil prac-
tice,82 excuse non-compliance.
2. Burdens of Proof and Presumptions
The general rule governing assignment of the burden of proof in
workmen's compensation- practice is the same as in civil practice.
As set forth by Judge Barbieri in his treatise, "the burden of proof
in any proceeding ordinarily will be on the petitioner, or the one
who seeks to change the status quo. "83 Skinner, the early treatise-
writer, cited the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for the similar pro-
position that "[t]he burden of proof of a particular allegation rests
upon the side to whose case it is necessary."
84
While the analysis of which party has the burden of proof in a
particular instance will often be self-evident, a number of provi-
sions exist in the Act which specifically assign the burden of proof
to a particular party. Section 201 of the Act,85 for example, abol-
ishes most defenses which can be raised by an employer being sued
by an employee in a personal injury trespass case.86 The same pro-
vision, however, states that the employer may raise as a defense
that there was contributory fault, if "it be established that the in-
jury was caused by such employe's intoxication or by his reckless
indifference to danger. The burden of proving such intoxication or
reckless indifference to danger shall be upon the defendant
,,87
Section 301(a) of the Act 8 is similar, but relates to actual com-
80. Id.
81. 34 Pa Code § 131.51.
82. Pa RCP 234.4(a) (Purdon Supp 1990).
83. Barbieri, Workmen's Compensation §6.21(3) at 76 (cited in note 37).
84. Skinner, Pennsylvania Workmen's at 770 (cited in note 16) (citing Keyes v N. Y.O.
& W.R. Ry. Co., 265 Pa 105, 108 A 406 (1919)).
85. 77 Pa Stat § 41.
86. See Martin v Recker, 380 Pa Super 527, 533, 552 A2d 668, 671 (1988); Fink v
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 37 Pa Commw 67, 70, 388 A2d 1152, 1153 (1978).
But see, Cool v Curtis-Wright, 362 Pa 60, 66, 66 A2d 287, 290 (1949) (dicta); Macke Vend-
ing Co. v Abrams, 27 Pa Conmw 490, 494, n.1, 365 A2d 451, 453, n.1 (1976).
87. Macke, 365 A2d at 453 n.1.
88. 77 Pa Stat § 431.
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pensation proceedings. In a compensation case, of course, the al-
leged negligence or contributory fault of the employee is irrelevant,
except where the injury is "intentionally self-inflicted, or is caused
by the employee's violation of law . . . ." In such instances, "the
burden of proof of such fact shall be upon the employer . ".. ,,89
"Violations of law" under this provision have traditionally been
limited to felonies and misdemeanors, 0 although the common-
wealth court has now indicated that even summary offenses may
constitute a violation of law sufficient to defeat an award of com-
pensation.91 The cases have consistently held, in any event, that
the burden on the employer in such cases is to establish by "a clear
preponderance of the evidence" that the worker's injury resulted
from the involved violation of law.2 While more than a mere pre-
ponderance of the evidence is thus required, "it is not necessary to
prove the violation beyond a reasonable doubt."9
More contemporary decisions agree, and use the phrase "clear
and convincing" when referring to the evidence which the em-
ployer must produce." Describing this standard, the common-
wealth court has recently stated that "it must be found [that] the
witnesses are credible, that they distinctly remember the facts to
which they testify, that they narrate the details exactly, and that
their statements are true. '95 Just as in a criminal case, however, a
claimant's violation of law can be demonstrated by circumstantial
evidence alone.9 6 Whether established by direct or circumstantial
evidence, the commonwealth court on appeal will examine the en-
tire record to determine whether the evidence presented by the
employer was sufficient.
9 7
According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, imposition of the
89. Id.
90. Corey v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (General Elec. Co.), 72 Pa
Commw 10, 13, 455 A2d 774, 775 (1983).
91. Burger King v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Boyd), 134 Pa Commw
547, 579 A2d 1013, 1016 (1990).
92. Bogavich v Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 162 Pa Super 388, 392, 57 A2d 598,
599 (1948).
93. Skiba v Nick Calvitti Coal Co., 153 Pa Super 628, 630-31, 34 A2d 921, 922 (1943).
94. Ogden v Carolina Freight Carriers, 127 Pa Commw 286, 291, 561 A2d 837, 840
(1989).
95. Ogden, 561 A2d at 840.
96. Bogavich, 57 A2d at 600; Skiba, 34 A2d at 922. Compare Wagner v Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd. (Rogers Curtis Mathes), - Pa Commw - , 575 A2d 168
(1990).
97. Lomax v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Mitchell), 121 Pa Commw 371,
375, 550 A2d 866, 868 (1988).
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burden of proof upon the employer to demonstrate that a worker's
death was self-inflicted "is simply a recognition of the legal 'pre-
sumption' against suicide."' 8 The employer's burden in such cases
is to "rebut the presumption against suicide" with "a preponder-
ance of the evidence that death was intentionally self-inflicted." 99
Arguments that the burden of proof to overcome the presumption
is higher have been raised and rejected by the courts.100 As is the
case in violation-of-law cases, the presumption against suicide can
be overcome with circumstantial evidence. 101
The Act also establishes numerous presumptions which are com-
monly encountered in the course of the proceedings. These devices,
which "are not evidence, but are legal rules governing the proce-
dural effect to be given certain evidence,'1 0 2 have a rather notori-
ous history in terms of the Pennsylvania Act. Indeed, one such rule
was struck down as unconstitutional in the landmark case of Rich
Hill Coal Co. v Bcshore,10 a case discussed later in this article 10 4
Others, however, have survived and prospered. Section 301(e) of
the Act 0 5 is certainly the most commonly applied statutory pre-
sumption in the context of disease cases. It provides that,
If it be shown that the employe, at or immediately before the date of disa-
bility, was employed in any occupation or industry in which the occupa-
tional disease is a hazard, it shall be presumed that the employe's occupa-
tional disease arose out of and in the course of his employment, but this
presumption shall not be conclusive. 06
Numerous appellate cases have discussed the manner in which
the presumption operates. As a preliminary matter, the claimant
must in all cases first demonstrate that he or she in fact suffers
98. Garcia v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Bethlehem Steel Corp.), 503 Pa
342, 346, 469 A2d 585, 587 (1983), afl'g, 65 Pa Commw 59, 441 A2d 518 (1982).
99. See Garcia v Workmen's Compensation Bd. (Bethelem Steel Corp.), 65 Pa
Commw 59, 441 A2d 518 (1982).
100. Garcia, 441 A2d at 519.
101. Garcia, 469 A2d at 587. Most disputes regarding suicide do not, in fact, concern
whether or not the act itself occurred, but whether the death was truly "self- inflicted." The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has, in this regard, adapted the "chain-of-causation" test. See
Globe Security Systems Co. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 518 Pa 544, 544 A2d
953 (1988) (test allows compensation "if the injury causes a deranged mental condition
which, in turn, causes the suicide"). For an illustration of how the burden of proof shifts in
this regard, see Widdis v Collingdale Millwork Co., 169 Pa Super 612, 84 A2d 259 (1951).
102. Packel & Poulin, Evidence § 306 at 81 (cited in note 58) (citing Waters v New
Amsterdam Casualty Co., 393 Pa 247, 144 A2d 354 (1958)).
103. 334 Pa 449, 7 A2d 302 (1938).
104. See notes 531 to 538 and accompanying text.




from an occupational disease. 10 7 The presumption will not apply
without this threshold showing. 08 If the threshold burden is met,
the presumption will then apply upon production of evidence that
the claimant labored in an industry or specific worksite where
there was an occupational disease hazard. 1 9 If this is accom-
plished, the claimant is relieved "of the burden of showing the
causal relationship between exposure to a hazard and the resulting
disability."110
The cases have interpreted this provision to indicate that the
presumption can be rebutted, 1 ' and that the employer's burden in
this regard is to rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the
evidence.' 1
Importantly, the issue of whether a particular industry or work-
site possesses an occupational disease hazard can be established by
the claimant's testimony alone. This is implied in the older
cases, '" 3 and has recently been expressly held by the common-
wealth court." 4 Still, the presence of a disease hazard may be the
subject of expert testimony,"' and prudent counsel will employ
such evidence when experience indicates that the referee may not
be persuaded by the claimant's lay testimony that the involved in-
dustry or worksite possessed a disease hazard.
107. Harrigan v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 40 Pa Commw 390, 394, 397
A2d 490, 492 (1979).
108. Helverson v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Central Foundry Co.), 76 Pa
Commw 286, 292, 463 A2d 1243, 1246 (1983).
109. Consolidation Coal v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 37 PaCommw 412,
416, 391 A2d 14, 16 (1977).
110. Consolidation Coal, 391 A2d at 16.
111. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v Golmetz, 28 Pa Commw 25, 27, 367 A2d 323, 325
(1976).
112. Consolidation Coal, 391 A2d at 17. For discussion of the purpose behind this
prescription, see Metz v Quakertown Stove Works, 156 Pa Super 70, 39 A2d 534 (1944).
113. See Jones & Laughlin, 367 A2d at 325.
114. In Witco-Kendall Co. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Adams), 127 Pa
Commw 509, 562 A2d 397 (1988), the court opines:
Whether a hazard exists is a question of fact for the referee . . . .Further, the claim-
ant's "burden of proof related to this issue is not very demanding." . .
We . ..conclude that claimants need not prove their exposure to an occupational
hazard ...by means of scientific tests of the employers' premises.
Witco-Kendall, 562 A2d at 400-01. See also, Superior Tube Co. v Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Bd., 132 Pa Commw 191, 194, 572 A2d 258, 260 (1990).
115. See for example, Metz, 39 A2d at 536 (claimant's expert, a physician, "testified
that in his professional opinion a polisher of cast iron stove parts is employed in an occupa-
tion in which silicosis is a hazard").
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Section 307(5)116 establishes a presumption in death cases with
regard to a minor. That section normally requires that, if an un-
married worker suffers work-related death and has no widow, wid-
ower or children, for the parents to recover they must establish
some level of dependency on the wages of the deceased worker. In
"the case of a minor who has been contributing to his parents,"
however, the dependency of said parents shall be presumed."' 7
This presumption has been held to be rebuttable by the em-
ployer.1 18 The operation of the presumption was explained by the
commonwealth court in a 1980 decision, Borough of Wilmore v
New, '" which remains the leading case.
Further, two sections of the Act also address the issue of the
employment of minors with presumptions. In general, a defendant
which employs a minor in violation of any applicable state law will,
in the event of the worker's injury, be liable for 150% of the nor-
mal compensation due. 20 Section 320(d), 1 1 however, provides that
if an employer possesses a valid certificate of employment, such
document "shall be conclusive evidence to such employer of his le-
gal right to employ the minor . . . ." Section 320(e),' 22 meanwhile,
provides that the possession of an age certificate "shall be conclu-
sive' evidence to the employer of the minor's age as certified
therein."
Section 406 of the Act'23 is a procedural provision establishing a
presumption that a notice of hearing, decision or other document
116. 77 Pa Stat § 561(5) (Purdon Supp 1990).
117. Id. See Walzer v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Globe Sec.), 69 Pa
Commw 468, 451 A2d 799 (1982).
118. Borough of Wilmore v New, 54 Pa Commw 145, 419 A2d 1383 (1980).
119. New, 419 A2d at 1383. The court declared the operation of the presumption as
follows:
[B]ecause dependency is a question of fact, the presumption is rebuttable by evidence
to the contrary . . . .It follows that once the presumption is raised, the burden of
proof shifts to the employer to produce evidence of non-dependence. . . .In order to
rebut the presumption-. . . the proof of non-dependence offered by the employer
must at the outset include a showing that at the time of the injury, the difference
between family income and expenditures was such that the minor child's contribu-
tions were not needed to any extent. In the absence of that threshold showing, the
employer fails to carry its burden, and the parents are entitled to rest upon the pre-
sumption. On the other hand, once it is shown that income exceeded expenditures,
the burden of proof goes back to the parents to prove dependency . . ..
Id at 1389 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
120. Section 320 of the Act, 77 Pa Stat § 672(a) (Purdon Supp 1990).
121. Id at section 672(d) (Purdon 1952).
122. Id at section 672(e) (Purdon 1952).
123. Id at section 717 (Purdon Supp 1990).
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mailed by the Bureau of Workers' Compensation "reached the
party to be served." This presumption, commonly known as the
"mailbox rule," is plainly rebuttable, as the statute further pro-
vides that "any party may show by competent evidence that any
notice or copy was not received, or that there was an unusual or
unreasonable delay in transmission through the mails. '124 At-
tempts to rebut the presumption have in fact been successful, as
evidenced by at least one appellate case. 25 There is no indication
in the Act or in the cases that the burden of proof in attempting to
rebut the presumption is anything other than by a preponderance
of the evidence.
1 26
No specific corollary presumption exists in the Act or regula-
tions, with regard to timely receipt of notices and requests mailed
or otherwise delivered by the parties. An informal presumption
probably does exist, however, when the party has filed a proof of
service along with the involved notice, as now required by the Ref-
eree's Rules.
1 27
3. Provisions Specifically Allowing or Precluding Reports as
Evidence
Two provisions of the Act specifically authorize the admission
into evidence of medical reports, notwithstanding the fact that
they technically constitute hearsay. The first provision is found in
section 413(a) of the Act, 28 and permits the submission of physi-
cians' affidavits by employers filing termination or suspension peti-
tions. The offer of such an affidavit is sufficient, however, only for
the supersedeas, or stay request, which is usually ruled upon
shortly after the initial hearing on the petition.
12 9
Documents other than affidavits, such as formal narrative medi-
cal reports, are also admissible in the context of a supersedeas re-
quest. A specific provision for admissibility of such evidence is not
included in section 413(a), but the section does provide that the
124. Id.
125. Sinclair v Henry Shaffer Lumber Co., 180 Pa Super 234, 119 A2d 682 (1956).
126. Sinclair, 119 A2d at 683 (indicating that resolution of whether presumption had
been overcome embraced simple credibility determination by fact-finder).
127. See for example, 34 Pa Code §§ 131.12(b)(3) and 131.13(h).
Presumptions are also included in the Act at section 306(c)(3), 77 Pa Stat § 513(23) (Pur-
don Supp Pamphlet 1990) (loss of both appendages raises presumption of total disability),
and at section 601, 77 Pa Stat § 1031 (Purdon Supp 1990) (members of various volunteer
corps are presumed to earn wages at least equal to statewide average weekly wage).




"referee hearing the case may consider any other fact which he
deems to be relevant when making the decision on the supersedeas
request . . .-.
Pursuant to this provision, the Referee's Rules provide that the
"report of a physician," the "records of a physician, hospital, clinic
or similar entity," and the "written statements or reports of an-
other person expected to be called by a party" may be submit-
ted."'1 Of course, the ability to submit such hearsay documents in
the context of a supersedeas requests applies equally to claimant
and employer. 1 2
As pointed out by one commentator, the specific parameters of
what is "relevant"-beyond those items specifically recounted in
the rules-in the context of a supersedeas request is not addressed
by the cases. 3' As the same commentator has pointed out, the rea-
son for this is that supersedeas orders are interlocutory' 4 and
hence do not generate the appeals which would give rise to opin-
ion-writing on this issu1e.35
The third paragraph of section 422136 sets forth a specific excep-
tion to the hearsay rule which is of tremendous practical signifi-
cance in compensation practice. It provides as follows:
Where any claim for compensation at issue before a referee involves twenty-
five weeks or less of disability, either the employe or the employer may sub-
mit a certificate by any qualified physician as to history, examination, treat-
ment, diagnosis and cause of the condition, and sworn reports by other wit-
nesses as to any other facts and such statements shall be admissible as
evidence of medical and surgical or other matters therein stated and find-
ings of fact may be based upon such certificates or such reports. 
7
This provision has been given a common-sense interpretation, with
the commonwealth court very reasonably rejecting the use of re-
ports in cases involving greater than twenty-five weeks of
disability.
We think that the principle of expresso unius est exclusio alterius applies to
an interpretation of that statutory language ... By expressly providing
130. Id.
131. 34 Pa Code § 131.42.
132. Id.
133. Remarks of Chief Referee Persifor Oliver, Pittsburgh Office, Bureau of Workers'
Compensation, at Pennsylvania Bar Association, Workers' Compensation Section Meeting,
Harrisburg, Pa, November 2, 1990.
134. See 77 Pa Stat Ann § 774, (Purdon 1990).
135. Remarks of Referee Oliver (cited in note 133.




that a physician's certificate is admissible in claims involving 25 weeks or
less of disability, the Legislature intended to exclude such certificates in
claims involving more than 25 weeks of disability.'
38
The same case held that the principle that the Act and the rules of
evidence are to be liberally construed did not mean that the fore-
going provision would not be applied strictly.139
Predictable rulings have been rendered by the commonwealth
court with regard to this provision. A party's failure to object to a
certificate or report will result in a waiver of such objection.140 Fur-
ther, the certificate or report must still be reliable in the sense that
the opinion expressed in the document must still be unequivocal as
to causation,"' if such an opinion is necessary in the case under
consideration, and the physician's signature and the time of com-
pletion must be evident." 2
The commonwealth court has recently indicated, in addition,
that it is only the reports of "physicians" which are competent evi-
dence in small claims cases. Giving teeth to the plain language of
the statute, the court has held that the reports of others, specifi-
cally chiropractors, must be sworn, i.e., bear a notarial seal."
3
Several issues remain undecided-or at least continue to be dis-
puted-with regard to the use of reports as evidence under the
third paragraph of section 422. The first issue is whether a dispute
concerning medical bills constitutes "any claim . . . for compensa-
tion . . . involv[ing] twenty-five weeks or less of disability . .. .
Such a situation can arise in at least two contexts. First, if an
injury results in fewer than seven days of disability there is no
valid claim for lost wages,'" and hence no claim for "disability," as
that term is defined under the Act. ' 5 The claimant may, however,
138. Young v Workmen's Compensation- Appeal Bd., 39 Pa Commw 265, 266, 395 A2d
317, 317-18 (1978). See also, Weis Markets, Inc. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(Barbuto), - Pa Commw ., -, 572 A2d 1295, 1297 (1990); Vital Signs Institute v
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 114 Pa Commw 191, 201, 538 A2d 617, 622 (1988).
139. Young, 395 A2d at 318.
140. Purex Corp. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 66 Pa Commw 499, 505,
445 A2d 267, 270 (1982) ("Such certificates need only be excluded ... when the party op-
posing their admission makes an objection.").
141. See DeBaldo Bros. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 49 Pa Commw 632,
633-34, 411 A2d 1277, 1278 (1980) (report was unequivocal).
142. See D.L. Clark Co. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 49 Pa Commw'535,
538, 411 A2d 1269, 1271 (1980).
143. Weis Markets, Inc. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Barbuto), - Pa
Commw - , , 572 A2d 1295, 1297 (1990) ("We agree [that] a chiropractor is not a
'qualified physician' defined under the Act...").
144. Section 306(a) of the Act, 77 Pa Stat § 511 (Purdon Supp Pamphlet 1990).
145. Corcoran v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Pepperidge Farms), 100 Pa
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have sustained significant hospital and medical bills during and/or
after that period, and the claim may thus involve significant liabil-
ity for the employer. In such situations, claimants typically argue
that the case falls under the third paragraph of section 422. The
reasoning in this regard is appealing-zero weeks of disability is,
after all, less than twenty-five weeks; therefore, the section should
be deemed to apply and physicians' reports be deemed admissible.
This reasoning employs the notion that a claim, for hospital or
medical bills is a "claim for compensation."
The argument in opposition is that the section speaks only of
"disability," thus implying lost time cases, so that "medical-only"
cases are necessarily not included. This argument is not uncom-
mon, because medical-only cases in the contemporary era can often
involve significant liability, sometimes far in excess of the lost
wage portion of many claims. Further, because the obvious intent
of this portion of section 422 is to permit quick and easy resolution
of small claims, that purpose would seem to be subverted by per-
mitting the litigation of large claims on reports only.
Notwithstanding this entirely reasonable concern, two principles
of compensation law tend to indicate that the better view is that
reports should be admissible in medical-only cases. First, if a pro-
vision is to be deemed ambiguous, it will be read in favor of claim-
ant.146 Significantly, it is almost invariably the claimant who is
seeking the admissibility of reports in this context, because he is
the party that is least likely to possess the resources to secure the
live testimony of a physician. Second, the right of cross-examina-
tion is still available to either party; if the objecting party (em-
ployer or claimant) has an objection to the submission of a report,
a deposition may still be scheduled for cross-examination to be un-
dertaken. The existence of section 422 merely permits the admis-
sion of reports-it could not possibly abolish the right to cross-
examination. 147
Commw 608, 612, 515 A2d 342, 343-44 (1986).
146. See for example, Visintin v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Hale Pump
Co.), 127 Pa Commw 244, 252, n.5, 561 A2d 372, 375-76, n.5 (1989).
147. See text accompanying note 153. In one important context, however, the rule that
reports constitute competent evidence in "medical only" cases also greatly aids employers.
In this regard, note that the commonwealth court has now held that a referee has no power,
in response to an employer's review petition, to grant a supersedeas (a stay) on the payment
of medical treatment expenses. Under this new rule, an employer is to pay treatment ex-
penses until a final order is issued.- See ADIA Personal Agency v Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Bd. (Coleman), - Pa Commw -, 586 A2d 507 (1991) (allocatur pending). Ob-
viously, if reports are admissible in such cases, much time can be saved and a final order
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, The result may be different in the second context. Often, in the
course of a disability, a dispute arises over medical bills. In such
instances, the claim for compensation may well have extended
more than twenty-five weeks; so the argument is more persuasive
that section 422 applies to preclude litigation of medical-only cases
on the basis of reports. For example, if a claimant incurs disputed
medical bills in the hundredth week of disability, the claim may be
interpreted to be a claim for compensation involving greater than
twenty-five weeks of disability. On the other hand, the claim may
be conceptualized, again, as one not involving disability at all, so
reports should be admitted just as in a less-than-twenty-five week
case.
One case addressing the matter is Hilton Hotel Corp. v Work-
men's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Totin). 4 s In Hilton Hotel, the
claimant had been off work and receiving total disability, for an
extended period when she began to seek psychological and psychi-
atric care. Because the compensated injury was back pain, the em-
ployer refused to pay the bills, challenging the causal connection.
The claimant then brought a petition to review the payability of
the bills, and the referee admitted the reports of the claimant's
psychiatrist over the objection of the employer's counsel. On ap-
peal, the commonwealth court held that this was reversible error:
We are in agreement that the employer successfully and effectively objected
to the introduction of the documents signed by Dr. Hughes and Dr. Freed-
man . . . . That the petition is one seeking only medical payments allegedly
stemming from the acknowledged original injury, rather than for disability
benefits due to the original injury itself, is, not relevant in considering the
admissibility of hearsay evidence. . . . We must, then, conclude that these
documents, though included in the record before us and, indeed, relied upon
by the Board, were so included and relied upon improperly. '9
The case cited in support of the foregoing declaration, City of
Pittsburgh v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 5 ° does seem
to be applicable authority. In that case, the claimant brought a Pe-
tition for Further Medicals (now a defunct petition) and sought to
recover roughly $18,000.00 in medicals on the basis of medical re-
ports only. 5" The reports were offered into evidence upon a re-
potentially relieving the employer from liability for medical expenses can be received with
relative speed.
.148. 102 Pa Commw 528, 518 A2d 1316 (1986).
149. Hilton Hotel, 518 A2d at 1318.
150. 12 Pa Commw 246, 315 A2d 901 (1974).
151. See Sherred v City of Pittsburgh, 7 Pa Commw 401, 402-03, 299 A2d 381, 382
(1973) (a related predecessor case).
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mand order from the Board, over the objection of the employer. 152
On appeal, this was alleged as error. The commonwealth court
agreed:
We conclude that the Appeal Board committed an error of law in receiv-
ing and considering written medical reports over the objection of the em-
ployer. [Although claimant notes that the compensation act relieves the ref-
eree from compliance with the rules of evidence,] section 422 . . . [is] not
authority for denying parties in adversary proceedings fundamental rights
embraced by some rules of evidence. Among such fundamental rights is that
of confronting, cross-examining and refuting witnesses.'
5
3
The court then remanded the case for testimony to be taken by
deposition.
Although the foregoing cases seem to be authority for the pro-
position that reports are not competent evidence in open claim/
medical-only cases, a careful reading of those cases indicates that
the court did not address the issue of whether the third paragraph
of section 422 has any application, presumably because the parties
did not raise the operation of the section. 15 There seems to be
room for clarification in this regard.
A reasonable rule in this regard would seem to be that section
422 should apply to permit such reports as competent evidence, as
long as the right of each party is respected to proceed to cross-
examine the author of the objected-to report, if such cross-exami-
nation is thought necessary. This proposal respects the fundamen-
tal right of confronting an adverse witness, while preserving the
procedural advantage of advancing a case on reports in medical-
only cases. That advantage is, of course, highly valued, especially
by claimants without resources seeking the payment of disputed
bills.
A second issue with regard to this aspect of section 422 does not
appear to have been addressed to any extent by the appellate
courts. The issue arises when -the claimant, because of an injury,
has been absent from the worksite for less than twenty-five weeks,
but then returns and claims a disability not manifested by a loss of
earning power. In such instances, the employee almost invariably
152. City of Pittsburgh, 315 A2d at 902.
153. Id at 903.
154. See for example, Brief for Petitioner 6-9; Brief for Respondent at 5-7, in Hilton
Hotel v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Totin), 102 Pa Commw 528, 518 A2d 1316
(1986). An analysis of these briefs, as well as the record of the case, demonstrate that the
role of section 422 was neither at issue in proceedings before the referee, nor raised on
appeal as a legal issue before the Commonwealth Court. The cited briefs, and the entire
record of the case, are available on microfiche at the Allegheny County Law Library.
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requests a suspension of benefits upon the return to work, rather
than a full termination.
The dispute is engendered by the question of whether the indefi-
nite period of suspension requested should be considered a period
of "disability" for purposes of the third paragraph of section 422.
Obviously, if that period is to be considered "disability," reports in
such cases are not competent evidence. It is submitted that such
periods should be considered "disability" for purposes of section
422. This conclusion is logical in light of the fact that the common-
wealth court has consistently held that there is a "presumption of
continuing disability" when an employee returns to work on a sus-
pension. 155 Indeed, so powerful is the presumption, under the cur-
rent (and questionable) interpretation, that a worker is allegedly
entitled to a virtual automatic reinstatement if for any reason the
"reason for the suspension," i.e., the return to work, ends. 6  Dis-
turbingly, this interpretation means that reinstatement is to follow
even in cases of such non-work-related catalysts as lay-offs or job
eliminations. Further, this is so even when the employee has re-
turned not to light duty, but to the time-of-injury job.
57
155. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Glinka), 117 Pa
Commw 1, 542 A2d 630 (1988).
156. Fells v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Caterpillar Tractor Co.), 122 Pa
Commw 399, 401, 552 A2d 334, 335 (1989).
157. See for example, Certainteed Corp. & Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd. (Williams), 126 Pa Commw 311, 317, 559 A2d 971, 973 (1989).
Since the composition of the accompanying text, however, the appeals courts have
strongly retreated from this view. Indeed, it is submitted that the courts have abandoned
the notion of "automatic reinstatement" altogether, when a worker whohas returned to his
former job on a suspension once again loses earning power. See York City School Dist. v
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Peyser &. Royal Globe Ins. Co.), - Pa Commw
__, 582 A2d 423 (1990), in which the commonwealth court, retreating from the automatic
reinstatement rule, held: an employer has a legitimate, "affirmative defense," when it argues
that the claimant's alleged continuing disability, for which reinstatement is sought, is really
due to a different ailment. See also, Pieper v Ametek-Thermox Instruments Division, -
Pa __, 584 A2d 301 (1990). In this case, the supreme court recognized a presumption of
causation, but omitted any notion that an employer must "automatically reinstate" a claim-
ant on disability. Instead, the court specifically imposes on the claimaint an affirmative,
two-prong burden of proof of showing entitlement to reinstatement in such cases:
In such suspension situations, the causal connection between the original work-re-
lated injury and the disability is presumed . . . [because, among other reasons,] there
is no contention by any party that the liability of the employer [had] terminated. The
only fact established at [sic] a suspension of benefits is that the earning power of a
claimant has improved to a point where benefits are no longer necessary ...
Thereafter, if the economic picture of a claimant changes and he applies for rein-
statement of benefits, he need not re-prove the causal connection between the origi-
nal disability and the fact that it was suffered at work per his original claim, since
causation was established at the time of the original claim.
474
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In light of this. interpretation, it is obvious that the effect of a
suspension is limited, and leaves the employer open to reinstating
the claimant's benefits indefinitely. A claim presenting such open-
ended liability is not the type of small claim that should be af-
forded the procedural advantage of submission on reports. If the
employee is so severely injured and impaired that he is entitled to
a presumption of continuing disability many years into the future,
the claim should be handled like any other involving greater than
twenty-five weeks of disability.
Section 438 of the Act 158 provides, in mandatory terms, that in-
jury reports, which must be filed with the Bureau in every instance
where a worker sustains or alleges an injury, are not accepted into
evidence. The statute specifically admonishes that '"[lreports of in-
juries filed with the department under this section shall not be evi-
dence against the employer or the employer's insurer in any pro-
ceeding either under this Act or otherwise." 15 9
This provision was added in 1972, as part of an amendment
which requires employers to report all injuries promptly.1 60 The
section provides, in pertinent part,
An employer shall report such injuries to the Department of Labor and In-
dustry by filing directly with the department on the form it prescribes a
report of injury within forty-eight hours for every injury resulting in death,
and within three days after the date of injury for all other injuries except
those resulting in disability continuing less than the day, shift, or turn in
which the injury was received.'61
The exclusionary rule is meant, very clearly, to encourage employ-
ers to comply with the foregoing provision, relieving them of the
concern that the recording of various information on an injury
Pieper, 584 A2d at 305 (emphasis added). The .curt concluded as follows:
[While there is a presumption as to causation,] since many months or years may pass
before the economic condition of a claimant forces him to apply for reinstatement of
benefits, the law requires a claimant to prove .two things in order to show that the
reasons for the suspension no longer exist.
First, he must prove that through nofault of his own his earning power is once
again adversely affected by his disability. And second, that the disability which gave
rise to his original claim, in fact, continues. . . . Because of the passage of time, the
law does require that he prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is the same
disability that the law presumes occurred during his original employment and for
which he initially received workmen's compensation benefits. In other words, that his
disability has not ceased during the passage of time.
Id (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
158. 77 Pa Stat § 994 (Purdon Supp 1990).
159. Id.
160. See Act of February 8, 1972, P L 25, No 12.
161. Section 438 of the Act, 77 Pa Stat § 994.
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form may result in an admission of a work-related injury or disa-
bility. This concern is, in fact, contemplated in the National Com-
mission report which recommended the prompt reporting of inju-
ries and the keeping of statistics by the various state labor
departments. 
1 2
The use of the phrase "shall not be evidence" in the exclusionary
rule suggests that the legislature meant the exclusion to be
mandatory, not a matter of discretion on the part of the referee.
16 3
Further, it is well established that the legislature's use of the term
"shall," when referring to the ability to perform a particular
act-such as take an appeal-indicates that the provision limits
the very power of the involved entity to grant relief or exercise
power."" In other words, the provision is "jurisdictional.' 65
This being the case, it is submitted that the legislature intended
that injury reports filed pursuant to section 438 were under no
condition to be admitted into evidence. Indeed, the legislature by
its language was most likaly intending to restrict the very power of
the referee to admit such reports into evidence, even if the parties
consent to their admission. Such a strict construction is not only
justified by the legislature's use of the term "shall," as in the ap-
peal provisions, but because of the enduring importance that in-
jury reports be completed and submitted promptly, with the un-
qualified certainty that they will never be admitted in evidence. 6
162. Report of National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws 105
(1972) ("The employer's report on the work-related impairment or death may become the
first document in the employee's case file, although an employer would be reluctant to pro-
vide full information in the initial report if he felt it could be used against him in a con-
tested claim."). Compare 64 NY Workmen's Compensation Law § 110 (McKinney Supp
1990) (Practice Commentaries), which noted that under New York law similar injury reports
are admissible in evidence: "The statements made by the employer on these forms have
been held to be admissions of the employer which can be used against it at a hearing." 64
NY Workmen's Compensation Law § 110.
163. See generally, Torrey, 24 Duquesne L Rev at 1006-08 (cited in note 56).
164. Id at 1010.
165. Id at 1009-12.
166. But see, Mauchly v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 15 Pa Commw 296,
325 A2d 496 (1974). In that case, admission of an injury report was found to be harmless
error. The court did not indicate whether or not it thought admission of the report was
beyond the power of the referee, although it is also true that the issue was apparently not
raised. The court also implied that the report might be admissible to show notice of injury





The second paragraph of section 422 of the Act'67 makes specific
provision for the admissibility of hospital records, reading in perti-
nent part as follows: "The records kept by a hospital of the medi-
cal or surgical treatment given to an employe in such hospital shall
be admissible as evidence of the medical and surgical matters
stated therein."168 The commonwealth court has noted that this
provision mirrors the Uniform Business Records as Evidence
Act,"6 9 which itself has been used as authority for the proposition
that hospital records are admissible in evidence in civil
proceedings.7 0
All inclusions in hospital records have not, however, been held
admissibleas competent evidence to support a finding of fact. As a
preliminary matter, the inclusion must be "pathologically germane
to the physical or mental condition which caused the patient to
come to the hospital for treatment.''7 The commonwealth court
has explained the reasoning behind the exception, and the reason
for the latter requirement, in a compensation case:
The obvious reason for this exception to the hearsay evidence rule is that
it is reasonable to presume that when a patient enters a hospital for treat-
ment, especially when the patient is in pain or is anxious about his condi-
tion, he will be meticulous in relating all facts which may aid his physicians
in diagnosing his illness or injury so that the physician can prescribe the
proper medical treatment. Without proof to the contrary, it would be illogi-
cal to assume that a patient would describe his pains and symptoms in a
false or misleading manner. When a man enters a hospital with a pain in his
chest and believes himself to be ill, he is in search of help and not a claim
for damages or insurance benefits.1
7
2
Quoting a criminal case, the court also stated, however, that
Certainly every 'act, condition or event' which some hospital physician
places on a hospital record does not ipso facto become competent when
later an issue is being judicially tried to which such fact would be relevant if
proved by competent testimony. The [Business Records] Act. . . obviously
means that the 'act, condition or event' recorded in the hospital must be
167. 77 Pa Stat § 835 (Purdon Supp 1990).
168. Id.
169. See Thomas v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 57 Pa Commw 117, 119,
425 A2d 1192, 1193 (1981) (citing 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6108(b) (Purdon 1990)).
170. See Packel & Poulin, Evidence § 803.6(h) at 587 (cited in note 58).
171. Scanella v Salerno Importing Co., 2 Pa Commw 11, 15-6, 275 A2d 907, 909
(1971).
172. Scanella, 275 A2d at 910.
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pathologically germane .. . .7
In the quoted case, Scannella v Salerno Importing Co., 174 the
commonwealth court specifically adopted reasoning, for purposes
of section 422, which had been applied to the Business Records
Act. Accordingly, it would seem reasonable that decisions decided
under the latter law should be applicable, in general, to section
422.
Importantly, an opinion expressed within hospital records does
not fall within the definition of "pathologically germane." As set
forth by the leading evidence treatise:
[T]he rule has developed that medical or hospital records are admissible to
show the fact of hospitalization, treatment prescribed, and symptoms given.
Medical opinion contained in the record is not admissible where the doctor
is not available for cross-examination.
75
The leading Pennsylvania Supreme Court case in this regard is
Paxos v Jarka Corp.,' 76 which held that opinion evidence set forth
in hospital records is not admissible, although other portions are
admissible. The court, in this regard, explained, "However admira-
ble, whatever the character and reputation of the institution from
which the records come, to deny a defendant the opportunity to
test the correctness of the diagnosis and ascertain the qualifica-
tions of the assertor [through cross-examination]. . . is to deny
[him] a substantial right.'
77
In light of the express ruling that the right of cross-examination
is as substantial a right in compensation proceedings as it is in the
civil context,17 8 there is every reason to believe that the admonition
in Paxos applies to compensation cases. At the same time, of
course, it should be recalled that corroborative hearsay may be ad-
missible in compensation proceedings, so an expression of opinion
which corroborates that of a live witness may be considered as ad-
missible in evidence. 79 This would probably not be the case in civil
173. Id at 909 (quoting Commonwealth v Harris, 351 Pa 325, 330, 41 A2d 688, 691
(1945)).
174. Scannella, 275 A2d at 909.
175. Packel & Poulin, Evidence § 803.6(h) at 587 (cited in note 58).
176. 314 Pa 148, 171 A 468 (1934).
177. Paxos, 171 A at 471.
178. See for example, Cowan v Bunting Glider, 159 Pa Super 573, 576, 49 A2d 270,
271 (1946). See generally, note 153 and accompanying text.
179. See Thomas v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 57 Pa Commw 117, 119-20,
425 A2d 1192, 1193 (1981), wherein the court stated:
Even if the records were hearsay not subject to an exception ... where the facts are




Although opinion evidence contained in hospital records does
not fall under the category of "pathologically germane" inclusions
of a hospital record, it is apparently the case that hearsay state-
ments recorded as to the manner in which the claimant sustained
an injury may constitute "pathologically germane" statements, at
least under limited circumstances.
In the Scannella'80 case, for example, the claimant's decedent
had been permitted to testify that her deceased husband, immedi-
ately before his fatal heart attack, had related that he had just
undertaken especially rigorous exertional activity.18 ' The employer,
on the other hand, offered a hospital record "which included three
different and separate statements written by a doctor and two in-
terns to the effect that the decedent in describing his symptoms
and complaints disclosed" that he had suffered chest pain while
involved in non-work-related activity.182 These records were found
persuasive by the referee, who denied benefits.
On appeal, the claimant argued that "since the statements con-
tained in the hospital histories are extra judicial statements, with-
out the benefit of cross-examination, they are hearsay and should
have been excluded."' 83 This argument was rejected by the com-
monwealth court, which first declared-as set forth above-that
such records were reliable, and then further indicated that under
the particular circumstances the records were properly admitted:
In this case, the statements made by the decedent to the medical person-
nel in the hospital are clearly pathologically germane to his condition which
caused him to come to the hospital. They clearly were admissible as an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule, and. were competent items of evidence upon
which the referee .. could base [his] determination. These records ... led
the referee ... to conclude ... that:the incident which caused decedent's
death did not occur during his working hours. 84
It is surely the case, however, that all such statements are not
necessarily admissible. Some indicia of reliability should be re-
tent, may be considered for the additional light, if any, that it throws upon the mat-
ter .... Here, the hearsay testimony was not inconsistent with the 'testimony of
three employer doctors who independently and directly established adequate support
for the referee's findings.
Thomas, 425 A2d at 1193.
180. 2 Pa Commw 11, 275 A2d 907 (1971).
181. Scannella, 275 A2d at 908-09.
182. Id at 909.
183. Id.
184. Id at 910.
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quired. Indeed, an early Pennsylvania Superior Court case indi-
cated that a claimant's relation of a history-"three or four days
after the alleged date of the alleged accident"-as to how an injury
was sustained did not constitute "evidence of. . . medical and sur-
gical matters" for purposes of section 422.165
In this same connection, the superior court, at an early point,
demanded that the same earmarks of reliability which govern the
admissibility of business records in general apply to hospital
records, whatever their inclusions, under section 422. This is ap-
parently the case-and rightly so-notwithstanding the fact that
the Act makes no specific reference to these requirements. In any
event, the court in 1937 declared,
[I]f hospital records are admissible in evidence, three probative elements
must be present: (1) They must be made contemporaneously with the acts
which they purport to relate; (2) at the time of making, it was impossible to
anticipate reasons which might subsequently arise from making a false en-
try in the original record; [and] (3) the statements or entries must be made
by one possessing knowledge of their truth. 8 6
Apparently applying one of these criteria, the court, in the quoted
decision, specifically ruled that non-conforming hospital records
should have been excluded. 18 One of these criteria was also ap-
plied when, for example, a physician had indicated on the claim-
ant's hospital record, "Injury had nothing to do whatever in aggra-
vating or inducing this condition."188 In the superior court's words,
such evidence "should not have been received or been considered,
for it smacked too much of a defense to an anticipated compensa-
185. Thomas v DeCommine, 133 Pa Super 489, 496-97, 3 A2d 41, 44 (1938)(emphasis
added). In Thomas, a hospital record had apparently been offered (or at least included in
the record by the referee) that recounted the claimant had, while in the course of his em-
ployment, "[fallen] in bathroom while opening a drain . Thomas, 3 A2d at 44. After
analyzing section 422, the superior court remarked:
Even if we were warranted in assuming that this record was in fact received into
evidence, we would certainly not assume'that it was admitted for purposes or with
effects not. contemplated by that statute. The fact that there had been an accident
might concern medical or surgical matters, but not the facts as to where the acci-
dent occurred.
Id at 44 (emphasis added). This was so held prior to the liberalization of the statement-to-
physician exception in compensation cases involving death. See notes 336 to 343 and accom-
panying text. Given the lapse of time involved in the case, however, it is probably still good
authority.
186. Leed v State Workmen's Ins. Fund, 128 Pa Super 572, 194 A 689, 691 (1937).
187. Leed, 194 A at 691. A close reading of this case, however, reveals that the better
reason for excluding the evidence was that. it constituted opinion testimony from a non-
expert.
188. Miller v Pittsburgh Coal Co., 129 Pa Super 1, 195 A 151 (1937).
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tion claim .... .s8
Just as the latter statement was properly held inadmissible, so
too should a self-serving statement as to the circumstances of an
injury, made by a claimant in a hospital record and generated a
significant period of time after the work-related injury be held. If
there is not some degree of spontaneity to the statements made in
the hospital records, the same suspicions must necessarily be
raised as to motive as was reflected by the superior court in the
quoted case.19 0
5. Miscellaneous Provisions
The Act makes specific provision for decisions on stipulated
facts in contested cases. Section 411 of the Act 19' provides, in this
regard, that whenever the employer and employee "agree on all the
facts on which a claim for compensation depends, but shall fail to
agree on the compensation payable, they may petition the depart-
ment to determine the compensation payable.' 9 2 In doing so, the
petition is to include "the agreed facts, and shall be signed by all
the parties in interest."'9 3
Of course, in authorizing stipulations, the Act empowers the ref-
eree with typical judicial or administrative power. 9 " The practice
described is in fact analogous to decision on a "case stated" in civil
practice, or perhaps more accurately to a non-jury trial upon stipu-
lated facts.' 95 Section 416 of the Act, 9 ' as discussed above,
197
189. Miller, 195 A at 152. On the other hand, the following hospital record entry was
correctly found to be admissible in a compensation case:
His chief complaints on admission were: Swollen right face, severe pain in chest, and
the analysis of the chief complaint, on returning home from work . . . hands being
dirty from working in a previously flooded cellar, patient picked furuncle in right
nostril. The next morning he noted it had become sore and inflamed. By 4/3/36, the
right face was markedly swollen, also the right eye.
Parks v Miller Printing Mach. Co., 133 Pa Super 530, 4 A2d 831, 832 (1938), rev'd on other
grounds, 336 Pa 455, 9 A2d 742 (1939). The foregoing entry was made by an intern within a
few days of April 3, 1936, and was found on the history portion of the record. In the court's
view, "This record was competent evidence." Parks, 4 A2d at 832.
190. But see, Thomas v DeCommine, 133 Pa 489, 3 A2d 41 (1938).
191. 77 Pa Stat § 752 (Purdon Supp 1990).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See generally, 73 Am Jur 2d Stipulations §§ 1-15 (1974).
195. See Dale F. Shughart, Pennsylvania Civil Practice § 25.2 at 253-54 (Michie
1988).
196. 77 Pa Stat § 821 (Purdon Supp.1990).




makes specific provision for an employer's admission of facts, in-
cluded in the allegations of a worker's claim petition, if the em-
ployer fails to "specifically deny" those allegations. This rule is en-
forced with vigor, and the allegations must be denied in the
employer's answer in a timely fashion if such denials are to be ef-
fective.19 8 At the same time, it is well settled that general denials
of the allegations of a claim petition in a timely-filed answer are
sufficient. As the commonwealth court stated in St. Denis v Work-
men's Compensation Appeal Bd.,199
We cannot agree ... that "denied" and "proof demanded" are not specific
denials within the meaning of Section 416. In interpreting Section 416 it is
necessary to remember that workmen's compensation proceedings are not
subject to strict rules of pleading . . ., so that defining "specifically denied"
by analogy with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure is not appropri-
ate. We believe that it is most consistent with the legislative intent to hold
that "denied" and "proof demanded" specifically deny allegations in a claim
petition. 0
While this is the rule, the better practice is the filing of an answer
which sets forth admissions and denials, and any additional rele-
vant matter that is available.2 1
Depositions are specifically authorized as a method of adducing
testimony in the second paragraph of section 422 of the Act. 02
Section 422 provides in pertinent part as follows:
If any party or witness resides outside of the Commonwealth, or through
illness or other cause is unable to testify before the board or a referee, his or
her testimony or deposition may be taken, within or without this Common-
wealth, in such manner and in such form as the department may, by special
order or general rule, prescribe.203
In practice, nearly all expert testimony is adduced by way of depo-
sition in Pennsylvania practice,:-and the "other cause" mentioned
198. Straub v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (City of Erie), 114 Pa Commw
224, 229-30, 538 A2d 965, 968 (1988). See also, Hildebrand v Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Bd. (Fire Dept. City of Reading), 111 Pa Commw 24, 31-2, 532 A2d 1287, 1290
(1987).
199. 29 Pa Commw 375, 371 A2d 252 (1977).
200. St. Denis, 371 A2d at 53-4.
201. See for example, Williams v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Philadel-
phia), 119 Pa Commw 127, 132, 546 A2d 7,47, 749, 750 (1988), in which Senior Judge Bar-
bieri referred to defendant's answer, which contained general denials and the statement,
"the aforesaid is denied in as much as the defendant has not yet had time to verify their
accuracy," as "a worthless filing," and "a worthless document."
202. 77 Pa Stat § 835.




in the statute has been construed to require as little as the mere.
inconvenience of a party to attend a hearing." 4 It is also beyond
dispute that the referee has the power to order that testimony be
taken by deposition as part of his or her inherent authority to con-
trol the conduct of hearings.2 5
C. The First Paragraph of Section 422 and its Common Law
Interpretation
1. Introduction: A Brief History of the Section
While the Act provides for specific evidentiary rules at various
junctures, the vast majority of compensation "evidence law" is
found in court decisions. For guidance, the courts in this regard
look to the first paragraph of section 422.20 As recounted at the
beginning of this article, that section provides as follows: "Neither
the board nor any of its members, nor any referee shall be bound
by the common law or statutory rules of evidence in conducting
any hearing or investigation, but all findings of fact shall be based
upon sufficient competent evidence to justify same."20
A form of this provision has been included in the Act since its
birth in 1915. Furthermore, for the most part this section has been
given a relatively consistent interpretation. Still, it is worthy to
recognize the various forms the section has taken over the years.
As will be seen, some of the amendments have been very
significant.
When the Act became law in 1915, the first paragraph of what is
now section 422 included only one sentence, providing that
"[n]either the Board nor any referee shall be bound by the techni-
cal rules of evidence in conducting any hearing or investigation. 208
No express demand was made that "competent evidence," as com-
monly understood at common law,. be required to support a critical
finding and decision.
In practice, however, the workmen's compensation authorities
for the most part-at least in their earliest reported'decisions-did
require such evidence. Indeed, the earliest decisions of the Work-
204. See Pasquarello v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Bechtel Power Corp.),
97 Pa Commw 307, 310, 509 A2d 933, 934 (1986) (doctor could testify by deposition: "Here
the proper cause for accepting the physician's testimony was to avoid the physician from
having to take time from his busy schedule to appear in person.").
205. See section 418 of the Act, 77 Pa Stat § 833 (Purdon Supp 1990).
206. 77 Pa Stat § 834 (Purdon Supp 1990).
207. Id.
208. See section 428 of the Act, Act of June 2, 1915, P L 736.
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men's Compensation Board demonstrate that the most notorious
form of incompetent evidence, hearsay, was not sufficient to sup-
port a decision. 09
In 1918, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed this principle
in the landmark decision of McCauley v Imperial Woolen Co.,2 10 a
case discussed in depth in the next section of this article. Not by
accident, the legislature immediately thereafter amended the sec-
tion to incorporate the court's demand. Specifically, in 1919, the
section, having been renumbered to its present number 422, was
amended to add the clause "but all findings of fact shall be based
only upon competent evidence.
'21 1
In 1937 the Act, in general, underwent significant amendment,
and a new occupational disease law was passed for the first time.
The first paragraph of section 422 was not, however, subject to any
material modification. The only change was the addition of a pro-
vision indicating that it was not only the Board that was not
bound by the technical rules of evidence, but that such dispensa-
tion also applied to "any of its members.
' '212
Other new provisions governing evidence were, however, shortly
thereafter added. Among the most notorious of these was section
201.1(a) of the first Disease Act,21 8 which established a presump-
tion of negligence on the part of an employer sued by an employee
in a trespass case when certain conditions were met. Section
201.1(b) of the amended compensation act, meanwhile, essentially
codified an expanded res gestae hearsay-exception rule, providing
that "[w]hen an employee sustains an injury in the course of his
employment, declarations, remarks and utterances made by the in-
jured employee within twelve hours after the injury was sustained
shall be admissible as competent evidence.
'21 4
These liberal provisions, which were meant to pressure all Penn-
sylvania employers into accepting the terms of the Act-which was
not mandatory in those days-were promptly held unconstitu-
tional in Rich Hill Coal Co. v Bashore2 5 In that case, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court characterized such provisions as creating
209. See for example, Malone v Delaware & Hudson Co., 2 Dept Reports 2442, 2442-
43, 1 WCB 239, 239 (1916). See also, notes 230 to 234 and accompanying text.
210. 261 Pa 312, 104 A 617 (1918). See notes 235 to 245 and accompanying text.
211. See Act of June 26, 1919, P L 642, No 277, Article IV.
212. See Act of June 4, 1937, P L 1552, No 323, Article IV.
213. See Act of September 29, 1938, P L 52, No 20.
214. Id.
215. 334 Pa 449, 7 A2d 302 (1939).
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contrived proofs which, respectively, constituted mere conjecture 216
and patently untrustworthy testimony; "" rejected the authority of
the legislature to so alter the rules of evidence." 8
In apparent response to the harsh rebuke of the Rich Hill case,
the legislature, in an amendment passed roughly two months after
that decision, deleted the offensive, unconstitutional provisions. In
addition, the last clause of section 422 was amended to provide
that, while the "technical rules of evidence" were not to apply in
compensation proceedings, all findings of fact were to be based
only upon "sufficient competent evidence to justify same.
' '2 1 9
The first paragraph of section 422 took its present form with the
1972 amendments. These amendments changed the phrase "tech-
nical rules of evidence" to "common law or statutory rules of evi-
dence, 2 20 and deleted the term "only"22' from the phrase "only
upon sufficient competent evidence.
22
1
The change of "technical" to "common law or statutory," in
terms of the rules of evidence, seems to provide even greater lee-
way to the compensation authorities in the administration of the
evidence rules. For example, one response of the initial interpreters
of the Act to the argument that hearsay was permitted, since the
"technical rules of evidence" did not apply, was that an objection
based on hearsay was not a "technical rule of evidence" in the first
place. 2 3
No such increased leeway has, however, been evidenced because
of the 1972 amendment. An analysis of the numerous post-1972
amendment cases reveals that the change in terminology has not
generated a single appeals court case standing for such a proposi-
tion. To the contrary, the commonwealth court in 1974 rejected the
argument that, because section 422 relieved the referee from com-
pliance with the "common law or statutory rules of evidence,"
216. Rich Hill, 7 A2d at 315.
217. Id at 319.
218. Id at 319-20. See also generally, notes 531 to 539 and accompanying text.
219. Act of June 21, 1939, P L 520, No 281. The offensive, unconstitutional provisions
actually dealt with actions in trespass cases brought by employees against employers which
had not elected to accept the provisions of the Act, an option available at that time. Still, it
seems likely that section 422 was bolstered with the word "sufficient" in reaction to the
supreme court's accusation that, with the 1937 Act, the legislature had attempted to under-
mine traditional rules of evidence.
220. See Act of February 8, 1972, P L 25, No 12.
221. Id.
222. Id. See also, Act of March 29, 1972, P L 159, No 61.
223. Cowan v Bunting Glider Co., 159 Pa Super 573, 576, 49 A2d 270, 271 (1946).
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hearsay testimony was admissible. 224 Confirming the pre-amend-
ment authority, the court joined in the prior resolve that section
422 is "not authority for denying parties in adversary proceedings
fundamental rights embraced by some rules of evidence."225
The 1972 deletion of the term "only," meanwhile, was appar-
ently undertaken to reflect the long-standing rule that, while hear-
say alone (incompetent evidence) cannot support findings of fact
and a decision, if such hearsay or other evidence is relevant and
has some probative value, it is still admissible to corroborate other
competent evidence.2 6 Accordingly, even the pre-amendment rule
was, in practice, that findings of fact could be based upon compe-
tent evidence and corroborative hearsay, notwithstanding the pre-
amendment statute's provision that findings were to be supported
by "only" competent evidence. As indicated above, the amendment
has brought the statute in line with the court decisions.
2. Hearsay in Compensation Cases
Three general principles regarding hearsay in workmen's com-
pensation cases may easily be posited at the outset. First, objected-
to hearsay is not "competent evidence" for purposes of section 422
and cannot, standing alone, support critical findings of fact.22 7 Sec-
ond, hearsay is nevertheless admissible if offered to corroborate
other competent evidence of record. 22 8 Finally, non-objected-to
hearsay is competent and can, if found credible, support findings
of'fact and an award of compensation.229
As discussed in a prior section of this article, the original version
of section 422 did not include the provision that findings be sup-
ported by competent evidence, but provided only that the Board
and referees were not to be bound by the technical rules of evi-
dence. Nevertheless, from its earliest decision, the Board ruled
that hearsay evidence alone was not sufficient to support a finding.
The first express ruling in this regard was Mayer v Pollock,2 30 in
which an award had been made based upon hearsay alone. Citing
224. City of Pittsburgh v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 12 Pa Cornmw 246,
248, 315 A2d 901, 903 (1974).
225. City of Pittsburgh, 315 A2d at 903.
226. See Nesbit v Vandervort & Curry, 128 Pa Super 58, 62, 193 A 393, 395 (1937).
227. McCauley v Imperial Woolen Co., 261 Pa 312, 104 A 617 (1918).
228. Nesbit, 193 A at 393. See also, Landis v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.,
35 Pa Commw 122, 383 A2d 246 (1978).
229. Poluski v Glen Alden Coal Co., 286 Pa 473, 133 A 819 (1926).
230. 2 Dept Reports 1641, 1 WCB 133 (1916).
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English compensation decisions, the Board declared this to have
been erroneous and reversed:
The only evidence that the deceased had ever strained his back by lifting
a calf out of a wagon to carry it into the defendant's shop was the testimony
of-some relatives and acquaintances who swore that the deceased had so
told them previous to his death. With this alone and uncontradicted it
would create a most dangerous precedent to base a verdict upon such un-
trusted and unsatisfactory evidence. This evidence was not corroborated by
any of the facts or probabilities surrounding the case.
2 3'
Later in the same year, the chairman of the Board issued a set of
instructions to referees on "Hearsay Evidence in Compensation
Cases, '232 which left no doubt as to the Board's policy: hearsay
could well be admitted in the course of hearings "unfiltered by
'technical rules of evidence,'" but in the end "'[t]here must be in
the record some evidence of sound, competent and recognizedly
probative character to sustain the findings and award made, other-
wise the findings and award must in fairness be set aside by the
court.' "23 In so directing, of course, the Board, at the very incep-





* Within two years the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was to con-
firm that the Board's firm resolve in this regard was entirely cor-
231. Mayer, 1 WCB at 134. See also, Andrulis v Del. & Hudson R.R. Co., 2 Dept
Reports 1325, 2 WCB 109 (1916).
232. 2 Dept Reports 2636 (1916).
233. Mayer, 2 Dept Reports at 2640 (quoting Carroll v Knickerbocker Ice Co., 169 A
D 450, 155 NYS 1 (1915) (Woodward, J., dissenting), rev'd, 218 NY 435, 113 NE 507 (1916)).
234. A semantic debate probably exists with regard to the precise meaning of the "re-
siduum rule" as applied in Pennsylvania. Larson, in his treatise, speaks of the requirement
in compensation generally, i.e., a "residuum of competent evidence" must support a finding
of fact. In Pennsylvania, the Board and the supreme court immediately adopted this view.
McCauley v Imperial Woolen Co., 261 Pa 312, 104 A 617 (1918). See also, Mayer v Pollock,
2 Dept Reports 2636 (1916). The rule certainly allowed for an exception, however, when
there was no objection lodged to the incompetent testimony. In such instances, the pre-
sumptively incompetent testimony was in fact considered competent. Poluski v Glen Alden
Coal Co., 286 Pa 473, 133 A 819 (1926).
In an unemployment case, filed many years later, the commonwealth court constructed A
different residuum rule in the context of unemployment cases. See Walker v Unemploy-
ment Compensation Bd. of Review, 27 Pa Commw 522, 367 A2d 366 (1976). In that case, the
court declared that even unobjected-to hearsay could not support a finding of fact. This
declaration was, in turn, characterized as being the Pennsylvania formulation of the resid-
uum rule in the case of Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review v Ceja, 493 Pa 588,
427 A2d 631 (1981). The supreme court in Ceja pointed to McCauley as the genesis of the
Walker residuum rule, but such attribution is inaccurate. Walker was the first case which
ever constructed a residuum rule which did not allow for the reliance by administrative fact-
finders on unobjected-to hearsay. See generally, notes 273 to 283 and accompanying text.
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rect. The "leading 23 5 and "seminal" 236 case in this regard was, and
is, known to all generations of compensation practitioners 237 for
the memorable declaration-"I got stuck with a sticker"-that
constituted the disputed hearsay in the case.
In that case, McCauley v Imperial Woolen Co., 2 38 the claimant's
deceased was a worker employed as a wool sorter for his employer,
a wool company.2 9 He died from the disease of anthrax, allegedly
because of a work injury. There were, however, no witnesses to the
alleged injury, which manifested itself as a scratch or abrasion on
the worker's neck. Prior to his death, however, the worker had told
his son, "I got stuck with a sticker," and had, later in the day "told
his wife that one of the stickers in the wool which he was carrying
had torn him in the neck.
'2 0
This testimony was offered into evidence before the referee, who
admitted it and thereafter awarded benefits. The Board, however,
reversed, "decid[ing] that what McCauley said, as to the cause of
the mark upon his neck is hearsay and, standing alone, insufficient
to sustain findings in favor of the claimant made by the refe-
ree[.]"241 Ultimately, both the common pleas and supreme court
concluded that circumstantial evidence would, by itself, have sus-
tained the referee's award; the supreme court in McCauley thus
reinstated the award to the widow. 24 2 In so doing, however, the Mc-
235. McDevitt v Checker Cab Co., 288 Pa 394, 397, 136 A 230, 231 (1927).
236. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review v Ceja, 493 Pa 588, 597, 427 A2d
631, 636 (1981).
237. Interview with John D. Rhodes, Esquire, October 15, 1990.
238. 261 Pa 312, 104 A 617 (1918).
239. McCauley, 104 A at 621.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id at 622. This was plainly a correct result, since the competent evidence demon-
strated that the deceased, when he left for work, was "perfectly well and had no abrasion or
mark upon his neck, but when he left defendant's plant, in the afternoon of that day,"
possessed such an abrasion or mark. When coupled with the fact that "anthrax is primarily
a disease of animals, such as sheep, which may be transmitted to man when handling in-
fected animal materials, like wool, the conclusion that circumstantial evidence supported
the proposition that claimant sustained his injury at work seems unassailable.
It is to be noted further that the anthrax disease caused the deceased's neck immediately
to swell and become discolored, and caused him to die within three days of having been
"stuck with [the sticker]." The disease itself was not uncommon among workers during the
early history of this country, when workers were routinely exposed to such things as animal
fur, skins and hides.
Importantly, anthrax was specifically provided for as a covered disease when the Occupa-
tional Disease Act of 1939 was passed. See Act of June 21, 1939, P L 566, § 108(j), 77 Pa
Stat § 1208(j) (Purdon 1952) (providing compensation for "[a]nthrax occurring in any occu-
pation involving the handling of or exposure to wool, hair, bristles, hides, or skins, or bodies
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Cauley court constructed what remains the contemporary analysis
of section 422 with regard to the core role of hearsay in compensa-
tion cases:
On the subject of proofs, section 428 [now section 422] . . . provides that
"neither the board nor any referee shall be bound by the technical rules of
evidence in conducting any hearing or investigation.".
[This does not] mean, however, that either the referee or board has the
right to find material facts on hearsay alone, whether such evidence is de-
veloped in the course of formal hearings or in less formal investigations; for
in the first place, the rule which forbids the making of material facts on
hearsay alone, is more than a technical rule of evidence, and, next, there is
nothing in the act before us which justifies the conclusion that the Legisla-
ture intended any such loose method for determining material facts. The
act permits liberal investigation, by hearing and otherwise; but after all the
data has been gathered without regard to technical rules, then the proofs
must be examined, and that which is not evidence within the meaning of
the law, must be excluded from consideration; that is to say, when all the
irrelevant and incompetent testimony has been put aside, the findings must
rest upon such relevant and competent evidence of sound, probative charac-
ter as may be left, be this circumstantial or direct. 
1 3
The ongoing viability of McCauley is unquestioned.2 4 As Judge
Barbieri insists in his treatise, for example, all findings of fact
must be based on competent evidence and "competent evidence, of
course, does not include pure hearsay.
2 46
Nevertheless, it has also long been the rule that hearsay, even if
objected to, can be evidence if offered to corroborate other, compe-
tent evidence. The leading case in this regard is Nesbit v Vander-
vort & Curry,246 although the principle itself is inferable from Mc-
Cauley. The Nesbit case is one of many decisions arising out of
death claims where the compensation authorities permitted awards
based, in part, upon hearsay statements, prompting appeals by em-
ployers alleging reversible error in the application of the hearsay
rule. In virtually all such cases, however, circumstantial evidence
had also been advanced which by itself could have supported the
award. Under such conditions, all Pennsylvania appellate courts
have consistently held that hearsay is admissible for its corrobora-
of animals either alive or dead"). Even before this development, however, the ailment was
considered compensable as an accident. See generally, H. Kessler, Accidental Injuries 619-
24 (Lea & Febinger 1931).
243. McCauley, 104 A at 621-22 (emphasis added).
244. See also, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v Ceja, 493 Pa 588, 597,
427 A2d 631, 636 (1981).
245. Barbieri, Workmen's Compensation.§ 6.21(7) at 90 (cited in note 37).




The facts of Nesbit are illustrative of this long-standing proposi-
tion. The claimant's deceased was an embalmer for a funeral
home. 247 Competent evidence was advanced for the proposition
that, when the deceased worker left home for work in the day in
question, he had no.scratch on his hand.24 8 The body upon which
he worked, however, had been autopsied, and the ribs had been
separated, leaving sharp edges on the rib bones where they had
been cut. The deceased's duties required him to work in the area
of this anatomical hazard.
249
When the claimant's deceased arrived home from work on the
involved day, he possessed a serious scratch on his finger, and de-
clared to his wife, "Look at the scratch I got embalming that
body," and, "I don't like it, knowing what was wrong with that
body." Similar statements were also made later to the deceased's
physician and to the employer.250
Thereafter, the deceased developed a fatal cellulitis and within
five days was dead. In the course of the fatal claim petition which
followed, the widow and others were permitted to testify with re-
gard to the deceased's statements. An award was made. On appeal,
the admission of the statements was alleged as error.251
As in McCauley, this argument was rejected initially on the
ground that the circumstances alone could have supported an
award, even "leaving out of the case the declarations to his wife
and to the doctor and to the employer .... " The court also in-
sisted, however, that
[w]hile awards in workmen's compensation cases cannot rest wholly on
hearsay evidence. . . , the Workmen's Compensation Law. . . , by its very
nature, contemplates liberality in the admission of proofs and the inferences
reasonably to be drawn therefrom . . ., and where the facts are sufficiently
established by circumstantial evidence, hearsay testimony, not inconsis-
tent therewith, if relevant and material to the fact in issue . .. , may be
considered for the additional light, if any, that it throws on the matter.
252
The ruling in Nesbit has been applied frequently, and is almost
invariably invoked in death cases where hearsay is offered to fur-
ther explain the circumstantial evidence which purports to estab-
247. Nesbit, 193 A at 394.
248. Id at 395.
249. Id at 394.
250. Id at 393-94.
251. Id at 395-96.
252. Id at 395 (emphasis added).
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lish a work-related injury.153
The rule that corroborative hearsay is admissible, however, has
been taken beyond the circumstantial evidence case context. The
contemporary genesis of this expansion is marked by the case of
Irwin Sensenich Corp. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.,
2 5
4
in which the commonwealth court held that no error had been
committed by the referee's admission of, and partial reliance upon,
an objected-to medical report. In the case, the claimant had of-
fered into evidence, over objection, the report of a physician which
corroborated another, testifying physician's opinion that the
claimant had not suffered a specific loss of a limb. In the court's
view, "Although the letter was hearsay and did not qualify as an
admissible medical deposition under section 422, 77 P.S. section
835, it was merely corroborative of [claimant's] medical expert's
testimony and therefore was properly considered by the referee
"255
The cited authority for this proposition was Cody v S.K.F. In-
dus., Inc.,251 a case in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ex-
panded the statement-to-physician hearsay exception in compen-
sation cases. 2 7 An analysis of that case does not reveal that it was
particularly good authority for the proposition that a medical re-
port-setting forth an expert opinion-should come into evidence
in the same manner as would a co-worker's or widow's claim of
what a deceased worker had said as to the cause of an injury. After
all, a "necessity" arguably exists in such cases to allow such testi-
mony, when deemed reliable, in light of the fact that the original
declarant is, obviously, unavailable. Nevertheless, the Irwin Sen-
senich rule does seem supportable under the general residuum
253. See Landis v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 35 Pa Commw 122, 127-28,
393 A2d 246, 248 (1978) (referee did not commit error in allowing hearsay statements from
wife, co-workers and physician as to alleged cause of onset of fatal pulmonary episode where
circumstances demonstrated that deceased had undertaken significant external effort while
working); Leber v Naftulin, 179 Pa Super 22, 24-5, 115 A2d 768, 769-71 (1955) (referee did
not commit error in allowing hearsay statements from wife as to cause of accident, viz., "I
must have hit my head when I fell from the ladder," when deceased had been found by
fellow workers, while at work, "sitting in a dazed condition near the foot of a ladder on
which he had been working"). See also, Lambing v Consolidated Coal Co., 161 Pa Super
346, 54 A2d 291 (1947); Baker v Freed, 188 Pa Super 315, 10 A2d 913 (1940); Chelden Radio
Cab Co., 10 Pa Commw 478, 310 A2d 726 (1973) (police detective could provide hearsay
testimony lending credence to circumstantial evidence indicating that the deceased was shot
to death by a passenger).
254. 15 Pa Commw 518, 327 A2d 644 (1974).
255. Irwin Sensenich Corp., 327 A2d at 646, n.1.
256. 447 Pa 558, 291 A2d 772 (1972).
257. See notes 336 to 343 and accompanying text.
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rule, as formulated in McCauley, which provides that traditionally
incompetent evidence may be considered as long as there is suffi-
cient competent evidence of record to support a decision.
In any event, the expanded rule has been popular with the com-
monwealth court. In Huff v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(Ingalls Steel of Pa.) ,5 for example, the court held that the refe-
ree properly admitted the reports of one of the employer's consult-
ing physicians, since they "tended to corroborate the testimony of
the [examining] neurologist[, whose deposition was offered], and
were discussed by the referee in that manner. In workmen's com-
pensation cases, hearsay testimony, if relevant and material to the
facts at issue, may be considered for the additional light it sheds
on the matter. '2 29 The same result followed in Koppers Co. v
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Boyle), 60 where the court
held admissible a report "properly considered as corroborative of
the oral testimony of [claimant's physician], particularly since it
supported to some extent the diagnosis and referee's conclusion
that silicosis was the responsible cause of claimant's disability.
'261
The third principle, dealing with the sufficiency of non-objected-
to hearsay to support critical findings of fact, is not as settled as it
should be. In negligence cases, of course, the rule is that if no ob-
jection is lodged to hearsay testimony, it can be offered into evi-
dence and can support a verdict. 262 This rule was held applicable
in workmen's compensation cases by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Poluski v Glen Alden Coal Co.
263
In that case, the claimant's deceased was a coal miner who re-
lated to co-workers and his physician-a significant period of time
after an injury to his toe-that he had "finished it," and that "he
had hurt it in the mines." He died soon after of blood poisoning.2
258. 70 Pa Commw 646, 453 A2d 753 (1982).
259. Huff, 453 A2d at 755.
260. 113 Pa Commw 161, 536 A2d 509 (1988).
261. Koppers, 536 A2d at 512.
262. See Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review v Ceja, 493 Pa 588, 599, 427
A2d 631, 636-37 (1981). See also, Hurrah v Montour Ry. Co., 321 Pa 526, 528, 184 A 666, 667
(1936).
263. 286 Pa 473, 133 A 819 (1926). See also, Renfrew v State Workmen's Ins. Fund, 13
WCB 203 (1928), where the court stated the following:
a great deal of testimony as to the claimant's condition prior to his death was in the
nature of hearsay evidence. The same was not objected to and must therefore be
considered as if it were admissible. A rule of evidence not invoked is waived.
Renfrew, 13 WCB at 204. See also, Nesbit v Vandervort & Curry, 128 Pa Super 58, 62, 193
A 393, 395 (1937).
264. Poluski, 133 A at 819-20.
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The compensation authorities permitted the testimony of the co-
workers and the physician as to the cause of the injury, and the
employer appealed the case to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
alleging error in the admission of such evidence. The court, how-
ever, affirmed the compensation authorities. In affirming the lower
court, the supreme court noted that it was true, in this regard, that
the statements were made too long after the alleged incident to be
part of the res gestae, and hence admissible as a hearsay excep-
tion.2" The claimant had in fact admitted this, and had argued
instead on appeal that the finding of a work-related injury should
be "sustained . . . because the evidence was admitted without ob-
jection as proof of these substantive facts."26 With this argument
the supreme court was in agreement: "Under this state of the rec-
ord [the statements] must be treated as though counsel deemed
them part of the res gestae, or, if not, then that they were of suffi-
cient probative value for the purpose intended; that is, to show a
compensable case.
''267
The court then announced the general rule in compensation pro-
ceedings which has never been overruled:
Where evidence, incompetent as hearsay, is admitted without objection and
is relevant and material to the fact in issue, the court may give it the value
of direct evidence, and on it base a finding of fact; or it may be treated, by
what may be taken as consent, as part of the res gestae in determining the
issue.
The essence of the hearsay rule is a requirement that testimonial assertions
shall be subjected to the test of cross-examination.
But an opponent may waive such requirements, as well as the right to be
confronted by the witness .... 28
Importantly, pursuant to this analysis, unobjected-to hearsay
"evidence is [, in fact,] competent to the full extent of such proba-
tive value as it may have under all the circumstances. '' 2,9 Of
course, pursuant to this analysis, the award in the Poluski case was
affirmed.
The arguably unsettled aspect of the law on this issue stems
from the anomalous and unsatisfactory decision in Gallick v Work-
265. Id at 820 ("There is nothing in the evidence thus quoted or in the statements
later made to his wife and son that would bring them within the res gestae rule.").
266. Id.
267. Id.




men's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Dept. of Environmental Re-
sources).70 In that case, the claimant refused, or otherwise failed,
to attend the hearing at which the employer advanced its termina-
tion petition. As a result, the employer's affidavit of recovery was
admitted into evidence with no objection lodged by the claimant.
The evidence was found credible and the claimant's benefits were
terminated.
71
On appeal, the commonwealth court specifically found that the
claimant had no good excuse for failing to attend the hearing and
rejected the notion that the referee had abused his discretion in
denying a continuance.2 72 Without reference to, or acknowledg-
ment of, Poluski, however, the court thereafter held that
unobjected-to hearsay could not, as a matter of law, support the
termination award.
This conclusion was reached by way of application of the "hear-
say guidelines" set forth in the non-workmen's compensation case
of Walker v Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review.273 In
that case, the commonwealth court had analyzed an extended line
of cases in unemployment which dealt with the "issue of the use of
hearsay to support the findings of the Unemployment Board." The
court recognized that the cases were contradictory, at least one up-
holding the traditional rule "that evidence, admitted without ob-
jection, may be given its natural and probative effect and may sup-
port the Board's findings. 2 74 Other cases, however, condemned the
practice of the Board making findings on hearsay alone, even when
not objected to.
To remedy the situation, the Walker court set forth a pair of
guidelines regarding the "use of hearsay to support the findings of
the [Unemployment Compensation] Board, 2 75 which provide the
following:
(1) Hearsay evidence, properly objected to, is not competent evidence to
support a finding of the Board . . .
(2) Hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, will be given its natural
probative effect and may support a finding of the Board, if it is corrobo-
rated by any competent evidence in the record, but a finding of fact based
solely on hearsay will not stand.
2 7
1
270. 108 Pa Commw 617, 530 A2d 945 (1987).
271. Gallick, 530 A2d at 946.
272. Id at 946-47.
273. 27 Pa Commw 522, 367 A2d 366 (1976).
274. Walker, 367 A2d at 370;
275. Id at 369.
276. Id at 370.
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The Walker declaration was supported by neither critical analy-
sis or statutory support, nor did the court make any suggestion
that the guidelines were to apply in workmen's compensation.
Although Walker has been criticized,"" it has nevertheless sur-
vived 78 and has been applied in a variety of Pennsylvania admin-
istrative law contexts.27 In workmen's compensation, however, ten
years passed before the surprising declaration was forthcoming
from the commonwealth court that Walker applied in proceedings
before referees. Indeed, in early 1987, the writers of a leading
workmen's compensation treatise made no mention of Walker and,
to the contrary, declared that "[h]earsay evidence may be admissi-
ble in compensation hearings as in other trials if it is relevant and
material to the issues and if there is no objection."280
Later in that year, however, the commonwealth court, seemingly
oblivious to the clear supreme court precedent, announced in Gal-
lick that the Walker guidelines applied in workmen's compensa-
tion cases.28' Little doubt, however, must attach to the proposition
that Gallick is most certainly decided improperly. The supreme
court decision in Poluski is the precedent which controls and
which clearly applies the common-law rule in the context of work-
men's compensation. It is submitted, accordingly, that Gallick
must be rejected as anomalous and of no precedential value.2 2
277. See Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review v Ceja, 493 Pa 588, 601-02, 427
A2d 631, 637-38 (1981).
278. See for example, Vann v Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 508 Pa
Commw 139, 494 A2d 1081 (1985).
279. See for example, Lehigh County OCYS v Department of Public Welfare, 101 Pa
Commw 491, 550 A2d 269 (1988); Bassett v Civ. Serv. Comm'n., City of Phila., 100 Pa
Commw 356, 514 A2d 784 (1986).
280. Siegel & Stander, Pennsylvania Workers' at 112 (cited in note 71). See also, I.
Stander, Guide to Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation: Second Series 103 (Packard Press
1984) (writing in 1984, author declares that "[i]t must be remembered that if otherwise
excludable hearsay comes into the record without objection, it will be accorded the same
weight as direct evidence. . ."). Accord, Skinner, Pennsylvania Workmen's at 755 (cited in
note.16) ("[TIhe rule of evidence which requires objection to be made to incompetent testi-
mony if it is not to be received and acted upon is one of the rules which will be enforced.").
See also, Barbieri, Workmen's Compensation § 6.21(7)(e) (cited in note 37) ("Of course,
any hearsay statements which are not objected to, when admitted, become competent evi-
dence of facts and circumstances stated therein ... ").
281. The Gallick court implied that Walker had already been applied in workmen's
compensation. The court in this regard cited North Schuylkill School Dist. v Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd. (Babiak), 83 Pa Commw 506, 477 A2d 910 (1984). That case,
however, while mentioning Walker, did not cite it for any proposition that was not already
firmly entrenched in workmen's compensation law. Gallick was the first time that Walker
was truly "applied" in workmen's compensation.
282. Few arguments should be required to support this assertion. The most obvious
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Unobjected-to hearsay can and should constitute competent evi-
dence in workmen's compensation cases, and should be deemed
sufficient to support critical findings of fact.28a To apply the
Walker rule would result in an administrative regime in which the
evidence rules are more strictly applied than in trespass cases.
Such an irrational result should not prevail, especially in light of
Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent to the contrary.
3. Practical Treatment of Hearsay, The Definition of Hearsay,
and "Exceptions" to the Hearsay Rule
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, the relaxation of the
rules of evidence in compensation cases permits the admission of
hearsay in a variety of contexts. Nevertheless, the admonition that
hearsay alone is not sufficient to support critical findings results, or
should result, as a practical matter, in the sustaining of objections
to most hearsay.
It is submitted that this follows because referees are well aware
of the traditional instruction against findings based on hearsay
alone, and will thus usually refuse the admission of such presump-
tively incompetent testimony. This will follow, or should follow,
unless, at an earlier juncture in the case, competent testimony to
support the relevant matter has been offered. While other ap-
proaches may exist with regard to the practical treatment of hear-
say, the foregoing is perhaps the best approach to ensure that the
record does not become cluttered with hopelessly incompetent
testimony.
The approach to be avoided, certainly, is the referee's condi-
tional admission of all hearsay, premised upon the expectation: that
such evidence will be rejected and not relied upon if competent
testimony is not ultimately produced on the involved point. Such
an approach is not, as a technical matter, at odds with the original
McCauley formulation, which speaks of sifting through all of the
proffered evidence in search of the competent evidence which may
reason that Gallick is an anomaly is, of course, that it conflicts with the express decision of
a higher court. More importantly, there were no relevant changes in any statute which
would suggest that Poluski is outmoded. Finally, an analysis of Walker demonstrates that,
even when applied to unemployment cases, it has no grounding in reason or precedent.
283. Larson indicates in. his treatise that Pennsylvania follows a "residium" rule,
based upon Walker, in workmen's compensation cases. This unfortunate and incorrect claim
results from the erroneous Gallick decision. See Larson, 2B Workmen's § 79.21 at 15-426.57
(cited in note 18).
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be applied to support the critical finding involved.2 " Such an ap-
proach is not typically undertaken-for which all should be thank-
ful-most probably because it is administratively inefficient, and
because of the common understanding discussed in the foregoing
paragraph.
Another reason exists, however, for disallowing such wholesale
admission of hearsay. In this regard, it is true that the referee is a
sophisticated fact-finder285 and should be able to ignore incompe-
tent proofs, but the wholesale, blind admission of hearsay testi-
mony in compensation cases has the potential, though surely re-
duced, for poisoning the well of justice in a similar manner as
would revelation of such evidence to a jury in a common pleas
trial.
Admission of suspect hearsay proofs may also breed lack of trust
and confidence in the referee and the compensation system in gen-
eral on the part of the parties to the litigation. One need only
think of the usual distrust that is held by the public for the district
justice system-in which there rarely are any rules of evidence en-
countered -to imagine how injured workers and employer person-
nel would react to wholesale entertaining by referees of alleged
statements by individuals not available in court to be cross-ex-
amined. Such a practice should, accordingly, be avoided.
Because of this practical treatment of hearsay in compensation
cases, it is essential to be conscious of the definition of hearsay.
There is no particular mystery in this regard. As Referee Stander,
a leading expert, summarizes, "Hearsay is an out-of-court state-
ment to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Such a statement
can be by verbal declaration, or in writing, or may consist of non-
verbal behavior,-if [such non-verbal behavior] is meant by the de-
clarant to be an assertion.
' '286
The foregoing characterization corresponds with the common
284. See McCauley v Imperial Woolen Co., 261 Pa 312, 326, 104 A 619, 622 (1918).
Accord, Stander, Guide at 108 (cited in note 280): "[U]nder the liberalized rules in work-
men's compensation cases which allow the introduction of evidence on a quantum basis,
hearsay evidence is not barred, but, as pointed out above, it cannot be used, standing alone,
to support findings of fact." Accord, Skinner, Pennsylvania Workmen's at 709 (cited in.note
16): "It would appear that it is not error to admit hearsay testimony provided the finding is
not based on that evidence."
285. See Levonchuck v Ken Ost Automotive, 4 PAWCLR 1054, 1055 (1990) (Work-
men's Compensation Appeal Board decision) (Although improper evidence was presented ex
parte to referee, award to claimant would not be reversed: "[Tihe Referee, as an impartial
finder of fact, has the sophistication to ignore such improper material.")
286. Stander, Guide at 103 (cited in note 280).
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law formulation 287 which the commonwealth court has frequently
articulated as applicable in the course of other administrative
agency proceedings,28 8 including workmen's compensation proceed-
ings. As explained by the court in Cleland Simpson Co. v Work-
men's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Decker & Moosic Borough),289
the "elements of hearsay" are "1) a statement made by an out-of-
court declarant, 2) that is offered for the truth of the matter
asserted.
29 0
There is no evidence, accordingly, that the definition of hearsay
is any different in workmen's compensation than in trespass cases.
The same rigorous, threshold analysis of evidence alleged to be
hearsay should thus be undertaken in compensation cases, as
would be the case in jury trials.291 Ultimately, of course, such evi-
dence may be offered into evidence if it is corroborative of compe-
tent evidence, pursuant to the relaxed rules, but the definitional
threshold analysis is not affected by that principle.
The logical counterpart to this principle is that the various ex-
ceptions to the common law hearsay rule should naturally be
thought to apply in compensation practice. The decisions with re-
gard to these exceptions are multitudinous and have been re-
counted with great skill in the leading evidence treatise. 92 In nu-
merous cases, however, the exceptions have been applied in
workmen's compensation cases, and work as valuable precedents in
compensation practice. Further, in the case of the statement-to-
physician exception, it is apparently the case that the exception
has been liberalized specifically for compensation cases.
a. Compensation Cases and Non-Hearsay
Because hearsay embraces an out-of-court statement intended to.
prove the truth of the matter asserted, it follows that not every
out-of-court statement will be adjudged inadmissible hearsay. As
287. See Packel & Poulin, Evidence § 801 at 541 (cited in note 58).
288. See for example, Caloric Corp. v Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review,
70 Pa Commw 182, 186, 452 A2d 907, 909 (1982). See also, Hughes v Unemployment Com-
pensation Bd. of Review, 51 Pa Commw 448, 453, 414 A2d 757, 759 (1980).
289. 128 Pa Commw 62, 562 A2d 981 (1989).
290. Cleland Simpson Co, 562 A2d at 985 (citing criminal law cases and common law
treatise).
291. See for example, Baird v Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 30 Pa
Commw 118, 122, 372 A2d 1254, 1257 (1977) (commonwealth court citing trespass case and
common law evidence treatise for definition of hearsay under unemployment compensation
law).
292. See Packel & Poulin, Evidence §§ 801-805 (cited in note 58).
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recounted accurately by Referee Stander, "If an out-of-court state-
ment is offered for the proof that such a statement was made, but
not to prove the truth of the allegations contained therein, such a
declaration should not be considered as hearsay. "293
This settled principle was recently applied in the Cleland Simp-
son case, 294 cited above, in which hearsay objections were lodged
against a family member's claim that she overheard her mother
placing a phone call to the deceased worker's (her husband's) em-
ployer informing the employer of the worker having sustained a
work-related injury. Such testimony was critical for notice of in-
jury to be established by the claimant.
The witness, the deceased worker's daughter, claimed specifically
that she had overheard her mother call the employer and say that
"my father was in Intensive Care due to a heart attack caused by
overworking and exertion. 2 95 Hearsay objections were overruled,
benefits were awarded and the ruling was alleged as error. The
commonwealth court, however, disagreed:
In the instant case, [the witness] is testifying from personal knowledge of
what she heard and saw. Furthermore, her testimony is being offered as
proof that the telephone call to the employer occurred, not for the purpose
of showing that the injury was work-related. Analysis of this testimony
shows that it is not hearsay at all .... 96
Accordingly, the finding of timely notice was upheld.'
Another form of non-hearsay,297 which has been treated in the
cases, are prior inconsistent statements which have been made by a
non-party testifying witness. In cases at common law, and in at
least one under the Act, the traditional rule was that "prior incon-
sistent statements were admissible only to impeach," and could
not be offered as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in the prior inconsistent statement.2 98
In Commonwealth v Brady,299 however, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court rejected the old rule and held that such statements
could be used as evidence.300 The rule has now been applied in a
293. Stander, Guide at 103-04 (cited in note 280). See Commonwealth v Wright, 455
Pa 480, 485, 317 A2d 271, 273 (1974).
294. 128 Pa Commw 62, 562 A2d 981 (1989).
295. Cleland Simpson Co., 562 A2d at 985.
296. Id.
297. See Packel & Poulin, Evidence § 801.5 at 549-52 (cited in note 58).
298. Id at 549.
299. 510 Pa 123, 507 A2d 66 (1986).
300. Brady, 507 A2d at 70.
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negligence case,301 so there should be little doubt that the rule
should also apply in the compensation cases.
Accordingly, the holding to the contrary in Vital Signs Inst. v
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Burke)303 must be consid-
ered an anomaly. In that case, the employer had cross-examined
the claimant's physician by way of reference to his early reports
which included inconsistencies with his sworn testimony. The em-
ployer sought to include the reports as evidence, but the offer was
refused by the referee. On appeal, this was held to be correct, with-
out reference being made to Brady.3 '
The court in this regard considered only the role of section 422,
which permits use of reports in cases involving fewer than twenty-
five weeks of disability:
[The employer] acknowledges that it used those letters at the deposition of
Dr. Segin for the purpose of attempting to establish inconsistencies with his
sworn testimony. Such use was proper; however, under section 422, the let-
ters and reports may not be admitted as substantive evidence in
themselves.3 "
While it is unclear why the court made no reference to Brady,
what can be safely said is that the wording of section 422, which
would indeed seem to preclude the admission of reports in other
than small claims cases, does not mean that other rules of evidence
or exceptions may not be applied to support their admission in ap-
propriate cases.305 Plainly, in any event, if this exception to the
common law rule has been made in criminal cases and trespass
cases, it most certainly applies in compensation cases. Accordingly,
it is submitted that the quoted declaration constitutes an anomaly.
b. Compensation Cases and Hearsay Exceptions
Numerous workmen's compensation cases deal with the applica-
tion of the many hearsay "exceptions" which have developed over
the years. Among these are cases dealing with the admissibility of
business records and death certificates. Certainly, however, the
301. See Estate of Dankulich v Tarantino, 110 Pa Commw 559, 564-65, 532 A2d 1243,
1245-46 (1987).
302. 114 Pa Commw 191, 538 A2d 617 (1988).
303. Vital Signs, 538 A2d at 622.
304. Id.
305. See for example, Scannella v Salerno Importing Co., 2 Pa Commw 11, 14-5, 275
A2d 907, 909 (1971) (although hospital records were admissible under section 422 of the Act,
they were also admissible under the Business Records Act; court performs analysis of admis-
sibility pursuant to such Act in compensation cases).
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most significant line of cases in this category deals with the res
gestae rule and other similar exceptions.
(i) Business Records
With regard to business records, the leading compensation case
is Alcoa v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 06 in which the
commonwealth court indicated that the rigors of the Business
Records as Evidence Act30 7 do have application in compensation
cases. In Alcoa, the claimant's deceased, an industrial worker, died
of heart failure roughly two weeks after first complaining of
problems in his shoulders and arms. When the symptoms had first
occurred, he was treated by his family physician, who provided the
deceased worker with medication for arthritis. 08
A fatal claim was then presented based on the theory that claim-
ant's efforts at work immediately before the office visit precipi-
tated the onset of the fatal cardiac malady. During the course of
the hearings, the "[e]mployer sought the admission of the records
[of the family physician] as proof that decedent had been diag-
nosed and treated . . . on [the critical date] for arthritis, not myo-
cardial infarction." The employer sought such admission because
the family physician had died prior to the proceedings, and was
hence not available for testimony.10 9
The claimant, however, objected on the grounds that "the docu-
ments did not initially qualify as business records" under the Uni-
form Business Records as Evidence Act."'0 That objection was sus-
tained by the referee. The commonwealth court agreed with the
ruling. Accordingly, the "medical records of a deceased physician
may be admissible even though they include opinion and diagno-
sis," but they must "first qualify as business records under the
306. 49 Pa Commw 152, 410 A2d 945 (1980).
307. Act of July 9, 1976, P L 586, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6108 (Purdon 1982). The Act
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(b) General Rule - A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as relevant,
be competent evidence if the custodian or otherwise qualified witness testifies to its
identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of
business at or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of
the tribunal, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as
to justify its admission.
Id.
308. Alcoa, 410 A2d at 946.
309. Id at 948.
310. See 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6108 (Purdon Supp 1990).
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Act."3 '
The defects in the employer's presentation, in this regard, were
two-fold. First, the identifying witness had not worked with the
physician for many years, and hence "could not satisfactorily iden-
tify the signature in the documents." Further, "no foundation had
been laid for the authentication of the documents as contempora-
neously-made business records, where the identifying witness was
not the custodian of the records.
312
Reference to the applicability of the statutory business records
exception was also made in Scannella v Salerno Importing Co.,
313
in which the commonwealth court held that hospital records would
be admissible in evidence in compensation cases not only under
section 422 of the compensation act, but under the Uniform Busi-
ness Records as Evidence Act as well. The court then indicated
that the interpretation afforded to that Act under the common law
cases would apply to the admissibility of hospital records in com-
pensation cases." 4
In the Alcoa case, it is quite evident that the statutory evidence
rule was applied strictly, notwithstanding the explicit provision in
the Act that the "statutory rules of evidence" are not to apply and
that, in general, the rules of evidence are to be applied with flexi-
bility. However, this may probably be explained by the fact that
the records involved contained crucial opinion evidence. The non-
offering party would thus be greatly prejudiced by the offer of a
critical piece of hearsay without the circumstantial guarantee of re-
liability, which reliability is meant to be evidenced by way of the
offering party's compliance with the requirements of the business
records statutory exception. - -: "
Thus it is unclear whether the commonwealth court would insist
on strict compliance with every element of the business records act
when such records are being offered in less crucial contexts. Such a
situation would arise, for example, in a notice-of-injury case where
the claimant has testified that he provided notice by calling in to
the employer's dispatcher and telling that individual. of his incur-
rence of a work-related injury."1 If the call-in logs contain no such
entry of a report, and if it is standard practice to record such re-
311. Alcoa, 410 A2d at 948.
312. Id.
313. 2 Pa Commw 11, 275 A2d 907 (1971).
314. Scannella, 275 A2d at 909-10.
315. See generally, section 311 of the Act, 77 Pa Stat § 631 (Purdon Supp Pamphlet
1990).
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ports on the log, the document is obviously a business record that
the employer would be seeking to introduce. In this instance, no
opinion evidence is involved, and presumably the court would be-
less insistent on strict compliance with the statutory exception.
While this general inquiry remains unaddressed by the court, it
is certainly the better practice to comply with the provisions of the
Act when seeking the admission of business records. As the authors
of the leading treatise admonish, the "relaxed rules. . . should not
be relied upon by counsel.
' '31 6
(ii) Death Certificates/Autopsy Reports
The longstanding rule 31 7 of the compensation cases is that death
certificates, though technically hearsay, are competent evidence
and, in fact, constitute prima facie evidence, "albeit not conclusive,
of both the fact and the cause of death. '318 The certificate must, of
course, reflect such an expression of an opinion as to cause that it
is legally sufficient.319 Further, if there is some reason to suspect
the trustworthiness of facts asserted in the certificate or the com-
petency of its author, the certificate is not competent evidence of
the facts in question. This latter rule was applied in Leonard v
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.,320 in which a death certifi-
cate was held incompetent and thus inadmissible because there
was no autopsy performed, and because the certificate was pre-
pared and signed by a deputy lay coroner.
32 1,
The admissibility of death certificates, even in compensation
cases, is grounded on section 810 of the Vital Statistics Law,322
which makes records such as death certificates "prima facie evi-
dence of [their] contents .... "323 Accordingly, autopsy reports,
which are not records prepared pursuant to the Vital Statistics
Law, do not have the same presumptive force as do death certifi-
cates. Autopsies may be undertaken for a variety of reasons," 4 and
316. Siegel & Stander, Pennsylvania Workers' at 128 (cited in note 71).
317. See Castor v Ruffing, 178 Pa Super 124, 128-29, 112 A2d 412, 414 (1955).
318. Hauck v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 47 Pa Commw 554, 557, 408 A2d
585, 587 (1979). See also, Novak v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 59 Pa Commw
596, 602, 430 A2d 703, 707 (1981). -
319. See Hauck, 408 A2d at 587.
320. 61 Pa Commw 200, 433 A2d 572 (1981).
321. Leonard, 433 A2d at 574, n.3.
322. Act of June 29, P L 304, as amended, 35 Pa Stat § 450.810 (Purdon 1977). See
Hauck, 408 A2d at 587.
323. Hauck, 408 A2d at 587.
324. See 35 Pa Stat § 111 et seq (Purdon 1977).
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the reports which are thereafter generated are not requisites in
every death case, as are certificates. Certainly, however, such re-
ports can be of significant persuasive value, as illustrated by a re-
cent commonwealth court case.32 5 The hearsay nature of such re-
ports must normally be overcome by taking the deposition of the
preparer.
(iii) Res Gestae ("Excited Utterance")
Numerous cases over the many years of interpretation of the Act
have addressed the operation of the res gestae, or "excited utter-
ance," exception. The definition in compensation cases is no differ-
ent than in negligence cases. As explained in the landmark com-
pensation case of Cody v S.K.F. Indus.,
32 6
A res gestae declaration is a spontaneous utterance by an individual whose
mind has suddenly been made subject to an overpowering emotion caused
by some unexpected and shocking act or occurrence .... The utterance is
generated by, or springs out of the act, and the words are in a sense part of
the act itself ... The words, which are in the nature of this emotional
impulsive outburst, must be in the same continuous transaction into the
acts, thus they are in a sense integrated with the acts .... The utterance
must be near in time to the occurrence and to ensure trustworthiness it
normally must be spoken to one of the first persons seen by the declarant
after the act .... The declaration must be spoken under conditions which
ensure that it is not the result of premeditation, consideration or design,
and it cannot be in the form of a narration or attempted explanation of past
events .... 327
As the court further explained, "The exciting event, closely fol-
lowed by the spontaneous exclamation emanating from the event,
insures the truthfulness of the declaration, thus allowing for its ad-
mission into evidence."3 8
The determination of whether a particular declaration consti-
tutes a res gestae statement is made on a case-by-case analysis. It
has been often held, in this regard, that
[n]o definite limit has been fixed . .. in determining what utterances are
part of the res gestae. Each case must stand on its own facts and circum-
stances, and the length of time is only one of the elements to be considered
325. See Johnson v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.), 107 Pa Commw 164, 527 A2d 638 (1987). See generally, 82 Am Jur 2d Workmen's
Compensation § 543 at 279 (1976).
326. 447 Pa 558, 291 A2d 772 (1972). See also, Siano v Workmen's Compensation Ap-
peal Bd. (DiLeo's Rest), - Pa Commw - , - A2d - (1991).
327. Cody, 291 A2d at 774-75 (citations omitted).
328. Id at 775.
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in determining if the utterance comes within the rule.329
The commonwealth court has generally been deferential to the
fact-finding role of referees with regard to determinations in this
regard. It is still conceivable, however, that an overly strict appli-
cation of the res gestae rule by a referee could be reversed by the
court to permit the allegedly incompetent evidence.
The superior court compensation case of Giordano v Ralph J.
Bianco, Inc.33 0 is instructive in this general regard. In that case,
the referee had granted fatal claim benefits based upon objected-to
hearsay as to the cause of the deceased worker's death, ruling that
it was within the res gestae exception. The deceased worker had
been working on a scaffold as a carpenter at a job site one and one-
half blocks from his home. He apparently fell and suffered various
traumatic injuries. He then apparently walked home and, accord-
ing to his wife, looked ill and said that "[I] just fell off a scaffold at
work."33 ' He died not long after.
On appeal, the Appeal Board and common pleas court joined in
reversing the award of benefits, claiming that the relied-upon
statement was outside the res gestae. On further appeal, however,
the superior court reinstated the award. The court, in this regard,
relied upon the principle of liberality in proofs in compensation
cases:
There is no question that the statements would fall out of the exception to
the hearsay rule in the strict interpretation of the law of evidence in the
courts but in the informal atmosphere of the referee's hearings and in view
of the admonition of liberality in the admission of proofs in these cases we
are of the opinion that the statements of the claimant and her daughter




Thus, while it is the case that perhaps increased flexibility in
terms of the res gestae rule may be entertained in compensation
cases, in general the cases reveal a fairly narrow interpretation of
the rule. For example, in the Cody'. case, the claimant's husband
came home early, directly from work, complaining of a headache
and of having suffered a blow to his head when a garage door at
work hit him. A few days later, he was dead. The declaration,
which was not terribly different from that in Giordano, was held to
329. Id at 775, n.l. See also, Thompson v Conemaugh Iron Works, 114 Pa Super 247,
254-55, 145 A 45, 48 (1934).
330. 204 Pa Super 219, 203 A2d 396 (1964).
331. Giordano, 203 A2d at 397.
332. Id at 398.
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be outside the res gestae, since the intervening trip home had de-
stroyed the "continuous transaction" required under the common
law construction of the rule.3 83
(iv) Statement to Physician
The general, civil rule with regard to statements to a physician is
that declarations as to "symptoms, feelings and conditions" are ad-
missible, "insofar as they [are] necessary and proper for diagnosis
and treatment of the injury and [refer] to symptoms, feelings and
conditions.""33 On the other hand, "statements which [relate] to
the cause of the injury [are] not admissible, unless they [are] part
of the res gestae."3 35
In the Cody case, quoted above, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court created an exception for compensation cases, and held that
statements made to a physician as to the cause of an injury, when
the injury was unwitnessed and where the party involved has died,
are admissible as substantive evidence. 336 Accordingly, although
the deceased's statements to his wife were inadmissible, as dis-
cussed above, subsequent statements to the same effect which he
made to his physician-three days later-were admissible.33 7
The controlling notion in creation of the exception was that the
declaration by the patient should be thought to be trustworthy. At
the same time, the exception is not to-be applied automatically:
Such an exception ... can be justified on grounds of circumstantial guaran-
tee of trustworthiness and necessity. As to trustworthiness, for a patient to
misrepresent to a treating physician the cause of his physical injury would
.be totally contrary to his most vital concern of saving his life and restoring
his health. Moreover, statements as to cause, as long as they are germane to
treatment are inseparable from the description of the injury and the pain it
is causing the declarant. We believe that as long as there are no circum-
stances casting suspicion on the genuineness of the utterances, statements
as to cause clearly meet the trustworthiness test."8
333. Cody, 291 A2d at 775. Given this generally strict construction, the court's decla-
ration, in another case, that statements made by the claimant when he was at the hospital
(long after the stressful events which allegedly constituted his injury) were admissible under
the res gestae exception is erroneous. See Twp. of Haverford v Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Bd. (Angstadt), 118 Pa Commw 467, 545 A2d 971 (1988).
334. Cody, 291 A2d at 776.
335. Id at 776 (emphasis added). See also, Packel & Poulin, Evidence § 803.4 at 577
(cited in note 58).
336. Cody, 291 A2d at 776.
337. Id at 773-74, 777.
338. Id at 776.
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Creating this exception was also compelled, in the court's words,
because of the "flexible approach" to treatment of the hearsay ex-
ceptions in compensation cases.339
The Cody exception has been repeatedly applied by the com-
monwealth court, and always in the context of death cases.340 This
fact is most likely what leads the authors of the leading treatise to
declare, accurately, that the "Cody case may be limited in applica-
tion to death cases, based on the 'necessity' test discussed" in the
case. 4" The cases have clearly indicated that the declaration as to
cause can either be in the physician's notes, as was presumably the
case in Cody, but also in hospital records . 2 The court has also
limited the exception to declarations made to treating physicians,
not physicians independently retained later by the employer or in-
surance carrier.
34 3
(v) Then-Existing Physical Condition
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has established a hear-
say exception for declarations pertinent to the declarant's then-ex-
isting physical condition, at least when the declarant is deceased.
The critical distinction to be made with regard to this exception
and the foregoing is that the declaration can be made to any other
person, and not only to a physician.
The cases illustrate these principles. In the initial case, House
Moving v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.,34" the deceased
had been injured at work, but then returned after having received
compensation. Although the medical records did not reflect it, his
widow testified that upon his=.return to work he was still having
significant symptoms. After a month, or two, the worker died. The
339. Id at 777.
340. See F.W. Kestle Assoc. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 54 Pa Commw
313, 316, 421 A2d 489, 491 (1981); Hatboro-Horsham Sch. Dist. v Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Bd., 35 Pa Commw 73, 76, 384 A2d 1050, 1053 (1978); Czanker v Sky Top Lodge,
Inc., 13 Pa Commw 220, 231, 318 A2d 379, 382 (1974). See also, Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Bd. v Guttman, 23 Pa Commw 177, 180, 351 A2d 326, 327 (1976) (physician's under-
standing of injury rather vague, but declaration still held admissible).
341. Stander & Siegel, Pennsylvania Workers' at 130 (cited in note 71). The sugges-
tion here is that statements to a physician outside the res gestae exception are only admissi-
ble in compensation cases involving death, not injury.
342. Landis v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 35 Pa Commw 122, 126-27, 383
A2d 246, 247 (1978). See also, Bethlehem Steel Corp. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd., 66 Pa Commw 579, 581, 445 A2d 843, 845 (1982).
343. Crangi Dist. Co. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 17 Pa Commw 530,
536, 333 A2d 207, 211 (1975).
344. 38 Pa Commw 21, 391 A2d 1105 (1978).
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employer lodged hearsay objections to the widow's description of
the deceased's ongoing chest pains, nausea and vomiting.34 5 They
were nevertheless allowed, and an award of compensation was
made. On appeal, the admission of such hearsay statements was
alleged as error, but the commonwealth court disagreed:
The prevailing view in other jurisdictions in non-workmen's compensation
cases appears to be that statements of a declarant's then existing physical
condition, such as expressions of pain, are admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule, regardless of to whom the statements are directed .... Al-
though this exception has apparently never been explicitly recognized in
Pennsylvania, neither the Board nor the referee are bound by the technical
rules of evidence. . . . In addition, our Supreme Court has indicated that
the exceptions to the hearsay rule may be more flexibly applied in work-
men's compensation cases than in other areas. . . . We therefore hold that
[the widow's] testimony, in its entirety, is competent evidence to support
the referee's findings.
3 48
Subsequent cases have refused to expand this exception. For ex-
ample, in Harkins v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
(Gulf Oil Corp.), 47 the court refused to permit a widow to testify
regarding statements as to the alleged cause of physical complaints
she reported that her husband had recounted to her. The same re-
fusal to so expand the exception was recently evidenced in Whelan
v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (F.H. Sparks Co.). 34
(vi) State of Mind,
The hearsay exception for declarations with respect to the de-
clarant's present mental state or emotion has been specifically ap-
plied in a workmen's compensation case. The rule, in general, has
been described as follows:
[O]ut-of-court statements which are offered to prove the declarant's state of
mind are not within the interdiction of the hearsay rule. For example, when
the declarant's sanity or competency are at issue, statements indicating the
presence or absence of either of these mental traits are properly received
evidence." 9
The reason that the existence of such an exception is useful has
been explained by the authors of the leading treatise: "The law
345. House Moving, 391 A2d at 1106-07.
346. Id at 1107-08 (emphasis added).
347. 98 Pa Commw 441, 511 A2d 927 (1986).
348. 110 Pa Commw 242, 532 A2d 65 (1987).
349. Commonwealth v Wright, 455 Pa 480, 486, 317 A2d 271, 274 (1974) (citations
omitted). See also, Commonwealth v Jermyn, 516 Pa 460, 533 A2d 74 (1987).
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frequently makes state of mind an element of a charge, claim or
defense. In such cases state of mind is in issue, and statements
made by a person indicating his state of mind at the time the
statement was made are admissible.
3 850
This is the case in various aspects of compensation law. In Wid-
dis v Collingdale Millwork Co.,351 for example, the claimant was a
widow seeking death benefits after the suicide of her husband. Fol-
lowing the legal requisites for recovery, she was attempting to
demonstrate that his suicide was undertaken during an uncontrol-
lable frenzy, rather than a rational act. The employer, however, of-
fered four "suicide notes" which the deceased had written to
demonstrate that the suicide was, indeed, undertaken in a rational
manner.3 52 Admission of these letters was alleged as error by the
widow, whose claim had been dismissed. The superior court, how-
ever, disagreed:
Four notes written by decedent shortly before his death were offered in evi-
dence for the purpose of indicating his state of mind when he committed
suicide. The notes were admitted for that single purpose alone. There is no
merit in claimant's contention that the notes were hearsay and should have
been rejected. ... .353
This exception has the potential for application in the hotly-con-
tested and unresolved area of the competency of testimony of vo-
cational counselors in compensation cases. Such counselors are
often retained to locate actual job prospects for workers who have
recovered to the extent that they can do some work, but who still
have some impairment. If such a worker is referred to such a job,
or jobs, it is his duty to "follow through in good faith" on the job
referral, and not to "sabotage" the interview.35'
Evidencing how the claimant has behaved at an interview, and
what he said or did not say, are obviously best proved by adducing
the testimony of the job interviewer. The burden of undertaking
such depositions or live testimony, however, is usually avoided and
350. Packel & Poulin, Evidence §803.3 at 573 (cited in note 58).
351. 169 Pa Super 612, 84 A2d 259 (1951).
352. Widdis, 84 A2d at 260-61.
353. Id at 260 (citations omitted). The exception could probably also have been ap-
plied in the recent case of Haverford Twp. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Ang-
stadt), 118 Pa Commw 467, 545 A2d 971 (1988). In that case, the claimant's deceased died
of an alleged stress heart attack brought on by an overbearing supervisor. According to the
court, "Statements [to co-workers] made by the Decedent under obvious emotional distress
are admissible," but the court then inaccurately applied the res gestae exception.
354. See Kachinski v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Vepco Constr. Co.), 516
Pa 240, 532 A2d 374 (1987).
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is handled by the vocational counselor relating what the inter-
viewer has said in the vocational 'counselor's own testimony. The
hearsay issue in such instances is clear enough, and has been iden-
tified by the commonwealth court. In this regard, in Young v
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Weis Markets),'5 5 Senior
Judge Barbieri hinted that the issue was ultimately to be resolved,
declaring specifically that "[w]e do not reach the issue of whether
or not the information that Employer's vocational counselor re-
ceives over the phone from a prospective employer and testifies to
is inadmissible hearsay."366
Given the relaxation of the rules of evidence in compensation
cases, it would seem to be appropriate to deem as admissible re-
ports of the manner in which the worker presented himself at an
interview. Plainly, the claimant's state of mind and motive are at
issue, and if the worker says things to a disinterested third party
that evidence bad faith or an interest in sabotaging the inter-
view-to ensure that he or she will not be required to return to
work-then such statements should be admissible under the state
of mind exception.
3 57
As the court and the compensation system are always vigilant in
protecting the rights of injured workers, however, it should go
without saying that guarantees of trustworthiness3 58 in permitting
the operation of this exception in this context must prevail. Ac-
cordingly, a vocational counselor should not merely repeat what
has been "received over the phone," but should secure a written
statement from the job interviewer relating specific things which
the claimant has said, and the manner in which claimant appeared.
Such reports should be signed and dated, the traditional earmarks
of presumptive authenticity of such documents. It is submitted
that this proposed use of the exception balances the rule regarding
liberality in treatment of the hearsay exceptions with the need to
protect the claimant from possible prejudice from out-of-court
testimony.
355. 113 Pa Commw 533, 537 A2d 393 (1988).
356. Young, 537 A2d at 396, n.3.
357. Compare Padden v Local 90, United .Ass'n. of Journeymen Plumbers, 168 Pa
Super 611, 617, 82 A2d 327, 330 (1951) (out-of-court statements-by worker "were not inad-
missible as hearsay, but were competent evidence showing [the worker's] motives in refusing
to work. ..").




A dying declaration-one made at the time that the declarant
"believed he would die, death was imminent, and death actually
ensued" 359-was passively applied in the workmen's compensation
case of Bethlehem Steel Corp. v Workmen's Compensation Ap-
peal Bd.360 The circumstances of the case are unremarkable. The
claimant's deceased apparently suffered some sort of severe trauma
at work, unwitnessed, which led to his death, a pre-existing aneu-
rysm having allegedly been ."blown out" '361 by the force of the
trauma.
Immediately prior to his death, but apparently at the hospital
later in the day after the trauma, the deceased told his wife that he
had been struck by a ball of wire. This account was related to, and
relied upon by the claimant's expert in the course of the fatal
claim which thereafter ensued. The statements were admitted, and
that ruling was alleged to be error. In the commonwealth court's
view, however, no error was committed by the referee in admitting
"the testimony of [the widow] on the grounds that the decedent
thought that he was going to die at the time that he gave the rele-
vant account and that his statements were therefore admissible as
dying declarations. '3 62 The court noted that the account of the ac-
cident was also discernible in the hospital records which were ad-
mitted. This account, likewise, was admissible and could have sup-
ported the physician's assumption.
(viii) Admissions
As pointed out by Referee Stander, there are three types of "ad-
missions" which may constitute evidence,363 with only one truly
characterizable as a hearsay exception. Such an admission is an ad-
mission of a party opponent, which the commonwealth court has
applied in compensation cases.
Interestingly, the leading case applied this exception to the
prejudice of a claimant. In that case, Senecal v Workmen's Com-
pensation Appeal Bd.,364 the claimant had alleged that she had
359. Commonwealth v Miller, 490 Pa 457, 471, 417 A2d 128, 135 (1980). See Packel &
Poulin, Evidence § 804.2 at 638 (cited in note 58).
360. 66 Pa Commw 579, 445 A2d 843 (1982).
361. Bethlehem Steel, 445 A2d at 844, 845.
'362. Id at 845, n.2.
363. Stander, Guide at 118 (cited in note 280).
364. 57 Pa Commw 180, 425 A2d 1200 (1981).
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sustained a back injury at work. The employer, however, offered
the testimony of a supervisor, who stated that claimant had in fact
been involved in an automobile accident which had "'shaken [her]
up.'" The court held that this testimony was admissible and
explained:
While this testimony was hearsay, it falls within the party admission excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. As such the statement may be used as substantive
evidence as well as for purposes of impeachment .... Thus, the referee's
finding is supported by competent evidence.68
The appellate court will, however, apparently demand indicia of
trustworthiness before allowing admissions to constitute evidence.
For example, in Frye v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd
(Lafferty Trucking Co.),368 the claimant, an injured worker who
was still receiving compensation, testified in opposition to a peti-
tion to reduce his benefits that defendant's insurance adjuster or
representative "promised [him] that his benefits would not be dis-
continued until he had been rehabilitated and could accept em-
ployment in another line of work." He claimed that, relying on this
promise, he enrolled in college to be re-trained as an engineer.
The court did not reach the issue of whether the alleged promise
would have had any effect on benefit entitlement, even if it were
made, but rejected in any event the notion that it constituted an
admission:
There was no corroboration of the claimant's self-serving, hearsay testimony
relating to the alleged agreement with the insurance agent and we do not
believe that the referee erred in refusing to accept it."e7
Because of the willingness: of the court to entertain arguments
that admissions are acceptable as substantive evidence, it seems
likely that offers into evidence of oral and written statements pro-
vided to insurance adjusters by claimants following an in-
jury-which include admissions-should be admissible, and not
merely ammunition for impeaclment. Because of the court's con-
cern for trustworthiness, however, the best method is still the re-
corded personal or telephone interview, the transcript of which is
usually persuasive and difficult for a claimant to contradict.
There is n.o authority that such transcripts are inadmissible."6 8
365. Senecal, 425 A2d at 1203, n.4 (citing Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Re-
view v Houp, 20 Pa Commw 111, 340 A2d 588 (1975)).
366. 78 PaCommw 427, 467 A2d 659 (1983).
367. Frye, 467 A2d at 661.
368. To the contrary, authority exists in unemployment compensation cases that simi-
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An objection that the transcript should not be admissible because
not properly authenticated, however, is not unreasonable and
probably should be sustained by a referee.
4. Presumptions
Just as there are several presumptions established in the Act, so
there are there presumptions which have developed in the cases
decided under the Act. One which was developed at common law,
viz., the presumption against suicide, 69 has in fact been codified in
the Act by requiring the employer to prove that the death was in-
tentionally self-inflicted. °
Another traditional presumption in compensation cases was es-
tablished many years ago and may be termed the "presumption of
employment. '"3 1 As established in Flucker v Carnegie Steel,3
72
[w]here no facts appear indicating anything to the contrary, it may be pre-
sumed logically that an employe at his regular place of service during his
usual working hours is there in discharge of some duty incident to his em-
ployment and when the dead body of an employe is found on the premises
of his employer, at or near his regular place of service, under circumstances
fairly indicating an accidental death, which probably occurred during the
usual working hours of the deceased, the inference may fairly be drawn in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the employe was injured in the
course of his employment. 7
Although the foregoing has been traditionally deemed a presump-
tion, at least the latter portion of the rule seems to be no more
than a statement of matters provable by circumstantial evidence,
rather than a true presumption.
The cases also indicate that-a "presumption of innocence
3 7 will
prevail in compensation cases. A-worker found dead of a bullet
wound off the premises will, for example, be presumed to have
been feloniously killed. To rebut the presumption, the employer
must demonstrate that the claimant was outside the course of his




lar documents, such as a "confession," are admissible as substantive evidence. Unemploy-
ment Compensation Bd. of Review vHoup, 20 Pa Commw 111, 340 A2d 588 (1975).
369. See note 98 and accompanying text.
370. See note 98 and accompanying text.
371. See Skinner, Pennsylvania Workmen's at 212 (cited in note 16).
372. 263 Pa 113, 106 A 192 (1919).
373. Flucker, 106 A at 194.
374. See Skinner, Pennsylvania Workmen's at 212-13 (cited in note 16).
375. Keyes v N.Y.O. & W.R. Co., 265 Pa 105, 108 A 406 (1920).
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Surely the most notorious presumption is the newly discovered,
or at least newly applied, "presumption of continuing disabil-
ity. '376 Pursuant to this presumption, an employee who has been
injured and then returns to work without impairment will be pre-
sumed as still disabled, at least when the employee returns under a
suspension agreement, as opposed to a termination agreement or
final receipt. This is so even when returning to his or her time-of-
injury job.377
The practical upshot of this is that, if the worker loses his or her
job through such-an event as an economic lay-off, the presumption
purportedly compels the employer to virtually automatically rein-
state"7 8 benefits, notwithstanding the fact that the renewed loss of
earnings has nothing to do with any residual impairment from the
work injury. The logical implication of this reasoning is that the
employee has virtually no burden of proof whatsoever to demon-
strate any work-related impairment, aside from ,merely moving for-
ward to reassert a right to benefits.
3 79
This presumption has been seriously questioned by Judge Barry
of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, 380 and the continuing
survivability of the presumption seems in question. Certainly, seri-
ous intellectual questions surround the integrity of the rule. Per-
haps the oddest aspect of this presumption is that it went unno-
ticed for nearly seventy years before being announced by judicial
fiat in the mid-1980's. Significantly, Judge Barbieri in his 1973
treatise makes no mention of the presumption, but, to the con-
trary, insists that the employee has the burden of proof to demon-
strate work-related disability when he or she seeks reinstatement
while on a suspension.
3 81
5. Relevance in Compensation Cases
For evidence to be admissible in compensation cases, it must be
376. See for example, Fells v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Caterpillar
Tractor Co.), 122 Pa Commw 399, 552 A2d 334 (1988). See also, Certainteed Corp. & Aetna
Cas. & Surety Co. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Williams), 126 Pa Commw 311,
559 A2d 971 (1989).
377. Fells, 552 A2d at 335-36. This rule, however, has now been overthrown by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See note 157.
378. Certainteed Corp., 559 A2d at 973.
379. See Fells, 552 A2d at 335-36.
380. Christopher v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Dravo Corp.), 124 Pa
Commw 562, 556 A2d 544 (1989) (Barry, J., concurring).
381. Barbieri, Workmen's Compensation §6.21(3) at 76 (cited in note 37) (citing Crain
v Small Tubes Products, Inc., 200 Pa Super 426, 188 A2d 766 (1963)).
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relevant to the issue or issues being litigated. The definition of rel-
evance, set forth recently in a workmen's compensation case, is
simple-"Evidence is relevant if it tends to establish facts in
issue."
38 2
The straightforward and simple definition is probably appropri-
ate in compensation cases, in light of the "liberal rules of evidence
followed in workmen's compensation* proceedings . "...383 The
quoted case, indeed, probably supports the further proposition
that even minimally relevant evidence is admissible, although this
practice for purposes of administrative economy is to be avoided.
In that case, Airco Speer Carbon v Workmen's Compensation Ap-
peal Bd.,38" the referee, upon an offer from claimant, had permit-
ted evidence of dust samplings from a factory which were not par-
ticularly relevant to the time period connected with claimant's
injury. A close analysis, however, convinced the court that there
was some minimal relevance which the samplings may have had.
Accordingly, no error was detected. 83
Pursuant to the general definition of relevance, the common-
wealth court has ruled that a referee committed no error in refus-
ing to admit evidence, upon relevancy objections, (1) of a criminal
conviction because it concerned events which occurred at a time
irrelevant to the involved work injury; 3"' (2) of evidence of an em-
ployer's negligence when the employer was seeking subrogation to
an employee's third-party action;3"" and (3) of the existence of a
social security disability award.388
In a recent case,3 89 the referee had refused to admit evidence of a
criminal conviction which post-dated the testimony of a claimant
in the course of a reinstatement petition, apparently on relevance
grounds. On appeal, this was alleged as error by the employer, but
the claimant argued that the referee was correct in concluding that
382. Monaci v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Ward Trucking), 116 Pa
Commw 172, 175, 541 A2d 60, 62 (1988).
383. Airco Speer Carbon v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 38 Pa Commw 274,
392 A2d 360 (1978).
384. Airco, 392 A2d 360.
385. Id at 362.
386. Commonwealth v Strickland Transp. Corp., 30 Pa Commw 463, 466, 373 A2d
1188, 1190 (1977).
387. Fidler v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (United Cable Corp.), 83 Pa
Commw 155, 163, 478 A2d 907, 911 (1984).
388. Monaci, 541 A2d at 62.
389. Philadelphia'Elec. Co. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Vona), 129 Pa
Commw 6, 564 A2d 548 (1989).
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the conviction was irrelevant.390 The court found no reversible er-
ror, but rather than deciding the propriety of the referee's ruling,
merely stated that the employer's fundamental rights had not been
violated by the ruling. 9' It is submitted that this approach is inap-
propriate, because such inquiry ignores the existence of the practi-
cal operation of the rules of evidence in workmen's compensation,
and because both referees and practitioners require guidance on
the admissibility of evidence in compensation cases. In short, if
referees are to rule on relevance objections, the correctness of those
rulings, When challenged on appeal, should be addressed.
6. Cases on Order of Proof, Objections at Trial, Witnesses and
Other Trial Matters
The conduct of a workmen's compensation hearing is, of course,
less formal than that of a jury trial, and, in this writer's experience,
also less formal than a bench trial. Still, in the interests of effi-
ciency, most hearings unfold in much the same way as do trials,
with the party bearing the burden of proof initiating the case with
the appropriate testimony or other evidence. Thereafter, the party
defending the case advances its proofs, and a period for rebuttal is
allowed.
Precisely how-this is managed is a matter of discretion with the
referee, and is rarely disturbed.-2 The new Referee's Rules also
govern this procedure.398 Again, however, the referee is specifically
empowered to apply the rules with flexibility.3 94
Although the proceedings are informal, practical experience and
an analysis of the appellate court cases indicate that the rules of
evidence are still applicable, and that failure to be aware of them
and utilize them at hearings or at depositions can be fatal to a
claim. The courts have also indicated that various evidentiary pro-
cedures and objections which are used at trial are appropriate in
compensation cases.
In this regard, for example, the commonwealth court has held
that a referee did not abuse his discretion in refusing to hear testi-
mony alleged to be irrelevant, after the objecting party has de-
manded an offer of proof which elicited the proposed contents of
390. Philadelphia, 564 A2d at 550.
391. Id at 550, n.4.
392. See for example, Kope v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Borg Warner
Corp.), 98 Pa Commw 341, 510 A2d 1294 (1986).
393. See 34 Pa Code § 131.1 et seq.
394. Id at § 131.3(a).
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the testimony.3 95 Of course, for an objection to be reviewable it
must be timely made.396 Like trial practice, however, objections
need not be continuously made in an inane fashion to the same
objectionable testimony. 97
As on cross-examination, questioning of an opponent is al-
lowed, 98 as in civil cases. 9e A compensation case holds, however,
that if the interrogating party calls for a hearsay response, such
party cannot complain of its admission. 00 Another indicates, at the
same time, that if claimant is unresponsive to a question and in-
stead testifies as to impermissible hearsay, a motion to strike is to
be entertained.0 1 In one case, an employer had failed to move to
strike such an answer and was deemed on appeal to have waived
such an objection. 02  "Argumentative questions," typically out-
lawed at common law,403 are likewise subject to objection in com-
pensation cases.' 4 Argumentative questions include "those ques-
tions which assume as true matters . . . which are not supported
by evidence, or which are in dispute.'4
0 5
The commonwealth court has also held that a party's failure to
call a witness whose testimony would presumably be essential for it
to prove or disprove a critical point, results in a permissible, "al-
beit not required," presumption that such individual's testimony
would be adverse to the non-calling party. 06 The court has also
395. Hartzell v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Bowen McLaughlin, York
Div.), 101 Pa Commw 137, 143, n.4, 515 A2d 1009, 1012, n.4 (1986).
396. See generally, Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v Continental Meat Co., 22
Pa Commw 37, 347 A2d 318 (1975). See also, Stander & Siegel, Pennsylvania Workers' at
131 (cited in note 71).
397. See Thomas v DeCommene, 133 Pa Super 489, 493, 3 A2d 41, 43 (1938).
398. See Mosley v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 155 Pa Super 598, 600, 39 A2d 161,
163 (1944).
399. See for example, Gaul v Consolidated Rail Corp., 383 Pa Super 250, 556 A2d 892
(1989), appeal denied, 524 Pa 621, 571 A2d 383 (1989).
400. Baker v Freed, 138 Pa Super 315, 319, 10 A2d 913, 915 (1939).
401. Lambing v Consolidated Coal Co., 161 Pa Super 346, 352-53, 54 A2d 291, 295
(1947).
402. Lambing, 54 A2d at 295.
403. See Pascone v Thomas Jefferson Univ., 357 Pa Super 524, 516 A2d 384 (1986).
404. See for example, Nicholas v Ohio Valley General Hosp., Suspension Petition No
211-30-3659 (hearing October 5, 1990) (Transcript at 17) (Parker, R., sustaining objection).
405. Packel & Poulin, Evidence § 611.3(b) (cited in note 58).
406. Holshue v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Robideau Express), 84 Pa
Commw 253, 257, 479 A2d 42, 44 (1984) (failure to call presumably critical witnesses). See
also, U.S. Steel Corp. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 10 Pa Commw 247, 250, 307
A2d 842, 843 (1973) (failure to call presumably helpful worker for proposition that alterca-
tion which led to injury of claimant was for reasons personal between worker and claimant);
Sorby v Three Rivers Motors, 178 Pa Super 187, 193, 114 A2d 347, 350 (1955) (noting that
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indicated that it is appropriate for a referee to sustain an objection
as to cumulative evidence, flatly holding at the same time that a
referee commits error if he sustains such an objection without de-
termining the basic contents of such allegedly cumulative
evidence.407
The practice of leading witnesses in compensation cases, particu-
larly claimants, is perhaps so common as to be the rule rather than
the exception. The practice is common, is usually tolerated and re-
sults in few appealable cases. Two compensation cases, however,
discuss the use of leading questions in the context of adducing
both lay and expert testimony.
The use of leading questions actually led to the reversal of a
referee's denial of benefits to a claimant in the unsatisfactory-and
nearly historical°80 -decision in Harbison v Workmen's Compen-
sation Appeal Board (Donelley).109 In that case, the deceased
worker had perished from a heart attack shortly after unloading a
load of telephone books from a truck. He had severe atherosclero-
sis, and his physician testified that the stress of work aggravated
that pre-existing condition to a fatal arrhythmia, causing death."10
The employer's physician, on the other had, testified that he did
not "think" that there was any direct relationship between work
and the arrhythmia, and also testified that "there is no direct rela-
tionship between the work and his heart attack . . . ." These re-
sponses were made, however, to leading questions which nearly
mirrored the answers exactly, and which were objected to on the
basis of their leading nature.' The referee ultimately disbelieved
the claimant's physician, and denied benefits.
The commonwealth court reversed. In the court's view, the testi-
mony of the employer's physician was not sufficiently unequivocal
(although it should not have been required, because the employer
did not have the burden of proof)," 2 and could not support the
presumption is "merely permissive, not conclusive").
407. Westinghouse Elec. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Pollock), 96 Pa
Commw 436, 442, 507 A2d 1287, 1289 (1986).
408. The authors of the leading Pennsylvania evidence treatise could only locate one
opinion which had ever reversed a lower court on the basis of a leading question. See Packel
& Poulin, Evidence § 611.3 at 468 (cited in note 58) (citing In re Rogan's Estate, 404 Pa
205, 171 A2d 177 (1961)).
409. 91 Pa Commw 169, 496 A2d 1306 (1985), appeal dismissed, 514 Pa 590, 526 A2d
746 (1987).
410. Harbison, 496 A2d at 1307.
411. Id at 1308.
412. See notes 455 to 461 and accompanying text.
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referee's finding. In addition, however, the court insisted that
[wihile it is true that the referee at these hearings has broad discretion as to
evidentiary questions, he cannot allow counsel to literally place the sought-
after "answers into the witnesses' mouths".'
18
Thus, objections to overly leading questions in compensation
cases may be well taken.
14
Evidence itself must be formally offered, 1 5 as at trial. Failure to
do so will result in a reversal, at least where such non-offered evi-
dence forms the basis for a critical finding of fact.416 This rule has
been applied so that a report which was merely attached to a depo-
sition, rather than having been formally offered, did not constitute
evidence, and could not be relied upon by a referee.'1 The rule has
not been so strict, however, as to require that records to which a
physician has referred, and which form the basis for a portion- of
his opinion, be necessarily offered into evidence.'1 3
As in civil proceedings, an attorney may make admissions which
bind his client. The commonwealth court has applied this rule
strictly and has never evidenced any liberality in ignoring admis-
sions. Of course, the. rule applies equally to both admissions by
claimant's"9 and employer's420 counsel.
7. Cases on the Use of Surveillance Evidence
The use of surveillance evidence is quite common in Pennsylva-
nia workmen's compensation practice. The principal use of surveil-
lance, especially films, is its potential impeachment value. Im-
peachment in this regard means, of course, bringing discredit upon
the claimant's truthfulness or honesty. In addition, the claimant's
knowledge of the existence of surveillance or other investigation
413. Harbison, 496 A2d at 1309.
414. See also, Sledge v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Temple Univ.), 78 Pa
Commw 380, 382, 467 A2d 913, 915 (1983) (referee did not commit error in sustaining em-
ployer's objections to leading questions posed to claimant's physician).
415. Johnson v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Jones & Laughlin Steel), 107
Pa Commw 164, 167, 527 A2d 638, 639-40 (1987) ("It is obviously a fundamental evidentiary
requirement that a document must be introduced into evidence before it may form the basis
for an adjudication.").
416. Johnson, 527 A2d at 639-40.
417. Id.
418. Bigler v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Bristol Twp.), 96 Pa Commw
642, 646, 508 A2d 635, 636-37 (1986).
419. Piper Aircraft Corp. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Bibey), 86 Pa
Commw 614, 618-19, 485 A2d 906, 908-09 (1985).
420. Sule v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Kraft, Inc.), 121 Pa Commw 242,
245, 550 A2d 847, 849 (1988).
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may also create leverage to settle or otherwise favorably resolve the
claim. Finally, because most workmen's compensation cases de-
volve into credibility battles, with the referee choosing the opinion
of one physician over that of another, surveillance film can be
viewed and then relied upon by a physician either to corroborate
his opinion that the claimant is fully recovered, or that he can,
indeed, perform some sort of restricted duty.
2 1
The commonwealth court has specifically held that "surveillance
films are admissible in workmen's compensation proceedings and
can'be used by the referee in assessing-the credibility of the claim-
ant and/or the claimant's evidence." 2 ' The court has also specifi-
cally ruled that presentation of films or tape to a physician to sup-
port or contradict his opinion is a legitimate use of surveillance
evidence.'23 In this latter connection, the court has held that a
physician who at first renders an opinion that claimant is disabled,
but then testifies that, after seeing the surveillance, he believes
claimant is recovered, does render a legally competent opinion.'
2 '
Importantly, the courts have repeatedly ruled that surveillance
alone is not sufficient to win either termination or modification of
a claimant's benefits. To terminate, there must be medical evi-
dence concurrent with the surveillance to support the proposition
that claimant is totally recovered. 25 To modify, there must be
medical evidence of partial recovery and vocational evidence of job
availability. 26 Of course, whether surveillance evidence is persua-
sive as to claimant's alleged recovery or reduced disability is totally
within the discretionary fact-finding power of the referee.' 27 Sur-
veillance or other investigatory evidence generated from so-called
421. See Bigler, 508 A2d at 637.
422. Kope v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Borg Warner Corp.), 98 Pa
Commw 341, 510 A2d 1294 (1986); Pennwalt, Stokes Div. v Workmen's Compensation Ap-
peal Bd., 44 Pa Commw 98, 403 A2d 186 (1979).
423. Hartzell v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Bowen McLaughlin, York
Div.), 101 Pa Commw 137, 515 A2d 1009 (1986).
424. Mertz v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 11 Pa Commw 541, 314 A2d 570
(1974).
425. DeBattiste v Anthony Laudadio & Son, 167 Pa Super 38, 74 A2d 784 (1950).
426. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 129 Pa
Commw 218, 565 A2d 204 (1989); John B. Kelly Co. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd., 8 Pa Commw 589, 303 A2d 255 (1973). See also, Sule v Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Board (Kraft, Inc.), 121 Pa Commw 242, 550 A2d 847 (1988) (employer met burden
and claimant's benefits suspended).
427. Panaci v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 66 Pa Commw 188, 443 A2d 881
(1982); Spectrum Arena v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 51 Pa Commw 381, 414
A2d 445 (1980). See also, John Curry, Inc. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Ad-
ams), 97 Pa Commw 127, 508 A2d 1317 (1986).
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"set-ups" or "ploys" is admissible. This is so notwithstanding the
facts that (a) the set-up was initiated after litigation had com-
menced; (b) the set-up involved representation to claimant that he
was participating in a criminal investigation; and (c) the claimant
alleged he could have been injured during the unfolding of the set-
up.
4 28
Of course, like all documentary evidence, surveillance evidence
should be properly identified and "authenticated" by the investi-
gator, just like any other trial evidentiary exhibit."29 It must, also,
become part of the record and not merely be brought in and shown
to the referee.'3 0 Finally, a referee commits error if he refuses to
admit into evidence surveillance evidence on the ground that
watching it is too time-consuming.'"' Asking for "still pictures"
from the video-tape is not a satisfactory way for a referee to avoid
admitting surveillance evidence. 3
A referee should not admit surveillance evidence when the inves-
tigator cannot testify for certain that the individual depicted is the
claimant.'33 The fact, however, that the claimant's face is not visi-
ble on the video is not a reason for excluding the evidence, as long
as the investigator testifies that the depicted person is, in fact, the
claimant.
434
Of course, to cast doubt upon the purported import of surveil-
lance evidence, claimant's counsel is free to cross-examine the in-
vestigator. The referee, however, as always, has the discretion to
limit the amount of such cross-examination. 35
8. Expert Testimony Issues-In Brief
The reported opinions produced with regard to expert testimony
in workmen's compensation practice are numerous. This is the case
428. Isadore v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Owens-Illinois), 77 Pa Commw
346, 465 A2d 1096 (1983).
429. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (McClane),
129 Pa Commw 218, 565 A2d 204 (1989).
430. Smith v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Donegal Indus., Inc.), 131 Pa
Commw 240, 569 A2d 1049 (1990).
431. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Pollock), 507
A2d 1287, 1289 (1986).
432. Westinghouse, 507 A2d at 1289, n.3.
433. William H. Rorer, Inc. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Staffieri), 110
Pa Commw 642, 532 A2d 1283 (1987).
434. Holshue v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Robideau Express), 84 Pa
Commw 253, 479 A2d 42 (1984).
435. Kope v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Borg Warner Corp.), 98 Pa
Commw 341, 344, 510 A2d 1294, 1296 (1986).
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because, as pointed out in precisely this context by noted compen-
sation attorney Peter J. Weber, "Practitioners in [workmen's com-
pensation] would not dispute that a major portion of their time
involves the preparation and presentation of medical testi-
mony."4 36 Such an investment of trial time has resulted in a correl-
ative number of fiercely litigated appeals on the issue.
While the large number of cases is thus explainable, the large
corpus of opinions is probably not justified from a conceptual point
of view. While the rules of evidence in compensation cases are ap-
proached differently than in trespass cases, the principal reason for
that distinction is that the evidence is being entertained by a spe-
cialized fact-finder, rather than a jury which may fail to give the
proper weight to various evidence. As we have seen, this distinction
has given rise to numerous appeals in which a resolution is made
as to whether an evidentiary rule or principle has been properly
applied in light of the pervasive admonition that the rules are to
be applied liberally.
With regard to the requisites and nuances of expert testimony,
however, the concern over the jury does not exist. There is thus no
conceptual reason why the rules surrounding the sufficiency of ex-
pert testimony, and the procedures utilized in adducing it, should
materially differ from negligence cases. This proposition is cer-
tainly borne out by the cases.
a. Requirement of Unequivocal Expert Opinion
With regard to the requirement that expert testimony be "une-
quivocal," for example, the earliest treatise writer confirms that
this was mandated before a competent opinion was rendered. "37 In-
deed, the notion that some sort of liberal rule was to apply in this
connection was addressed with some irritation by that writer,""
436. Peter J. Weber, Annual Survey of Significant Developments in the Law -
Workmen's Compensation, 55 Pa Bar Ass'n Q 148, 154 (1984).
437. Skinner, Pennsylvania Workmen's at 201-03 (cited in note 16).
438. Id at 201:
The informality of the hearings, the ignoring of the usual rulings governing the
presentation of evidence, the practice concerning leading questions (see Richkowsky
v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 276 Pa. 577), and liberality extended in cross-examination
have opened the door, where witnesses are allowed to testify to opinions, to an unlim-
ited field, with the result, among other things, that opinions have been expressed not
only as to existing and probable conditions and results, but to theorectical views as to
what might be. While the courts and administrative authorities have, very properly,
been most liberal in construing the Act, holding that claims thereunder need not be
made out with the same exactness of proof required in suits at law, however, it must
be understood that when in cases of this class, expert testimony is relied on to show
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who pointed out that the early supreme court cases in compensa-
tion insisted that expert opinion not be based on mere possibilities,
but that such opinion be rendered with the same certainty as
would obtain at trial.39
With some exceptions, this certainly was understood as the rule
until the filing of Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine v
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Lucas).440 In Philadelphia
College, the commonwealth court sustained an award of benefits,
notwithstanding the fact that the claimant's expert, in testifying
with regard to causation, merely testified that "it is possible" and
"it's conceivable," 1 terminology traditionally thought to be the
earmarks of an incompetent opinion.442 This opinion was thought
to be questionable by at least one contemporary writer, " 3 and
rightly so.
The Philadelphia College case has continued to be cited for its
more generic principles i.e., that the "testimony of the expert must
be considered as a whole" and that "complete certainty" is not re-
quired-but the danger that traditionally equivocal expressions
would become acceptable in compensation cases did not in fact be-
come manifest. Indeed, in 1985 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
issued what is still the leading opinion on the issue, and specifi-
cally relied upon a negligence case in declaring the expert burden
in compensation cases. In Lewis v Commonwealth,4 4 4 the court de-
clared as follows:
Where there is no obvious causal connection between an injury and the al-
leged cause, that connection must be established by unequivocal medical
testimony .... [T]he medical witness must testify, not that the injury or
condition might have or possibly came from the assigned cause, but that in
his professional opinion the result in question did come from the assigned
cause. . . . Medical evidence which is less than positive or which is based
the connection between an alleged cause and a certain result, it is not enough for the
doctors to say simply that the ailment in question might have resulted from the as-
signed cause, or that the one could have brought about the other; they must go fur-
ther and testify at least that, taking into consideration all the contending data, it is
their professional opinion that the result in question most probably came from the
cause alleged.
Id (citations omitted).
439. Id (citing Fink v Sheldon Axle & Spring Co., 270 Pa 476, 113 A 666 (1921); Mc-
Coy v Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 275 Pa 422, 119 A 484 (1923)).
440. 77 Pa Commw 202, 465 A2d 132 (1983).
441. Philadelphia College, 465 A2d at 135-36 (Blatt, J. dissenting).
442. See generally, Weber, 55 Pa Bar Ass'n Q at 154-55 (cited in note 436).
443. See Peter J. Weber, Annual Survey of Significant Developments in the Law -
Workmen's Compensation Law, 56 Pa Bar Ass'n Q 146, 154 (1985).
444. 508 Pa 360, 498 A2d 800 (1985).
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upon possibilities may not constitute legally competent evidence for the
purpose of establishing the causal relationship ...
In [analyzing an expert's testimony,] the medical witness's entire testimony
must be reviewed and taken as a whole and a final decision "should not rest
upon a few words taken out of the context of the entire testimony.
44
5
The supreme court applied the foregoing standard in the tradi-
tionally strict manner in the subsequent case of Cardyn v Work-
men's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Heppenstall),44 and the com-
monwealth court, in a thoughtful opinion by President Judge
Craig, applied it in Vital Signs Inst. v Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Bd. (Burke).447 There is no indication, in short, that the
Philadelphia College case has been applied to render formerly in-
competent testimony competent, or that the standard for compe-
tent expert testimony is any more "loose" in compensation cases
than it is in civil practice.
Appeals continue to be entertained in which the court under-
takes an analysis of the whole record in response to an allegation
that a physician's testimony has been equivocal. Some of these re-
sult in reversal.448 Other recent cases, on the other hand, have
445. Lewis, 498 A2d at 802-03 (quoting City of Wilkes-Barre v Workmen's Appeal
Board, 54 Pa Commw 230, 420 A2d 795 (1980)).
The commonwealth court's memorable language in the Philadelphia College case, in con-
trast, is as follows:
Certainly it is not the law, as it has been sometimes argued, that every utterance
which escapes the lips of a medical witness on a medical subject, must be certain,
positive, and without reservation, exception, or peradventure of a doubt. We repeat,
that as to facts which a claimant must prove by medical evidence, it is sufficient that
his medical expert, after providing a foundation, tesify that in his professional opin-
ion or that he believes or that he thinks the facts exist. The claimant has, in such
event, produced competent evidence of the facts which, if accepted by the factfinder
will support and award, even if the medical witness admits to uncertainty, reserva-
tion, doubt or lack of information with respect to medical and scientific details.
Philadelphia College, 465 A2d at 134-35.
446. 517 Pa 98, 534 A2d 1389 (1987).
447. 114 Pa Commw 191, 538 A2d 617 (1988).
448. See for example, Chestnut Hill Hosp. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(Van Den Bergh), 122 Pa Commw 338, 551 A2d 683 (1988). Another example is County of
Duphin v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Davis), - Pa Commw -, 582 A2d
434 (1990), where the Commonwealth Court affirmed the Board's reversal of a referee's ter-
mination of claimant's benefits. In that case, the employer's physician was found to have
proffered an equivocal opinion in saying that claimant had fully recovered but that he still
possessed a "functional overlay." Not every such admission by an employer's physician will,
however, result in a declaration that the opinion is equivocal. See Laird v Workmen's Com-
pensation Appeal Bd. (Curran & Argonaut Ins. Co.), - Pa Commw - , - A2d -
(1991); Williams v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Montgomery Ward), - Pa
Commw. -, 562 A2d 437 (1989).
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dealt with more novel twists on the expert testimony issue. In this
regard, a physician's testimony that his opinion had an "eighty
percent chance of being correct" was held to constitute an une-
quivocal opinion in the absence of any other equivocal expres-
sions." 9 In another case, a physician's opinion as to cause was
deemed equivocal and incompetent when he could only speak of
the "potential etiology" of the claimant's ailment.5 0 Another re-
cent case has indicated that, while an opinion which rests solely
upon the notion that there is "temporal proximity" between an ail-
ment and an alleged injury is incompetent,45 the mere use of those
words is not fatal, if the remainder of the testimony reveals an un-
equivocal opinion.4 52 This latter ruling is, of course, consistent with
the general rule that there are no "magic words"45' that render an
opinion competent or incompetent.'54
b. Burdened Party as Entity Required to Advance Unequivocal
Expert Opinion
A sometimes forgotten principle relative to unequivocal expert
testimony is that it is the burdened party, whether it be claimant
or employer, that must produce such evidence. This principle is
brought to the fore by appeals in which the burdened party has
not prevailed, and advances as reversible error the allegation that
the non-burdened party's expert has not produced an unequivocal
medical opinion.
It is submitted that such an allegation is ill-advanced. The lead-
ing Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court case in this regard is Rock-
wood Area School Dist. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(Tipton).'5 In that case, the claimant's deceased had expired at
his desk, at work, after suffering a heart attack. Claimant's expert
testified that the death was brought on by work stress. The em-
ployer's expert, on the other hand, denied in his testimony that it
449. Michaelson v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (R.R. Leminger & Son), 126
Pa Commw 542, 548-49, 560 A2d 306, 309 (1989).
450. Chestnut Hill Hosp. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Van Den Bergh),
122 Pa Commw 338, 343, 551 A2d 683, 685-86 (1988).
451. See Bisesi v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Tower Lines, Inc.), 61 Pa
Commw 260, 433 A2d 592 (1981).
452. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Gior-
dano), 116 Pa Commw 392, 399, 541 A2d 1171, 1175 (1988).
453. Bethlehem Mines Corp. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Plutch); 97 Pa
Commw 346, 350, 509 A2d 942, 943 (1986).
454. Bethlehem, 509 A2d at 943.
455. 98 Pa Commw 309, 511 A2d 263 (1986).
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was "professionally possible . . . to give an opinion as to the role
played by employment" in the fatal infarction, given the de-
ceased's pre-existing heart disease, and numerous other
ailments.4 56
The referee ultimately rejected the claimant's testimony and
credited that of the employer. On appeal, the testimony of the em-
ployer's expert was assailed as incompetent and insufficient to sup-
port the denial of benefits. The Appeal Board accepted this argu-
ment, but the commonwealth court reversed and upheld the denial
of benefits. As Judge Barry explained,
[C]ontrary to the Board's statement, the [opinion of the doctor testifying
for the employer], was not rendered incompetent because he did not give an
unequivocal opinion that the heart attack was not work related ...
[W]here, as here, there is no obvious causal relationship between work and
the injury or death, the burden is on the claimant to demonstrate the nexus
with unequivocal medical evidence.
6 7
This analysis, of course, is consistent with the well-settled rule that
the referee may choose to disbelieve even uncontradicted testi-
mony, including uncontradicted expert testimony. 58
Attention to these fundamental principles is warranted in light
of the existence of the anomalous and unsatisfactory decision in
Harbison v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Reuben H.
Donnelly)."9 In that case, which also involved a fatal heart attack,
the claimant's expert rendered an opinion that the deceased's
heart attack was brought on by the stress of work, notwithstanding
the fact that he had severe atherosclerosis and was at risk of a fatal
heart attack at any time. The employer's expert, on the other
hand, testified that he was "uncertain as to whether or not there
was a relationship;" that he "didn't think there was any direct re-
lationship;" and that he had "no way of establishing" a link be-
tween work and the fatal heart attack. 60
The referee concluded that the claimant had not met her burden
of proof and denied benefits. The commonwealth court, however,
reversed and awarded benefits. The court, in this regard, scruti-
456. Rockwood, 511 A2d at 265.
457. Id at 267 n.4. See also, McMahon v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (VW
of America), - Pa Commw -, 581 A2d 678 (1990), (afi'd per curiam).
458. Miller v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Pocono Hosp.), 114 Pa Commw
405, 410, 539 A2d 18, 21 (1988).
459. 91 Pa Commw 169, 496 A2d 1306 (1985), appeal dismissed, 514 Pa 590, 526 A2d
746 (1987).
460. Harbison, 496 A2d at 1308.
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nized the non-burdened party's evidence-as detailed above-and
concluded that it was "so equivocal that it cannot be considered
competent. ' 461 Continuing the analysis, the court examined the
testimony of the claimant's expert, found it to be competent and
concluded that an award of benefits must necessarily follow.
The foregoing case is, on occasion, advanced as authority that
the unburdened party must produce unequivocal medical testi-
mony to rebut the evidence of the burdened party. As suggested
above, this assertion finds no basis in the cases, and Harbison, as
an anomaly not supported in its own right by relevant case law,
cannot be considered as articulating a cognizable legal precept.
c. Hypotheticals and Objections
The authors of the leading treatise admonish that the "general
Pennsylvania evidentiary rules relating to ...form of hypotheti-
cal questions are equally applicable to workers' compensation." '462
This assertion is certainly supported by the cases.46
The corollary to this rule is that objections to such hypotheticals
must be lodged in a timely fashion, or they are to be considered
waived. In Castor v Ruffing, 4'" for example, the employer had
failed to lodge a specific objection to a hypothetical posed to the
claimant's physician, but then on appeal alleged the hypothetical
to be incomplete. In response, the superior court declared that the
"defendant had the duty to raise those questions at the hearing, at
which time the claimant would have had an opportunity to remedy
the hypothetical question if it was defective. Appellants cannot
now raise that objection.
' '4 65
The commonwealth court has traditionally demanded faithful-
ness with regard to objections to hypotheticals and has even cited
a common pleas court case in the context of setting forth the fol-
lowing rule:
A party objecting to the propriety of a hypothetical question must specifi-
461. Id at 1309.
462. Siegel & Stander, Pennsylvania Workers' at 133 (cited in note 71).
463. See Holy Family College v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Kycej), 84 Pa
Commw 109, 479 A2d 24 (1984). Compare Deitrich v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(Shamokin Cycle), - Pa Commw.., 584 A2d 372 (1990) (where omissions in hypo-
thetical were not so critical as to undermine opinion of expert, no error is committed by
referee in considering his opinion competent). See also, Hawkins v Workmen's Compensa-
tion Appeal Bd. (Medical College of Pa.), - Pa Commw , A2d - (1991).
464. 178 Pa Super 124, 112 A2d 412 (1955).
465. Castor, 112 A2d at 414 (emphasis in original).
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cally identify those elements being challenged so as to allow opposing coun-
sel an opportunity to correct the alleged defects. . . .The party must also
definitively state the particular grounds for the objection so as to preserve
those points for appellate review. . . Moreover, the rule is well settled that
where the grounds upon which an objection to evidence is based are specifi-
cally stated, all other reasons for exclusion are waived and may not be
raised on appeal.
4 66
An analysis of the cases demonstrates that, as is thecase with cer-
tainty in expert opinions, the precept that the rules of evidence in
compensation cases are to be liberally applied has not had'a signif-
icant impact in connection with the formation of hypotheticals and
objections made to such questions.
4617
III. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The starting point for all analysis of the rules of evidence under
the Act is, of course, the first paragraph of section 422. That provi-
sion, as repeatedly cited above, admonishes that the common law
and statutory rules of evidence are not to bind the referee in the
course of hearings, but that, at the same time, all findings of fact
are to be based on sufficient, competent evidence. " 8 This provision
has been part of the Act, in one form or another, since the time of
its enactment in 1915.469
One premature, and certainly inaccurate conclusion, to be drawn
from the provision is that the rules of evidence do not apply at all
in compensation cases, and that virtually any evidence may be
presented regardless of competency, relevance or quality. The no-
tion has at least some air of being plausible because, as the leading
writer on Pennsylvania compensation issues has correctly stated,
"the introduction of evidence on a quantum basis" in compensa-
tion cases is allowed, and hence, strictly speaking, incompetent evi-
dence such as hearsay is "not barred.
'470
The foregoing principle is not, in theory, subject to serious ques-
tion. Nevertheless, a review of the cases which have interpreted
section 422 and the other evidence-rule provisions of the Act dem-
466. Holy Family, 479 A2d at 28.
467. But see, Yantos v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 128 Pa Commw 231,
563 A2d 232 (1989) (Hypothetical itself need not be objected to, as long as cross-examina-
tion "attacks the assumptions made in the hypothetical .... If this were not the case, a
referee would be bound to accept as true assertions made within hypothetical questions no
matter how absurd or outrageous.").
468. See 77 Pa Stat § 834.
469. See notes 206 to 226 and accompanying text.




onstrates empirically that, whatever the theoretical analysis may
be, the rules of evidence do have application under the Act. In-
deed, as the commonwealth court has declared, while section 422
indicates that the referee is not to be bound by the rules, "this
statute has not been interpreted to mean that the rules of evidence
can be completely disregarded.
4 71
This latter declaration finds vindication in the cases. The com-
monwealth court, for example, with few exceptions, provides a
thoughtful analysis of the alleged error with regard to an evidence
question or ruling which has been advanced in support of an ap-
peal.47 No doubt should be entertained but that a critical, prejudi-
cial error on an evidence question may lead to a reversal of the
underlying decision. Likewise, experience before referees demon-
strates that evidentiary objections-the vast majority of which
never become subjects for appeal-are routinely ruled upon by
compensation referees. This practical reality leads the authors of
the leading treatise to warn that the "relaxed rules [of evidence]
are intended to assist claimants without counsel and should not be
relied upon by counsel." The critical examination of cases compris-
ing the first part of this article certainly bears out this
admonition.'"
If the proposition is thus well established that the rules of evi-
dence have significant application under the Act, and that practic-
ing counsel should take for granted that the usual evidentiary rig-
ors will apply, it is worthwhile to examine the further theoretical
and practical issues which are implicated by the operation of the
rules in this context. As will be seen, not all of the issues are well-
settled.
A. Principles and Theoretical Considerations
1. Principle of Liberal Application
A frequently encountered principle regarding the conduct of
compensation cases is that proofs are to be admitted with "liberal-
471. Sledge v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Temple Univ.), 78 Pa Commw
380, 382, 467 A2d 913, 915 (1983). See also, Webster by Webster for Lisa v Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd. (234, Inc.), 92 Pa Commw 412, 417, 499 A2d 1117, 1120 (1985);
Bigler v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Bristol Twp.), 96 Pa Commw 642, 646, 508
A2d 635, 637 (1986).
472. See for example, Webster, 467 A2d at 914-15.
473. As discussed later in this article, however, the first part of the sentence is proba-
bly not correct. See notes 523 to 528 and accompanying text.
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ity,"' 7' based upon the "policy allowing a liberal admission of evi-
dence. '4 75 This policy has been correctly identified by the com-
monwealth court as stemming directly from the first paragraph of
section 422.476 A number of cases demonstrate how this principle is
applied in actual practice.
In firmly establishing the rule that corroborative hearsay is ad-
missible in compensation cases, for example, the superior court uti-
lized the liberal admission policy, declaring the following:
While awards in workmen's compensation cases cannot rest wholly on hear-
say evidence . . . the Workmen's Compensation Law . . ., by its very na-
ture, contemplates liberality in the admission of proofs and the inferences
reasonably to be drawn therefrom . . . and where the facts are sufficiently
established by circumstantial evidence, hearsay testimony, not inconsistent
therewith, if relevant and material to the fact in issue ...may be consid-
ered for the additional light, if any, that it throws on the matter.1
7
The same language appears repeatedly in cases analyzing, on ap-
peal, the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to support awards
in death cases. 7 In at least one such case, indeed, it formed the
basis for the superior court to rule that the Appeal Board had too
strictly construed the hearsay rule in reversing a referee's award of
benefits. In that case, Giordano v Ralph J. Bianco, Inc.,"79 the de-
ceased had suffered a fatal heart attack a day after an alleged, non-
witnessed fall. The widow and her child had testified that the de-
ceased had returned home, roughly a half-hour after the fall, and
appeared with a gash on his face, a scrape on his arm, and looking
pale. According to these survivors, he stated that he had fallen off
a scaffold at work. On this testimony, a physician testified that the
fall aggravated the deceased's pre-existing heart condition to a fa,
tal heart attack.
80
The referee ruled that the statements were admissible under the
res gestae exception and awarded benefits. The Board concluded
that this was error, because the statements were made too long af-
474. Giordano v Ralph J. Bianco, Inc., 204 Pa Super 219, 224, 203 A2d 396, 398 (i964)
(referring to the "admonition of liberality in the admission of proofs").
475. Webster by Webster for Lisa v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (234, Inc.),
92 Pa Commw 412, 418, 499 A2d 1117, 1120 (1985).
476. Young v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (St. Agnes Hosp.), 39 Pa Commw
260, 267, 395 A2d 317, 318 (1978).
477. Nesbit v Vandervort & Curry, 128 Pa Super 58, 62, 193 A 393, 395 (1937) (em-
phasis added).
478. See for example, Jessie v Dash, 194 Pa Super 1, 8, 165 A2d 280, 284 (1960).
479. 204 Pa Super 219, 203 A2d 396 (1964).
480. Giordano, 203 A2d at 396-97.
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ter the alleged fall. On appeal, the superior court reversed and re-
manded, apparently for the Board to reinstate the referee's award
of benefits:
[T]he evidence of the accident was properly rejected as not being part of
the res gestae.
True, there is little corroborative evidence in this case, only the testimony
of the neighbor, the claimant and her daughter, that on the evening of the
alleged accident they saw the gash on the nose and the scratch on the arm.
There is no question that the statements would fall out of the exception to
the hearsay rule in the strict interpretation of the law of evidence in the
courts but in the informal atmosphere of the referee's hearings and in view
of the admonition of liberality in the admission of proofs in these cases we
are of the opinion that the statements of the claimant and her daughter'
should have been admitted.81
The Giordano case is a relative rarity-there are few other cases
which reveal an appellate court admonishing the Appeal Board (or
referee) that it has too strictly applied an evidentiary rule, and
then reversed, on the basis that the evidence rules are to be liber-
ally construed. A more typical scenario is for the court to utilize
this language to refute an appellant's argument that the referee
has admitted incompetent or other improper evidence, and hence
that reversible error has been committed.'"2
The principle has its limits. For example, the commonwealth
court has held that, because the principle stems from a statutory
provision originating in 1915, subsequent provisions of the Act spe-
cifically dealing with evidence are not to be effected by it, but are
to be construed in their strict sense.' 83 Likewise, a crucial eviden-
tiary default, such as failing to make an adequate offer of particu-
lar evidence into the record, will not be excused in the face of an
argument that a liberal view of evidence applies in compensation
cases.' 8' Finally, of course, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the
landmark case of McCauley v Imperial Woolen Co.'85 held that,
while the Act contemplates a "liberal investigation,"'' 8 hearsay evi-
dence alone will not support a finding of fact.'
The clearest and most important application of the liberal appli-
481. Id at 398 (emphasis added).
482. See for example, Bigler, 508 A2d at 637; Webster, 499 A2d at 1119-120.
483. Young, 395 A2d at 318.
484. Johnson v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Jones & Laughlin Steel), 107
Pa Commw i64, 166-67, n.2, 527 A2d 638, 639-40, n.2 (1987).
485. 261 Pa 312, 104 A 617 (1918).




cation rule-at least by implication-was certainly in Cody v
S.K.F. Industries.88 In that case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
utilized the principle to expand, in general, the statement-to-phy-
sician exception to the hearsay rule. As discussed above,489 tradi-
tionally that exception was limited to symptoms complained of by
the patient and details as to treatment. In Cody, a death case, the
court expanded the exception to permit statements as to the cause
for treatment.
The court supported its conclusion, in part, by declaring that
"[w]e believe this exception to the hearsay rule represents a more
flexible approach to the problem, and is more consonant with the
demands of justice and more adequately represents the policies of
the Workmen's Compensation Act.' 90 While the court chose not,
to delineate which policies it was referring to in this regard, it is
safe to assume that the informality principle and the knowledge
that a jury was not involved were relevant in the decision-making.
The importance of the principle of liberal admission, especially
in light of its use in Nesbit and Cody, is discussed further in the
succeeding section. 91
2. The "Exactness of Proof" Cases
Not unrelated to the liberal admission principle is the dictate,
found almost exclusively in older cases, that "in compensation
cases the same exactness of proof is not required as in suits at
common law.' 92 It is submitted that this phrase, which has been
virtually abandoned in the contemporary decisions, is not, in fact,
a principle of evidentiary consideration in compensation cases. In-
stead, an analysis of the cases demonstrates that it is an archaic
rubric employed by appellate courts in refuting arguments that
certain negligence rules should be employed in workmen's
compensation.
The language appears, for example, in cases upholding the hoary
rule that corroborative hearsay is admissible to support claims
-based in their competent aspect on circumstantial evidence. 93 This
is perhaps an appropriate use. It has likewise appeared in a case
where an employer had apparently taken a short-cut in adducing
488. 447 Pa 558, 291 A2d 772 (1972).
489. See notes 334 to 343 and accompanying text.
490. Cody, 291 A2d at 777.
491. See notes 506 to 528 and accompanying text.
492. Jessie v Dash, 194 Pa Super 1, 6, 165 A2d 280, 283 (1960).
493. Leber v Naftutin, 179 Pa Super 22, 26, 115 A2d 768, 770 (1955).
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the testimony of one physician.
In that case, Allen v Patterson-Emerson-Comstock, Inc.,94 the
employer's counsel was seeking to have a consulting physician cor-
roborate the favorable opinion of the treating physician. Rather
than ask the consultant to listen to a hypothetical and then render
an opinion, the physician simply listened to the testimony of the
treating physician, read "the compiled record,"'19 and rendered his
opinion. The claimant thereafter appealed the referee's decision to
deny death benefits. In reply to the claimant's allegation that the
employer had not abided by the rules of evidence came the tart
judicial response that "in workmen's compensation cases the same
exactness of proof is not required as is required in actions at
law. '496 Further, the claimant was not prejudiced, since the proce-
dure was for all intents and purposes the equivalent of having
heard a hypothetical question. Accordingly, no error was found.
The language has also been used, in Jessie v Dash,97 to describe
the purported reasoning of cases in which the superior court clari-
fied that a claimant in workmen's compensation could recover ben-
efits for all the consequences of his injury, and that the term
" 'natural and probable result' as used in compensation cases has a
meaning different from which it bears when used as a test of fore-
seeability in a negligence case." '498 This was probably an example of
sloppy opinion-writing, and definitely of inappropriate use-the
recoverability for a particular injury or its sequelae is less a matter
of exactness or inexactness of proof than it is a matter of substan-
tive law.
The point of this discussion is that the "exactness of proof" lan-
guage is perhaps best left abandoned, since its use is not terribly
helpful. The principle that corroborative hearsay is admissible can
stand on its own, for example, without the cryptic phraseology
concerning "exactness of proof" being further employed to muddy
the waters. As also seen above, its presence in the cases has also
led to inappropriate use.
3. The Burden of Proof-In Brief
Because the "exactness of proof' cases prove themselves to be
494. 186 Pa Super 498, 142 A2d 437 (1958).
495. Allen, 142 A2d at 439.
496. Id at 439.
497. 194 Pa Super 1, 165 A2d 280 (1960).
498. Jessie, 165 A2d at 283 (1960) (citing Gower v Mackes, 184 Pa Super 41, 132 A2d
880 (1957); Mahoney v Francis M. Roofing Co., 135 Pa Super 498, 5 A2d 812 (1939)).
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little more than archaic decisions espousing imprecise dicta, an in-
quiry is worthwhile into precisely what constitutes the burden of
proof in compensation cases. Such an inquiry would probably not
be of any interest if it was indeed true that exactness of proof did
not count for much.
The answer in this regard is not terribly complex. From the very
first decisions in the early part of the century, the Board, and then
the courts, have adopted the civil standard, declaring that the bur-
dened party is to demonstrate the elements of the case by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.499
The first appellate court case, Condron v Philadelphia & Read-
ing Coal & Iron Co.,500 has rather sad facts. The worker was a mine
boy, age seventeen, who went to work one day and was never seen
again. The claimant, the boy's mother, produced no evidence that
an accident occurred, nor was a body ever found. When time
passed and the worker was never heard of, a fatal claim was
pressed. While the facts were sympathetic, the compensation au-
thorities refused benefits, and the superior court agreed-the
claimant had simply failed to "show by the preponderance of evi-
dence that her son had met with an accident in the mine which
resulted in his death."
50 1
This has remained the general standard. For example, in the
premises case of Giallonardo v St. Joseph's College,0 2 the court
affirmed the denial of benefits and reaffirmed that a "[c]laimant
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence all
the elements necessary to support an award of compensation." 50 3
An analysis of the foregoing and other cases, as well as computer
research, reveals no support whatsoever for the claim, made in one
treatise, that the burden of proof, on the employer in seeking ter-
mination or suspension-and presumably modification-is greater
than that of the claimant seeking to establish an original claim.50 4
There is no express support in the Act for such a proposition, and
the case cited for the purported. rule,. Radez v Workmen's Com-
pensation Appeal Bd (Westmoreland Coal Co.), 505 under no con-
ceivable interpretation supports such a notion.
499. See Skinner, Pennsylvania Workmen's., at .770 (cited in note 16).
500. 78 Pa Super 133 (1921).
501. Condron,.78 Pa Super at 139.
502. 177 Pa Super 87, 111 A2d 178 (1955).
503. Giallonardo, 111 A2d at 180.
504. Barbieri, Workmen's Compensation §6.21(3) at 76 (cited in note 37).
505. 149 Pa Super 642, 27 A2d 698 (1942).
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In lieu of a special rule, accordingly, the preponderance standard
should control. Such special rules do, of course, exist, such as the
rule that violations of law-assertable as defense to payments on a
claim-be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence.50 6
4. Policy Underlying Liberalization and Flexibility in
Application of the Rules of Evidence
As well evidenced from the foregoing discussion, the principle
that the rules of evidence are to be applied with liberality and flex-
ibility in compensation cases is grounded both in section 422 of the
Act and in the cases that have construed that section. Indeed, the
principle is of such significant heritage at this point in time that it
is usually taken for granted by most seasoned practitioners.
However familiar the principle, the cases are few that have ar-
ticulated precisely why the rules are not to be binding and, in any
event, are to be liberally and relaxedly construed. There is, how-
ever, enough authority available that the legislative purpose in this
regard can be determined with certainty.
The founders of the Pennsylvania Act, like those of every work-
men's compensation law, had as one of their principal purposes the
elimination of jury trials and "litigation" in general for the resolu-
tion of claims by injured workers.0 Because such legal action was
thought to be time-consuming and detrimental to wageless em-
ployees, it was believed that administrative hearings, where "the
principles and rules of common law practice [were] not to ap-
ply,"508 would be more appropriate and more likely to promptly
resolve a dispute relative to a work injury. As the Board in an early
opinion declared, "One of the main purposes of the Workmen's
Compensation legislation is to afford an employee and his depen-
dents prompt, expeditious and immediate relief in case of injury or
506. See notes 92 to 97 and accompanying text. The burden on a claimant to reinstate
after termination has also been described as being greater than a mere preponderance of the
evidence. In such instances it is the claimant's burden to show by unequivocal, precise and
credible medical testimony that a disabling recurrence has transpired. Children's Hospital v
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Washington), 120 Pa Commw 1, 547 A2d 870
(1988); Tunstall v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (St Clair Memorial Hosp.), 107
Pa Commw 345, 528 A2d 719 (1987).
507. See for example, Skinner, Compensation Law at 10-11 (cited in note 15):
The purpose of the Act is to afford a workman a measure of protection against
injuries and relief in case of accident, which were denied under existing law; to
substitute a method of accident insurance in place of common law rights and
liabilities.
508. Id at 11.
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death caused by an accident to him in the course of his
employment."""9
With the elimination of jury trials and the desire that disputed
claims be quickly resolved came a coextensive desire that tradi-
tional common law rules of evidence be of diminished importance.
That desire followed logically from the fact that such rules were
created chiefly to "protect the jury" from exposure to incompetent,
irrelevant or otherwise defective evidence, to which, it was feared,
the jury would attach inappropriate weight in the course of its
fact-finding. These thoughts were articulately expressed in a 1916
opinion:
Our law of evidence is largely a product of the jury system. The purpose of
its exclusionary rules is to keep from the jury, not only all that is irrelevant,
but also much that, although relevant, is remote, or collateral, or nonproba-
tive, and, therefore, tends to mislead or confuse. . . . Yet we cannot over-
look the obvious fact that "the changing experience of mankind" may dic-
tate that these fundamental principles be modified and liberalized in their
application, when the hearing is before tribunals which adjudicate both on
law and fact, and not before a jury summoned temporarily from the vicinage
and untrained in the discriminating art of deciding causes on evidence. The
ascertainment of truth rather than the integrity of the rules being the
foremost consideration, we find that when the jury is absent the rules are
less strictly enforced; it being assumed that the court will not be easily
confused or misled by that which is irrelevant or inconclusive. 10
The foregoing philosophy, included in the influential New York
compensation case of Carroll v Knickerbocker Ice Co.,5 1' is one
and the same with that subsequently identified by the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court as controlling the liberalization of the evidence
rules in Pennsylvania administrative agency law. In advancing the
ultimately-unsuccessful argument that objected-to hearsay alone
should be admissible and sufficient to support findings in adminis-
trative decisions, the authoring justice in Unemployment Compen-
sation Board of Review v Ceja51 2 observed, in support of that argu-
ment, that
[i]t is axiomatic that the rules governing admission of proof in judicial tri-
als, which are designed to protect juries from unreliable and sometimes con-
fusing evidence, are less useful in the administrative context, and may often
be counter-productive. ...
509. DeCarlo v Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 7 Dept Reports 590, 594 (1920).
510. Carroll v Knickerbocker Ice. Co., 218 NY 435, 447-48, 113 NE 507, 511 (1916)
(Pound, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
511. Carroll, 113 NE at 511.
512. 493 Pa 588, 427 A2d 631 (1981).
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. . . [A]ny attempt to apply strictly the jury-trial rules of evidence to
an administrative tribunal acting without a jury is an historical anom-
aly, predestined to probable futility and failure. 1
One potential conclusion of the analyses of Carroll and Ceja-
i.e., that the rules of evidence should have diminished importance
in administrative proceedings-is that the rules should have no ap-
plication whatsoever in compensation or other such cases and that,
to the contrary, all seemingly trustworthy and minimally relevant
evidence should be admitted and have the potential to support
critical findings of fact. Such a position is, indeed, advanced by
Professor. Davis in his treatise, 14 and is, for all practical intents
and purposes, the rule under.the federal Administrative Procedure
Act.515 The controlling principle is, again, that the fact-finder is
sophisticated and can be trusted to ferret out that evidence which
is deserving of weight and that which should be disregarded. In-
deed, this is the principle taken to its ultimate extreme.
The principle of liberality does not, however, extend as far under
the Pennsylvania Act. As discussed in a similar context above,
hearsay objections, especially, are routinely sustained based upon
the principle that the right of cross-examination is a fundamental
right; thus, such objections substantially transcend the invocation
of some mere technicality.516 This is not only an admonition of the
cases, but is a familiar principle articulated throughout Pennsylva-
nia administrative law.517 That development is based in large part
on the fact that the right of cross-examination is guaranteed in the
Pennsylvania Administrative Agency. Law,51 8 as it was in the pred-
ecessor statute.51 9
In any event, the proposition should be well entrenched, and not
subject to serious dispute, that the' principal reason the evidence
513. Ceja, 427 A2d at 634 (quoting John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 46 at 31 (Little,
Brown, 3d ed 1940)).
514. K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§ 16.3-16.5 at 224-38 (2d ed 1989).
515. 5 USC §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976). See J. Stein, G. Mitchell & B. Mezines, 4 Ad-
ministrative Law § 2201 et seq (1989).
516. See notes 21 and 22 and accompanying text; notes 230 to 245 and accompanying
text.
517. See for example, Weder v Department of Educ., 27 Pa Commw 328, 332-33, 365
A2d 438, 440 (1976); A.P. Weaver & Sons v Sanitary Water Bd., 3 Pa Commw 499, 508, 24
A2d 515, 519 (1971); In re Bonser License, 46 D & C 2d 565, 566 (Montgomery County
1969); State Bd. of Private Business Schools v Thomasson, 66 Dauph 110, 127-28 (Common
Pleas 1954).
518. See 2 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 505 (Purdon Supp Pamphlet 1990) ("Reasonable ex-
amination and cross-examination shall be allowed.").
519. See Thomasson, 66 Dauph at 127.
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rules are treated with liberality in compensation cases is the simple
reality that the fact-finder is sophisticated and not subject to the
presumed frailties of laypeople culled from the "vicinage." Still,
the fact that the prejudice against hearsay is so equally well en-
trenched in Pennsylvania constitutional thinking, case law and
statute indicates that the principle of liberalization will never ar-
rive at its extreme without a significant rethinking and restructur-
ing of a broad range of the related legal precepts.
The second principle that drives the policy of liberality in the
admission of proofs bears on the nature of compensation referees,
who are not merely passive bureaucrats, but fact-finders who pos-
sess significant investigatory powers5a° Armed with such authority,
they are admonished to be impartial, yet to vigorously seek out the.
truth of the disputed matter. In so doing, of course, the common
law rules of evidence do not apply and, critically, evidence secured
through such investigation-and, of course, presented by the par-
ties-may under certain circumstances be admitted "for the addi-
tional light it sheds on the matter." 521
Because the foregoing are the reasons that the rules of evidence
should be applied with liberality, it should be abundantly clear
that the "rule of liberal construction," applied to the Act generally
520. See section 420 of the Act, 77 Pa Stat § 821 (Purdon Supp 1990).
521. Huff v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Ingalls Steel of Pa.), 70 Pa
Commw 646, 649, 453 A2d 753, 755 (1982). See Cody v S.K.F. Indus., 447 Pa 558, 571, n.5,
291 A2d 772, 778, n.5 (1972).
This policy for liberalization of the rules is detectable in one of the original Board deci-
sions. In that case a referee had admitted a significant amount of hearsay in a case where, in
the end, the circumstantial evidence alone could have supported an award of benefits. In
rejecting the employer's argument that such admission was, nonetheless, error, the Board
replied as follows:
[In our initial rulings and in those] of outside jurisdiction therein cited, we have
distinctly announced that hearsay testimony in itself and alone has no substantive
and probative force. This rule will not in any manner be departed from in the consid-
eration of this case.
The Referee in reaching his conclusions, resulting in the award made by him evi-
dently disregarded this rule and gave effect to the hearsay testimony in the evidence
in order to sustain the burden of proof which rested upon the claimant. True, the
Legislature in Section 428 of the Act, has invited and authorized the fullest hearing
and investigation of all facts and circumstances in any case, unfettered by the techni-
cal rules of evidence of the common or statute law with respect to the conduct of any
hearing. And this Board deems it the duty of a Referee and of the Board itself in all
hearings to admit hearsay testimony, not, however, to be considered as substantive
evidence, but only in so far as it shall suggest or lead to the discovery of facts which
can safely be taken as legitimate proof of the issues raised. In which case the possi-
ble ascertainment of the truth sought, will commend the wisdom of the liberal rule
authorized to be invoked by either the Referee of the Board.
McManus v Winter Garden Co., 2 Dept Reports 1980, 1983-84, 1 WCB 179, 182 (1916).
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as a rule of statutory construction, is a separate principle alto-
gether. That rule, in its complete formulation, directs that, because
the Act is "remedial" in nature, the law is to be "liberally con-
strued." '22 The law is so construed when a particular provision of
the law is ambiguous-if the law is capable of more than one
meaning, it will be so construed to favor the worker.5 23 The belief
in this regard is that the chief wrong to be remedied in creation of
compensation acts was, after all, the unsatisfactory system for in-
jured workers to make claims for their injuries. It thus makes sense
to read an ambiguous provision in favor of a claimant and allow
compensation, rather than read it narrowly and deny such benefits.
The distinction between this pervasive doctrine and the rule of
liberality in application of the evidence rules should be apparent.
The doctrine of liberal construction is a rule of statutory construc-
tion for ambiguous provisions. The. rule of liberality in application
of the evidence rules, on the other hand,: is a policy which stems
from the general nature of compensation proceedings as adminis-
trative in nature. While the former doctrine, for a rational reason,
favors the injured worker, the principle of liberality governs how
the rights of the parties in litigation are to be protected, and must
necessarily be deemed to apply to both injured worker and em-
ployer without distinction.
In short, the relaxing and liberalization of the evidence rules are
not devices which jre meant intrinsically to assist only injured
workers in pursuit of recovery on their claims. This being the case,
the accuracy of one particular judicial assertion, originally ad-
vanced by the court in Frey v Lehigh Engineering,52 must be re-
jected. In that case, a dispute arose between two employers with
regard to which of them employed 'the claimant's decedent at the
time of his admittedly work-related death. One of the employers
(National) sought to have the deceased's wife testify that the hus-
band had told her, the day before his death, that the "next day he
would begin to work" for the other employer (Lehigh). 25
This evidence was refused by the referee, who apparently sus-
tained hearsay objections raised by Lehigh.'2 National was then
522. See Pater v Super Steel Co., .63 Pa 244, 246, 106 A 202, 202 (1919). See also,
Visintin v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Hale Pump Co.), 127 Pa Commw 224,
n.5, 561 A2d 372, 375-76, n.5 (1989).
523. Visintin, 561 A2d 372.
524. 202 Pa Super 596, 199 A2d 287 (1964).
525. Frey, 199 A2d at 289-90.
526. Id. The tone of the opinion suggests.that an offer of proof was demanded with
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found liable. On appeal, National argued that the referee had com-
mitted error in keeping out the hearsay. This argument was found
unpersuasive by the superior court, which adopted the trial court's
opinion that no prejudice resulted because (1) precisely the same
statement came into evidence through statements of other wit-
nesses; and (2) because the testimony was not particularly trust-
worthy, as stating a conclusion, anyway. 527 The court thus affirmed
the award against National.
Along the way to these reasonable conclusions which supported
that affirmance, however, the court in rather angry dicta declared
that
[t]he relaxing of the rules of evidence is permitted in Workmen's Compen-
sation cases in the futile hope that unlearned claimants might proceed with-
out learned counsel. It was not intended to be employed in a contest be-
tween two insurance companies, each with able counsel.2 8
This declaration certainly sets forth a beneficial thought, but it
is, nevertheless, without any justification whatsoever. The role of
attorneys in compensation cases was certainly contemplated in
1915 when the Act was passed and the rule established as to the
relaxation of the rules of evidence.52 9 Further, there is no evidence
in the writings of the early treatise writers or cases that such a
policy underlay the relaxation of the rules. It is not without reason,
accordingly, that the Frey court provided no authority for its dicta.
Finally, as demonstrated above, the documented purpose of the re-
laxation of the rules relates to the strength of the fact-finder, not
the frailty of one of the litigants.
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the Frey case, however,
is the notion that the relaxation of rules applies only to claimants,
and that only such individuals, and not employers, can invoke the
principle in appropriate cases. As discussed in the next section,
such a notion is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
5. The Requirement of Equal Application
It ought to be inconceivable that anyone would advocate or ac-
quiesce in the notion that the rules of evidence in workmen's com-
regard to what the widow was going to testify to, and that upon objection to the proposed
testimony, the referee agreed and disallowed it. Id.
527. Id at 290.
528. Id.
529. See Schnader & Storey, Pennsylvania at 199-201 (cited in note 5).
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pensation are to be construed liberally and in a relaxed fashion
when the injured worker, represented or unrepresented, is to bene-
fit from this principle, but that the relaxed rules are not to inure to
the benefit of employers in the same proceedings. The Frey case
suggests such a rule in dicta, but its unholy declaration has appar-
ently been truly acted upon in only two cases, the vagaries of
which are so considerable that discussion of the same, though nec-
essary, will be relegated to the accompanying footnote. 30
To the extent that section 422 would be interpreted in such a
non-uniform and partial manner fashion, it would be unconstitu-
tional as violative of constitutional equal protection guarantees.
This was precisely the holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Rich Hill Coal Co. v Bashore,5s1 in which several evidentiary
provisions of the 1938 amendments to the Act were declared
unconstitutional.
Those amendments were intended, in large part, to pressure em-
ployers into accepting the provisions of the Act, which at that time
were elective. One of the offending provisions created a presump-
tion of negligence on the part of a non-electing employer, sued in
common pleas court. Such a presumption would arise in the event
that a plaintiff-worker had been discharged from his employment
530. See Commonwealth v Strickland Transp. Corp., 30 Pa Commw 463, 373 A2d
1188 (1977); City of Pittsburgh v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 12 Pa Commw
246, 315 A2d 901 (1974). In both cases, the courts invoke the Frey language but the ultimate
conclusions reached in the two cases probably could have been reached without the utiliza-
tion of the Frey dicta. In City of Pittsburgh, this was certainly the case. There, the referee
had permitted reports into evidence over hearsay objections from the employer. The com-
monwealth court held that this was reversible error, given the fundamental right of cross-
examination. Although the latter reasoning would have supported a reversal, the court also
invoked the Frey language to try to refute the claimant's argument that the rules of evi-
dence were not binding. Interestingly, the court applied the Frey dicta against the claimant,
insisting that the rules of evidence would apply since "this matter has been vigorously con-
ducted by able counsel for both claimant and employer." City of Pittsburgh, 315 A2d at 902
(emphasis added).
The Stickland Transp. case is gravely questionable. In that case, the worker's reinstate-
ment petition had been granted and the employer appealed, alleging that the referee had
committed reversible error in not admitting certain evidence. In reply, the court cited the
Frey dicta and indicated that the court would review the matter based upon the common
law of evidence:
[W]e may be somewhat guided by nonadminstrative caselaw since this appeal was
taken by the employer, who was fully and ably represented by counsel below.
Strickland Transp., 373 A2d at 1190. Having reviewed the issue based upon the common
law of evidence, the court determined that a trial judge would have ruled the proffered
evidence immaterial, and hence inadmissible. Accordingly, no error was found. As in City of
Pittsburgh, this would have been the appropriate ruling even without resort to the Frey
dicta, though the court does go through the motions of applying it.
531. 334 Pa 449, 7 A2d 302 (1939).
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with the employer within one year of his commencement of work
and the concurrent passing of his physical examination, and in the
event that the plaintiff-worker was thereafter unable to "secure
other employment within six months of the date of such discharge
by reason of the presence of an occupational disease in any stage
.... ,,2 This provision, challenged as unconstitutional, was found
to be violative of due process and equal protection guarantees and
was stricken, on the basis that it was "an attempt to make conjec-
tures serve as proof. It would be equally reasonable to declare by
statute that a criminal accusation is presumptive proof of guilt.
533
Another provision sought to codify a greatly expanded res gestae
rule. This portion of the amendment provided that, "when an em-
ployee sustains an injury in the course of his employment, declara-
tions, remarks and utterances made by the injured employee
within 12 hours after the injury was sustained shall be admissible
as competent evidence. 5 34 No distinction was made between state-
ments to a physician as opposed to statements to co-workers or
family members. This provision was likewise held unconstitutional.
After an extensive analysis, the court employed the same reasoning
as it did with regard to the illegal presumption amendment, re-
jecting the notion that the utterances made admissible should be
deemed to have probative value:
This is an extraordinary provision and nothing like it has ever before been
placed on the statute books of Pennsylvania..
[These] [e]x parte declarations ... have no probative value whatsoever, for
(1) they are not made under the safeguard of an oath, (2) they do not pos-
sess the spontaneity of res gestae declairations . (3) they are not made
under the solemnity of the consciousness of impending death, as are dying
declarations, and (4) they are not subject to the test of cross-examina-
tion. . . .Not even an act of legislation can give probative value to a state-
ment that has none. 3
While the provision was thus, violative of due process guarantees,
the fact that the provision was not to be equally applied also made
the provision unconstitutional:
Not only does the section in question attempt to clothe with the attribute
of probative value something which has none, but it possesses from the con-
stitutional point of view an even more -obviously fatal defect in that ...
532. Rich Hill, 7 A2d at 313.
533. Id at 315.
534. Id at 318.
535. Id at 318-19.
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even in actions for damages brought by "employees injured in the course of
their employment,' the benefit of this radical rule of evidence . . . is de-
nied to the defendant. There has never come to our attention any other
instance of a lawmaking body attempting to open the door of "loose hearsay
testimony" for the benefit of one party to litigation while keeping it closed
to the other. Because of the discriminatory character of this rule, if there
was no other reason, the section creating it is invalid.
53
6
The court, striking down the provision, concluded with the fol-
lowing analysis:
We recognize the right of the legislature to create or alter rules of evi-
dence. But this power is subject to [the limitation that] [i]f in fact the
legislature is attempting to regulate 'a rule of evidence, "its regulation
must be impartial and uniform".... "In judicial investigations the law of
the land requires an opportunity for a trial, and there can be no trial if only
one party is suffered to produce his proofs." The corollary of this is that
there "can be no trial" in the proper acceptation of that word, if one party
is permitted to introduce "hearsay testimony," and the opposing party is
not.
[This section] ...contravenes the principle that rules of evidence must
be uniform and impartial.
6 7
It is true that Rich Hill dealt with amendments to the Act gov-
erning rules of evidence in trials, and not in proceedings under the
Act per se.538 The uniformity and impartiality principle, however,
is as applicable to proceedings before the compensation authorities
as it is in any other context. This was certainly the view of the
early interpreters of the law, who recognized, as quoted earlier,
that "[t]he administration of compensation laws must be marked
by even handed justice. The same rules of evidence and principles
of law apply equally to the injured, the dependents, and the
employer."53 9
Less attention would have been provided by the author to the
issue of such procedural impartiality were it not for the noticeable
trend of courts to ignore this principle in the compensation cases.
The most familiar example -is the commonwealth court's rigid
enforcement of section 416 of the Act,54 0 which provides that if an
employer does not file its answer to an employee's claim petition
within fifteen days, every fact alleged will be deemed admitted.
536. Id at 319 (emphasis added).
537. Id at 319-20.
538. Id at 319.
539. Dodson v Haller, 1 WCB 149, 151 (1916).
540. 77 Pa Stat § 821 (Purdon Supp 1990).
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This provision is applied with such rigor " 1 that some referees have
interpreted the fifteen-day rule to be virtually jurisdictional, even
raising the period sua sponte,542 and precluding any evidence from
the employer whatsoever.
The rule with regard to a claimant's answer to an employer peti-
tion, on the other hand, is that one need not be filed at all and
that, in any event, a tardy answer will not result in evidentiary
admissions. This plainly should be the rule, because unrepresented
claimants, and even represented claimants, should not have their
right to benefits compromised because of mere procedural-eviden-
tiary defaults. Further, the rule is consistent with the settled prin-
ciple that proceedings in compensation are not controlled by com-
mon law dictates as to procedure.4 3  Yet, the court in its
interpretation of section 416 is willing to enforce a provision which
is at once hostile to the principle of informal procedures144 and
violative of the constitutional tenet that evidentiary rules, in this
case admissions, are to be applied impartially. Under current doc-
trine, claimants, represented or unrepresented, are free to flout the
filing procedures provided for in the Act, and admit nothing. Em-
ployers, however, represented or unrepresented, admit everything
and suffer a virtual default judgment for failing to file a timely
answer. A more obvious equal protection violation is difficult to
imagine.
The enforcement of section 416, an unconstitutional provision,
may be rationalized with some credibility by the explanation that
the court is simply construing the plain language of that section.
No such reasoning, however, is available with regard to the other
example of recent court action which applies one rule for a claim-
ant and the other to an employer. In that case, Boehm v Work-
men's Compensation Appeal Bd. (United Parcel Service),4 5 the
541. See Hildebrand v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Fire Dept. City of
Reading), 111 Pa Commw 24, 532 A2d 1287 (1987). See also, Straub v Workmen's Compen-
sation Appeal Bd. (City of Erie), 114 Pa Commw 224, 538 A2d 965 (1988).
542. This is plainly inappropriate. There is no evidence in any authority that the fif-
teen-day period is jurisdictional. Only the appeal provisions of the Act have been identified
as true jurisdictional limitations. See Torrey, 24 Duquesne L Rev at 1009-011 (cited in note
56).
543. See for example, Lako v Schlessinger, 208 Pa Super 85, 220 A2d 665 (1966).
544. Indeed, the rule regarding failure to file a timely answer in Pennsylvania work-
men's compensation practice is stricter that in civil practice. In civil practice failure to file a
timely answer could, and in fact does, result in a default judgment, but this will only be
entered after notice is provided Further, the judgment may be opened. For the workmen's
compensation rule to be stricter that the civil rule is, of course, irrational.
545. 133 Pa Commw 455, 576 A2d 1163 (1990).
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court reviewed a case where a referee had granted termination of
benefits notwithstanding the fact that the employer, on the record,
only requested suspension. On appeal, the employer pointed out
that the principle was well established that a referee had the power
to grant whatever relief was merited from the evidence, regardless
of the form of petition filed. 5"' This rule, which indeed exists, re-
sults from the hoary principle that the rules of procedure are re-
laxed in compensation cases.
The shocking reply, however, was that this principle only inures
to the benefit of claimant, presumably even a represented claim-
ant: "The decisions of this Court have consistently held that, 'the
form of a petition filed is not controlling where the facts warrant
relief for a claimant,' ,'I" and not when the facts warrant relief for
an employer. A reversal followed.
The foregoing declaration plainly establishes a procedural di-
chotomy which is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The impact of the case may be limited,
however, because the case also ignored precedent to the con-
trary.548 The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Fehr v YMCA,
Pottsville,5" had in this regard specifically held that "[i]f a claim-
ant is entitled to relief under any section of the statute his petition
will be considered as filed under that section. . . . The same rule
would apply to the employer."50 The influence of Boehm may also
be limited by the fact that, within a week of its having been
handed down, the liberal pleading rule was applied in favor of an
employer,51 notwithstanding the partial and non-uniform anomaly
announced in Boehm.
These recent developments threaten the historically authentic
and precedentially mandated principle that the rules of evidence
546. Boehm, 576 A2d at 1165.
547. Id.
548. See also, L. Moyer & D. Torrey, eds, "Gremlins II - Will the New Batch Strike
Workmen's Compensation Pleading Practice?", Pa Workmen's Compensation Newsletter 5
(June 1990).
It is worthy to note that the Boehm court also reversed on legitimate grounds. Because
the employer had only sought suspension, and so indicated on the record, the claimant al-
legedly did not seek to introduce any rebuttal evidence addressed to termination. Claimant
was thus correctly determined to have been prejudiced by the referee's order of termination.
See Boehm, 576 A2d at 1165-66. Accordingly, a reasonable argument can be made that the
unfortunate language of Boehm was obiter dicta.
549. 201 Pa Super 107, 192 A2d 143 (1963).
550. Fehr, 192 A2d at 147.
551. Peeples v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Foster Wheeler Energy Corp
& Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.), 133 Pa Commw 559, 576 A2d 1190 (1990).
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in workmen's compensation are to be applied in an equal, impar-
tial and uniform manner. The decay seems to be reflective of a
judicial gloss, which has only recently become attached to work-
men's compensation, which acquiesces in the superficial notion
that the Act is so worker-oriented and liberally-construed that vir-
tually any "anti-employer" construction is legitimate. The gloss
most likely stems from the well-grounded principle of "liberal con-
struction," carried to the extreme of unreasonably and unfairly
favoring injured workers in terms of the evidentiary and proce-
dural aspects of litigating disputed claims. This notion is inappro-
priate because, while the Act is worker-oriented, the proceedings
ultimately commenced under the law are quasi-judicial and adver-
sarial in nature, and equal protection demands that the evidentiary
and procedural rules which protect and/or vindicate the rights of
worker and employer in these proceedings be applied with imparti-
ality and uniformity.
B. Treatment by the Commonwealth Court of Evidentiary Is-
sues
Professor Larson insists that the real issue surrounding evidence,
in workmen's compensation is not so much admissibility of evi-
dence, but its sufficiency to support an award or denial. 2 His the-
sis in this regard is driven by the reality that in most workmen's
compensation laws, including those of Pennsylvania, there exists
no restriction on the "introduction of evidence on a quantum ba-
sis," '' as Referee Stander would phrase it, yet there is still the
requirement that final decisions be based on some degree of suffi-
cient evidence-in Pennsylvania, upon "sufficient, competent evi-
dence." Accordingly, the subject of most appellate opinions on evi-
dentiary questions is not so much the technical propriety or
exactness of particular rulings, but on the ultimate issue of
whether the evidence which was admitted justifies the ultimate
award, or whether the exclusion of admissible evidence was so
egregious that reversible error was committed. 54
An analysis of the manner in which the Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court reviews evidence questions under the Act does not
552. Larson, 2B Workmen's Compensation §79.10 at 15-37 (cited in note 17) ("[W]e
are here dealing with an issue, not of conduct of a trial or hearing, but of review.").
553. Stander, Guide at 108 (cited in note 280).
554. See Larson, 2B Workmen's Compensation §79.10 at 15-37, 15-39 (cited in note
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particularly contradict Larson's thesis. Still, because in practice
workmen's compensation referees are constantly ruling on eviden-
tiary objections, the propriety or impropriety of such rulings is
often an issue on appeal and is directly addressed by the court.
The typical approach of the commonwealth court when faced
with an evidentiary issue under the Act is to first make reference
to the statutory provision that the referee is not bound by the
common law rules of evidence, but that all findings are to be sup-
ported by competent evidence.55' The court likewise reminds itself
that the rules are, in any event, to be employed in a flexible man-
ner, but that complete disregard for the rules is normally not toler-
ated. 56 Armed with these principles, the court undertakes an anal-
ysis of whether the evidentiary ruling constitutes reversible error
as alleged.5
As part of this workmanlike analysis, the court properly under-
takes a consideration of whether the alleged error was in fact
harmless-or, stated another way, whether the complaining party
was in fact prejudiced.5 58 Just as in appeals from jury. trial verdicts,
if an evidentiary error is apparent-even under a system of relaxed
and liberalized rules-reversible error will not be found in cases
where the error caused no prejudice.
5 59
Anomalies in the analytical pattern, the examples of which are
to be avoided, exist. In Commonwealth v Strickland Transp.
Co., 5 0 the commonwealth court announced that, because the liber-
alized rules of evidence were intended to benefit unrepresented
claimants, it would analyze the merits of the employer's ap-
peal-which was based on allegedly erroneous evidence rul-
ings-on the basis of the common law rules. The reasoning of the
case seems to be that because the complaining party was the em-
ployer, who was represented before-the referee, the principle of lib-
erality and flexibility had no application, and the rules would ap-
ply as if the employer was appealing from a jury trial verdict. The
court then consulted evidentiary: cases decided at common law and
555. Bigler v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Bristol Twp.), 96 Pa Commw
642, 645-46, 508 A2d 635, 636-37 (1986).
556. See for example, Webster by "Webster for Lisa v Workmen's Compensation Ap-
peal Bd. (234, Inc.), 92 Pa Commw 412, 417, 499 A2d 1117, 1120 (1985).
557. Bigler, 508 A2d at 637.
558. Id. See also for example, Hill v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 59 Pa
Commw 219, 429 A2d 771 (1981); Stankowski v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 29
Pa Commw 433, 371 A2d 542 (1977). See also, Bigler, 508 A2d at 637.
559. See Hill, 429 A2d at 774.
560. 30 Pa Commw 463, 373 A2d 1188 (1977).
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held that no error had been committed by the referee. " "
The approach in the foregoing case is, of course, fraught with
serious error. As discussed above, the relaxing of the rules was not
intended to aid unrepresented claimants," 2 and application of
strict rules to the employer while dispensing with them in terms of
claimant is violative of equal protection guarantees. 56 3 It is submit-
ted, accordingly, that Strickland Transp. 'deserves the precedential
death which, research demonstrates, it has in fact already suffered.
Equally unsatisfactory is the more recent case of Philadelphia
Elec. Co. v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Vona), 56" in
which the court bypassed its usually thoughtful and workmanlike
analysis altogether in favor of an unacceptably abbreviated test. In
that case, the claimant had filed a reinstatement petition, but dur-
ing the course of hearings had been accused and convicted of crim-
inal conduct, apparently drug dealing. 65 The illicit behavior like-
wise took place during the course of hearings.
In order to demonstrate earned income, and for impeachment
purposes, the employer sought to introduce evidence of claimant's
conviction 66 The referee, however, refused to admit the evidence
and ordered claimant's benefits reinstated. On appeal, the em-
ployer alleged that this was error. The entire panoply of predict-
able issues and related principles was raised and discussed by the
parties, with the employer arguing the relevance of the evidence
and the claimant responding that the evidence was irrelevant, or
otherwise not admissible, under the traditionally employed com-
mon law evidence rules pertinent to criminal convictions. The
claimant also alleged that the referee was not obliged to consider
the conviction, in any event, because he was not bound by the
rules of evidence.
The court, in resolving the matter, approached the issues by sim-
ply declaring that no error had been committed by the referee,
since that individual is the fact-finder and is to resolve credibility
conflicts.5 67 Of course, such a response is an illogical non-sequitur
and was not responsive to the issues raised in the appeal. The rea-
soning of the opinion may, however, presumably be culled from a
561. Strickland Transp., 373 A2d at 1190.
562. See notes 506 to 528 and accompanying text.
563. See notes 529 to 549 and accompanying text.
564. 129 Pa Commw 6, 564 A2d 548 (1989).
565. Philadelphia Elec., 564 A2d at 549.




footnote in which the reader learns that no error was committed
because the employer's fundamental rights had not been violated
in the referee's ruling:
We have found that just because a relaxation of the rules of evidence is
statutorily permitted, compensation authorities may not circumscribe fun-
damental rights.. . . The Court does not find that any fundamental rights
have been violated in this case by the referee's refusal to admit documenta-
tion pertaining to claimant's criminal conviction."s
The cursory analysis which was employed in the foregoing case is
inappropriate because it failed to analyze the appealed issues on
the evidentiary base-relevance-which the employer had ad-
vanced. That basic evidentiary concept has, obviously, been recog-
nized as applicable in compensation cases, and a referee's refusal
to admit allegedly relevant evidence could possibly constitute
grounds for a remand. To dispose of such an appeal on a "funda-
mental rights" analysis is simply a default in legal review, and cer-
tainly a departure from the typical analysis devoted to evidentiary
issues.
It is submitted, accordingly, that the Philadelphia Electric case
should not become a model for analysis of evidentiary cases on ap-
peal. If workmen's compensation referees are to make rulings on
evidence, which they can and should be doing, then guidance from
the appellate courts should be forthcoming on specific issues. Re-
sort to a fundamental rights analysis is neither theoretically sound
nor practically helpful.
IV. CONCLUSION
Numerous theses have been set forth in the foregoing pages with
regard to the operation of the rules of evidence in workmen's com-
pensation practice. Those propositions, which bear on both the
practical application of the rules and the theoretical considerations
which surround them, will not be repeated at this juncture, but a
number of critical points merit summarization.
A significant portion of this article has addressed cases which
have been generated out of day-to-day rulings by referees on evi-
dentiary objections made by counsel in the course of hearings. The
historical record created by these cases, coupled with practical ex-
perience in practice before Pennsylvania workmen's compensation
referees, leave no doubt but that the rules of evidence do indeed
568. See notes 227 to 283 and accompanying text.
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have a prominent role in the course of well-run workmen's com-
pensation hearings.
This practical reality is at odds with the underlying statutory
and case law notion,, established at the very inception of the Act,
that evidence may be admitted "on a quantum bases" in the
course of hearings-notwithstanding its. status as incompetent-as
long as the ultimate decision is supported by a residuum of some
competent evidence.569
This dichotomy between actual practice and theory is the result,
chiefly, of the need for efficiency in the administration of compen-
sation hearings. Without some application of the rules of evidence,
and hence the control of the quantum of evidence being submitted,
compensation referees would simply be overwhelmed and unable
effectively to handle the significant caseloads that are becoming
ever more burdensome. Efficiency requires, for example, that in-
competent proofs, such as a worker's hearsay-recounting of all de-
tails of what a physician has allegedly said, are to be excluded.
This is so, notwithstanding the fact that such testimony is usually
innocuous to a sophisticated fact-finder who will always want ex-
pert verification of such crucial medical matters. Similarly, because
referees know that for an award to survive review the findings
must be based upon competent evidence, it makes no sense to clut-
ter the record with incompetent proofs when time must also be
devoted to the adducing of such competent proofs. Objections to
incompetent and irrelevant statements and documentary evidence
are thus routinely sustained.
Nevertheless, it is true that, pursuant to the sophisticated fact-
finder doctrine, reversible error will probably not follow in the
event a referee permits the wholesale admission of incompetent
and irrelevant proofs-ignoring the efficiency concern-as long as
the ultimate decision rests upon sufficient competent evidence. Ac-
cordingly, the rule that all proffered evidence may be considered is
not a mere theory, but would probably prevail under the appropri-
ate circumstances if such a hypothetical situation was presented to
the appellate courts.
From this reality, one might reach the conclusion that there re-
ally are no hard and fast rules of evidence in compensation prac-
tice after all. This inference, however, would not be justified for a
number of reasons. First, experience dictates that in practice
before the fact-finder, compensation referees rule on evidence
569. Siegel & Stander, Pennsylvania Workers' at 128 (cited in note 71).
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questions on a routine basis. Accordingly, to effectively practice
before referees, one must have knowledge of the rules, and how
they are applied, whatever the court may say on a hypothetical
appeal. As the writers of the leading treatise admonish, "the re-
laxed rules . . . should not be relied upon by counsel.
570
Second, however an appellate court may rule in the hypothetical
case, it is nevertheless true that the better commonwealth court
decisions do undertake a rigorous analysis of the propriety or im-
propriety of the manner in which the referee has ruled on an evi-
dence objection. As can plainly be detected from the foregoing sec-
tions of this article, reversible error may be found in the admission
of incompetent proofs.
Ultimately this is some degree of dichotomy between the treat-
ment of the rules of evidence in practice and in theory. It has cer-
tainly been the thesis of this article, however, that the normal rule
of practice-that the rules of evidence are. t6 be presumptively ap-
plied, in a relaxed, flexible and liberal manner-is the preferred
approach. That all proofs may be admitted on a quantum basis
does not, and should not, compel the conclusion that such a notion
should be put into practice.
Plainly, then, there is a discernible body of law which may be
characterized as constituting the law of evidence under the Penn-
sylvania Workmen's Compensation. Act. In this regard, the pre-
sumptive application of common law and general statutory rules,
which is demonstrated repeatedly in the cases, is tempered by the
doctrine of liberal application. That doctrine has resulted in exten-
sions of certain hearsay exceptions, and has been marked by the
appellate courts undertaking a careful analysis of whether "trust-
worthiness ' 571 -and "reliability '572 attach to the evidence which is
now to be considered competent. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to
posit that these two concepts, having been recognized by the courts
in compensations cases, are basic guidelines to be applied in af-
fording a liberal application to the evidence rules.
A crucial principle relevant to such liberal application is not dis-
cussed at length in the contemporary cases, but has a rich heritage
in the early and middle portion of this century. That principle de-
mands that the rules of evidence, applied in a relaxed, liberal and
flexible manner, are to be so construed regardless of the party in-
570. Siegel & Stander, Pennsylvania Workers' at 128 (cited in note 71).
571. Cody v S.K.F. Indus., 447 Pa 558, 567, 291 A2d 772, 776 (1972).
572. Webster by Webster for Lisa v Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (234, Inc.),
92 Pa Commw 412, 418, 499 A2d 1117, 1120 (1985).
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volved, the employer or claimant. 73 Disputed workmen's compen-
sation proceedings constitute adversary proceedings and are the di-
rect replacement for what was once settled in a jury trial. As
demonstrated earlier in this article, historical intent, Pennsylvania
Supreme Court precedent and contemporary notions of equal pro-
tection demand that the rules be applied with equality between
the parties. To apply the rules liberally to benefit only one side is
non-historical and unconstitutional.
While some cases have overlooked these crucial precepts, in con-
temporary proceedings the parties almost invariably receive equal
treatment in terms of evidentiary rulings. To the extent that this
article might assist in ensuring that this satisfactory state of affairs
continues, it will have met one of its purposes.
573. See notes 529 to 549 and accompanying text.
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